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The last decades of the 19th century were a convulse period in France, when social, 
political and economic tensions increased and where in many cases fuelled by the role 
and interests of the rising mass media. The defeat against Germany in 1870, and the 
dramatic events of the Paris Commune created a negative atmosphere among French 
society. The young 3rd Republic faced numerous challenges, and a new generation of 
politicians put all their efforts to recover the country in a short period of time. An 
ambitious program of modernisation was implemented, and by the mid-1880s France had 
become in one of the most advanced nations of the world.  
Soon, the generation of republicans who inherited a devastated country, started to 
generate strong links of friendship and collaboration. As soon as France stabilised its 
situation and the new republican government expressed its support to a liberal regime, it 
rapidly spread towards the business world,. My inspiration to study this period comes 
from the work of Jean Garrigues (1997), who developed an accurate and detailed analysis 
of the economic relations of the most important French personalities at that time. For a 
politician, at least until the Panama Scandal, participating in business activities was not 
only normal, but was seen as a matter of reputation and honour. I found very interesting 
how they created a whole socioeconomic structure from these relations, which liberal 
character would become in the main pillar supporting the regime. Politicians were active 
agents at the Paris Stock Market, being part of numerous boards of administration. In 
exchange, they could have facilitated the economic activities of some firms. However, as 
soon as the first scandals of corruption started to damage the reputation of these 
politicians, the conservative opposition saw on it a good opportunity to destabilise the 
Republic and promote a change in the regime. We see episodes of far-right populism, 
xenophobia and even fake news, a term nowadays playing an important role in the 
elections, polls, social preferences, etc. We have seen that during the election of Donald 
Trump, and we see this every day when a wide set of contradictory information comes to 
our hands. 
First, in Chapter 1, we provide a historical approach to the socio-political context 
of late 19th century France. We study how the sudden fall of the French 2nd Empire led to 
drastic political changes in the subsequent decades, which radically transformed the 
country. This section is aimed to understand these changes and the progressive mistakes 
committed by French political class gave rise -indirectly- to an extreme social 
polarisation. 
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The importance of political connections of firms has been an issue extensively 
analysed by the literature in more recent times. After Fisman (2001) seminal paper on the 
value of political connections to the Suharto regime in Indonesia, several studies focused 
on developing economies, where institutions are weaker and corruption widespread. By 
instance, in a sample of 47 developing countries, Faccio (2007) find that companies with 
political connections pay lower taxes and have preferential access to credit market and 
public contracts. In the case of China, Li et al. (2008) find that firms connected to the 
Communist Party enjoy larger benefits, easier access to credit, and more legal flexibility. 
Goldman et al. (2009) find that after the 2000 presidential election in the United States, 
companies connected to the Republican Party obtained higher cumulative abnormal 
returns than firms linked with Democrats. Coulomb & Sangnier (2014) find strong value-
effects derived from Sarkozy’s victory in 2007, for the firms linked to Nicolas Sarkozy.  
In recent years, the subject has attracted a growing interest also from economic 
historians. In the case of Germany, Ferguson and Voth (2008) find a strong correlation 
between German firms’ positive returns and political connections with the Nazi party 
after the elections of 1933. However, Lehman-Hasemeyer and Opitz (2017) find little 
evidence of a positive impact of political connections on firm performance after the 
general elections of 1924 and 1928 during the Weimar Republic. In turn, Lehman-
Hasemeyer et al. (2014) show that investors reacted negatively to the democratization of 
Saxony’s electoral rules in 1896 and 1909 (which increased the political influence of 
Social-Democrats in the regional government), which affected negatively Saxon firms 
listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange. In the case of UK, Braggion and Moore (2013), 
focusing on variations in stock returns in the London Stock Exchange after legislative 
elections in the late nineteenth century, find a positive and significant effect for 
companies with elected MPs on their boards. On the other hand, Grossman and Imai 
(2016) find little (or negative) impact of political connections on profitability of British 
banks from 1879 to 1909. Finally, in the case of Japan, Okazaki and Sawada (2017) find 
that political connections contributed to improve firms’ performance in non-regulated 
sectors but had no effect on firms operating in regulated sectors (where the majority of 
politically connected firms were located).  
In this sense, late 19th century France was not an exception and firms also had the 
incentives to use the political influence of their board members in their own benefit. 
Chapter 2 will test empirically the relationship between political connections and firms’ 
value. I use causal methodology on Event-Studies to show their importance during 
17 
 
periods of political turmoil. Particularly, it studies the populist Boulangist movement, 
which challenged the stability of the young 3rd Republic. The work shows, in a first stage, 
that politically connected firms captured more investors’ attention, and their assets were 
traded more frequently. In addition, we observe that French investors clearly 
discriminated between firms linked to republican parties -in government-, to 
conservatives -in opposition- or  with no political connectedness. After the events of 27 
January 1889, when Boulanger decided not to stage a Coup d’état, firms with a republican 
board experienced significant positive changes in their returns. This result suggests that 
investors may have considered that the republican regime strengthened after a long-run 
destabilising campaign. They thus rewarded those companies/assets connected with the 
parties in government. 
As in the case of the study of political connections of firms, the role of mass media 
has received especial attention in recent times. Fake news has become a hot-topic issue 
worldwide since the 2016 presidential campaign in the US which resulted in the election 
of Donald J. Trump as president. However, the idea of false information being presented 
as accurate either in journals, periodicals, television or any other mass media is not new. 
Bignon & Flandreau (2011) describe how journal editors and journalists in the early XX 
century used the threat of badmouthing to extract rents or benefits from different targets. 
Regarding the incorporation of information in stock prices, Ferguson et al. (2015) study 
the influence of tone and volume in UK newspapers and their influence in stock returns 
and find a strong effect of media content in firm’s value, for positive and negative news 
in 1981-2010. This finding is important since it links innovations in information with 
investor decision making. Regarding the role the media plays on corporate decision-
making, the seminal work of Dyck and Zingales (2002), analysed the influence of media 
in some decisions taken by firms’ managers, likely to affect the public image of the 
company. Additionally, Conrad et al. (2002) study the long run trend of stock 
performance, in the presence of bad and good news, using earnings’ announcements for 
1988-98 in the United States. They find that the effect of good and bad news is 
asymmetrical, where the effect of the latter is larger and the skew increases with market 
size. Finally, Dyck et al. (2008) tested the effect of media coverage on corporate 
governance decisions in the Russian market between 1999 and 2002. They find the effect 
of media coverage on public opinion is stronger if newspapers are foreign-owned, which 
suggests that, in developing countries, people do not give credibility to national media.  
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From a long-run historical perspective, Turner et al. (2017) examine the long-run 
influence of media coverage in the London Stock Exchange. They find that media became 
important after the 1840s, when the diffuse ownership emerged and spread. Particularly, 
they find a media discount, that is, a return premium which negatively affected firs that 
were not covered in the media. Similarly, Bignon and Miscio (2010) indicate that 
newspapers focused on subsets of companies to cover, catering to specific audiences, but 
that contemporaries substantially overemphasized the role this media bias played in 
distorting markets. Rather, they find that newspapers, even in a fragmented market as 
early 19th century France, played a role in disseminating information among investors. 
Conversely, Campbell et al. (2012) investigate the effect of media during the British 
Railway Mania in asset prices, showing that media published extensive information 
related with railway works. However, in this case, the effect of coverage is unclear, since 
it seems not to have contributed neither to keep stock prices of railway firms artificially 
high, nor to discourage investors after the market crash. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis wished to engage with both literatures by discussing the 
specific case of the Panama Scandal. The massive network of corruption created around 
the Panama Company in the 1880s involved politicians and journalists. The enterprises, 
managed by Ferdinand de Lesseps, planned to build canal that crossed the isthmus of 
Panama. However, the project experienced numerous economic difficulties since its early 
beginning, and by late 1887 its situation was close to a bankruptcy. Thus, the company 
issued a new set of bonds the 26 June 1888, to finance the costs of the project. 
Consequently, firm’s managers bribed some of the most important French newspapers, to 
publish positive information about the issue and the future of the project. We study 
whether the massive press-coverage about the issue influenced significantly investors’ 
decisions. One may expect positive outcomes from an extensive press-campaign 
supporting a firm. However, surprisingly, we obtain that investors acted very rationally 
regarding this excess of information, by selling company’s shares when new information 
about it appeared in newspapers. Thus, French investors may have interpreted this 
information as intentionally biased and decided not to follow it. 
We further explore the role of mass media in another case study on the economic 
effects of the Dreyfus Affair, by studying the consequences of Antisemitism on investors’ 
mentality. Our study connects naturally with recent historical studies in economics on the 
phenomenon of antisemitism in Europe. While existing studies have focused on its causes 
and its persistence (Voigtländer and Voth 2012, 2015, Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya 
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2017), we explore how it is ultimately reflected on economic outcomes. Most of the 
studies on the economic effects of discrimination analyse the Nazi period, since this is 
one of the best examples of a drastic and exogenous change in terms of ethnic tolerance. 
In that regard, our study relates to Ferguson and Voth’s (2008) research on how Nazi-
connected firms benefited from the rise of the Nazi party. We differ substantially from 
that paper in considering a series of events with potential signals on different dimensions, 
from which we could trace not only when antisemitism matters to Jews-connected firms, 
but also when it ceases to matter. Analogously, Lindenthal (2017) studies the performance 
of the firms including Jews in their boards of administration, during the first years of the 
Nazi period. The government of Hitler started soon a policy of Aryanization, forcing 
private agents to adapt to the new situation. The governmental pressure resulted in drastic 
changes in the composition of boards, which rapidly removed most of its Jewish 
members. The findings indicate a significant underperformance of Jewish-connected 
firms already in the first month after Hitler seized the power. A deeper analysis on firms’ 
performance is that of Huber, Lindenthal and Waldinger (2018). Using the variation of 
Jewish managers since 1932 as the object of study, they show that firms which had to 
change its board composition by removing its Jewish directors failed to find a substitute, 
and it affected negatively to its performance, losing market value, obtaining lower returns 
and sharing lower dividends. This is significant as well for the firms that removed Jews 
from their cabinet and were further favoured by Nazi government.  
Discrimination may have also negative consequences in academia. Waldinger 
(2010) studies PhD students’ outcomes from Jewish expulsions after the Nazi party seized 
power in 1933, measured through the academic quality of the department. Taking a large 
sample of scholars from top German universities, the findings show that the massive 
dismissals after the racial laws caused a deterioration of students’ performance and 
reduced their probability to obtain lifetime citations or to become in a full-time professor 
in the future, reducing, thus, department’s quality. In other work, Waldinger (2011) 
investigates the existence of peer effects in science derived from the massive dismissals 
of Jewish scientists after 1933. The author compiles all the publications of every 
researcher in top academic journals and attempts to if the loss of prestigious professors 
affected to the research quality of the department. Although it is observed a negative 
effect on department’s quality because of the dismissals, this cannot be taken as a causal 
relationship since the analysis can be affected by other reasons, such as the fact that 
spillovers are less important for prestigious researchers. Other potential cause is that the 
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analysis deserves a long-run study. Yuksel & Yuksel (2010) develop a similar analysis of 
the consequences of xenophobia on German education, particularly in the outcomes of 
German children who went to school after the purges of 1933. The law for the restoration 
of the professional service of 7 April of that year was, among other things, the trigger for 
the dismissal of about 2,000 professors by late 1933. They demonstrate the existence of 
a causal relationship between teachers’ expulsion and students’ outcomes, by showing 
that children more affected by the dismissal of Jewish teachers had, on average, less years 
of schooling and so a lower education level than the previous generation of students. 
Thus, whereas the effect of repression in Nazi Germany on students seems to be clear and 
statistically significant, there is little evidence of peer effects in Science.  
We test for potential medium/long-run effects of Antisemitism in France. In line 
with this, Acemoglu et al. (2011) focus their investigation of the Holocaust on the long-
run effects on economic development in Russia. They show a persistent effect derived 
from repression. That is, the places where the intensity of persecutions was higher 
experienced a long-run economic underperformance during the following decades. One 
of explanation could be that, since most of Jews living in these areas worked in white-
collar activities, the massive elimination of human capital may have had strong negative 
consequences for these regions, in socioeconomic terms. Likewise, D’Acunto et al. 
(2018) develop an analysis on the long-term effects of Antisemitism, focusing in 
Germany in this case. The findings show that the Holocaust explains partially regional 
divergences in financial development. Since German Jews historically specialized in 
financial activities, they may have settled across time in those regions characterized by 
higher ethnic tolerance. Building a new index to estimate the persistence of historical 
Antisemitism, the authors find that the counties where Antisemitism was historically 
more pronounced have nowadays lower levels of financial development. This research 
opens the gate to further analyses about the long-run effects of policy interventions based 
on ethnic discrimination.  
The Dreyfus Affair was also a source of political tensions, which could have 
indirectly affected to the daily economic life of the country. In that sense, He at al. (2017) 
study the economic costs of tensions between mainland China and Taiwan. This can be 
measured through numerous ways, and the intensity of a growth of political turmoil varies 
across territories. Thus, the authors consider the different types of tensions, such as the 
risk of a war, economic pressure against a country in particular, etc. They show that 
growing tensions between mainland China and Taiwan have a negative persistent effect 
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in the value of firms from both territories. However, it affects more deeply to Taiwanese 
exports towards mainland China. Political tensions and partisanship might also influence 
individuals’ choices and may bias some self-selection decisions in labour markets. This 
is analysed in McConnell et al. (2018), who find that individuals base many of their 
professional decisions on political preferences. Thus, individuals are willing to accept 
lower salaries or putting less exigences to the company if they perceive in exchange of 
working with a co-partisan. This is related to our research, since many investors may have 
based their investment decisions on racial prejudices against Jews. Under peaks of 
Antisemitism in press and among public opinion, they may have invested more in those 
companies which they perceived to be “non-Jewish”. 
Chapter 4 analyses the economic effects of Antisemitism and the widespread 
campaign of discrimination towards French Jews, between 1894 and 1899. The captain 
Dreyfus, arrested in late 1894 and accused of espionage, was in the middle of a 
progressive process of social polarisation in France during the following years. Some 
newspapers contributed to the rise of Antisemitism in the early years of the Dreyfus 
Affair, by accusing them of conspiring to destroy the country. Some of them, such as La 
Libre Parole and La Croix, played a key role in the dissemination of information during 
the Affair, pressuring government decisions and indirectly affecting to the military court 
final decision. When, by late 1897, some proofs against the real culprit evidenced 
Dreyfus’ innocence, the country split in two sides, those who supported him and those 
who hated him. The subsequent campaign of rehabilitation, triggered by the famous 
Zola’s article J’Accuse!, contributed to increase the number of Dreyfus supporters. We 
find a persistent effect derived from the Affair, which evidences the effect of social 
conflicts on financial markets. In a short-term analysis, Jewish-connected firms 
experienced substantial losses after the public degradation of Dreyfus, the 5 January 1895. 
Furthermore, the publication of J’Accuse! and the subsequent campaign to rehabilitate 
Dreyfus had a strong effect on the value of firms with Jewish connections, which 
experienced a recovery during the following months. These facts led us to argue that the 
Dreyfus Affair had an economic effect, which can be interpreted through the study of 
French financial markets. 
Chapter 5 complements Chapter 4, evidencing that the most powerful Jewish 
families tended to participate in politically connected firms, for the year 1894. It would 
confirm the views of historians of French Jews, such as Birnbaum (2014) and Grange 
(2016). I argue that the existence of this strong relationship might have a social 
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explanation. Thus, French Jews, concerned of the growing Antisemitism in Europe after 
Russian pogroms, were encouraged to be accepted by French upper-class and identified 
as one of them. That is, they could have pursued to overcome social reluctance by 
attempting to be more integrated among French economic elite. 
Summing up,  this thesis studies the economic effects of the progressive political 
and social conflicts happening in France in the later 19th century. Based in a wide set of 
financial literature, I consider that the growth in political tensions caused by the 
Boulangist movement, the widespread campaign of briberies of the Panama Company in 
1888, and the polarisation of French society during the Dreyfus Affair had strong and 
significant consequences in investors’ perception. They may have reacted to events that 
potentially changed their expectations in the short and the long term. Thus, this work has 
two intentions: First, complementing historical literature by providing evidence of 
importance given by contemporaries to these episodes. Second, to shed some light on the 
study of investors’ behaviour, in an attempt to find common patterns of performance 
between late 19th century and current financial markets. Thus, the present dissertation is 
organised as follows. Chapter 1 provides a brief explanation on the historical context. 
Chapter 2 studies the economic effects of the Boulangist campaign. Chapter 3 focuses on 
investors’ behaviour during the bribery campaign of the Panama Company. Chapter 4 
provides a detailed analysis of the effects of Antisemitism on the Paris Stock Market 
during the Dreyfus Affair. Chapter 5 complements Chapter 4, and examines, through a 
sectorial analysis, the existing links between politicians and upper-class Jews in France 
from 1894 to 1898. Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Historical context: The fall of the Empire and the early 
years of the French 3rd Republic 
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I. The liberal precedents of the Third Republic under Louis 
Bonaparte 
The Centre-Gauche was the group around which the Third Republic consolidated after 
the convulse period 1870-1875. Although we cannot speak of a new social class, their 
members belonged to a political branch which inherited the liberal-conservative 
principles of the Monarchie de Juillet1, based on liberalism. In economic terms, the 
Orleanist regime was much closer to the ideas of the Centre-Gauche than the Second 
Empire of Napoleon III, characterised by interventionism, restricted political rights, and 
a populist way of government based on plebiscites. the Second Empire has been 
controversial for historians because of its multiple contradictions: It represents the 
success of mass-populism, a new political strategy consisting in direct messages and 
intense electoral campaigns.  
Napoleon III based the most important pillars of his regime in plebiscites rather 
than in parliamentary legitimacy, in an attempt to obtain popular approval directly. This 
form of consultation was used three times; to obtain the necessary support to legitimise 
his Coup d’état in 1851, to become in the emperor Napoleon III in 1852 -guaranteeing 
the stability of the new regime-, and to assure the survival of the Empire after his death, 
in 1870. As the Bonapartist party controlled the propaganda machine of the regime, he 
had a comparative advantage in every electoral process. Public officers, state and 
municipal counsellors (among others) were an essential part of government propaganda. 
In this example, the municipal authorities of Metz express their preference for the ‘Yes’ 
-the preferred government option- in the Plebiscite of 1870, that ensured the continuation 
of the Bonaparte dynasty and approved the new constitution. 
  
 
1 The regime of Louis Philippe of Orléans was commonly known as the Monarchie de Juillet. 
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Figure 1: Document showing the support of public officers to the Plebiscite of 1870. 
 
• We will vote YES, because we trust on the Emperor, who wants the best for France. 
• We will vote YES, because we are in favor of a wise and progressive freedom. 
• We will vote YES, because we do not believe in theories aiming to destroy everything, and 
unable to reconstruct. 
• We will vote YES, because we do not want a revolution that would ruin everyone, which cannot 
enrich anyone, which harms trade and industry, and is a threat for the working class. 
• Finally, we encourage you to vote if you share our ideas, to vote like us, YES. 
Source: Circular letter on the plebiscite of the 1870, by Flosse and Le Secq de Crépy. Metz, 1870.  
Gallica:https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5403225d/f3.image.r=plebiscite%20napoleon  
 
Louis-Napoleon became president of the 2nd Republic in 1848 supported by the 
Parti de l’Ordre -the right-wing party-. He can be considered in general terms as a 
traditionalist politician, who supported the clericalism of the Catholic Church and 
implemented numerous conservative policies (private property, the defence of rural and 
industrial bourgeoisie, etc.). However, his ideology was eclectic, and changed across 
time. In economic terms, the government made many efforts to modernise the economy, 
putting special emphasis in the development of public infrastructures, such as railways. 
If the Orleanist monarchy was the time of the ‘Haute-Banque’ represented by the ‘kings 
of gold’ -such as the Rothschild family-, the Second Empire was the time of State-led 
capitalism where the government took an active role. This time was represented by a new 
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economic elite, the ‘kings of iron’2. Objectively, these measures led to a general 
modernisation of the country, by improving the efficiency of transports and trade 
relationships. Nonetheless, authors such as André Encrevé3 point out that it did not 
necessarily led to a higher rate of economic growth. He shows that French GDP grew at 
a rate of 2.36% between 1852 and 1869. Moreover, it grew on average a 2.74% under the 
Orleanist Monarchie de Juillet, from 1830 to 18484. In political terms, it soon evolved 
towards an autocratic regime. Under the 2nd Republic, he had multiple confrontations with 
the conservatives. In addition, social unrest spread under his government. In an attempt 
to continue in power and defeat political opposition, he performed a Coup d’état in 
December 1851. Since the constitutional mechanisms of the Republic were suspended, 
he gave legitimacy to his coup through a referendum in November 1852. Some days later, 
the 2 December of the same year, he proclaimed the Second Empire. Soon, the activities 
of political parties, public meetings and press-freedom were restricted. Plessis (1985, pp 
11-24) describes the main changes made in French institutions after the fall of the Second 
Republic. The solution was to be an eclectic convergence between a type of radical 
democracy -expressed through universal suffrage- and authoritarianism -based on the 
extensive power accumulated by the Emperor and the ‘de facto’ suppression of 
parliamentarianism-. Contrary to his former liberal-conservative allies, Louis Napoleon 
legalised universal suffrage; however, it was a mean to publicly approve his actions, 
denying this power to French parliament. Newspapers lost the capacity to criticise the 
executive power and the State, and their activities could be suspended directly by French 
government if they were considered to have acted against the interests of the Empire. 
Figure 2 explains graphically the political organisation of the Second Empire (ibid): 
The executive power had all the mechanisms to control the functioning of French 
institutions. Louis Napoleon had the power to appoint new ministers, state counsellors 
and senators. The emperor and the ministers were the government and enacted all the 
laws including the national budget5. The Conseil d’état -council of state- was an 
 
2 Gillet, M. (1962). Guy P. Palmade, Capitalisme et Capitalistes français au XIXe siècle. Chapter 3.3. 
L’Usine. Revue du Nord, 44(173), 171-172 (Kindle Edition). 
3 Encrevé, A. (2004). Le Second Empire:«Que sais-je?. Chapter II : La France du Second Empire. n° 739. 
Presses universitaires de France. 
4 The author uses the data from Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985) to describe the economic 
performance of the Second Empire. 
5 In a pure parliamentary regime, the yearly national budget can be accepted or rejected by the parliament. 
However, the National Assembly did not have this capacity under the Second Empire. 
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intermediate group between ministers and the French national assembly; it examined the 
laws enacted and could propose amendments to them, having ‘de jure’ a larger legislative 
autonomy than the parliament.  
Figure 2: The political organisation of the Second Empire 
 
Source: Plessis (1985, p.17). 
 
The French legislative power, the National Assembly, had little mechanisms to 
control governmental actions, and by no means it had the capacity to overthrow the 
national government. French deputies became in an appendix -endorsed by universal 
suffrage- of the executive power, with the only capacity of approving government 
decisions. Senators were elected for life, and their task was to supervise the constitutional 
legitimacy of the laws. In a parliamentary democracy, the Senate -although typically a 
more conservative chamber than the assembly- has a relative independence from  national 
government. However, this autonomy was very reduced during the Second Empire, since 
senators owed their political position to the Emperor’s appointment. In reality, their task 
was to legally reinforce imperial institutions. Albeit Louis-Napoleon exhibited an 
apparent democratic functioning of French institutions mainly because of universal 
suffrage, the political independence of the legislative body -deputies, borough councils, 
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and municipal councils- was very restricted, receiving strong pressures from upper-level 
politicians to not to act against the interests of the Empire (ibid). 
The repression decreased in the decades of the 1860s, and the government allowed 
a higher degree of political freedom. A moderate opposition was permitted in French 
imperial parliament, which axis was the Union Libérale. This party did not have a clear 
tendency to republicanism, but its creation aimed to gather all French ‘liberals’ around a 
unique force, regardless they were monarchists or republicans. The form of government 
could be discussed; however, they shared a set of common principles that shaped their 
political identity: The respect to the people’s rights and their dignity, to their opinions and 
moral convictions, combined with a set of conservative economic policies guaranteeing 
austerity and liberalism6. Despite they called themselves the Center-Left, they were 
liberals more than leftist activists; they believed in free-trade, low tariffs and a non-
interventionist government. In political terms, their aspirations were guided by the desire 
to configure a regime that allowed for freedom of speech, an independent justice and a 
parliamentary system7 that guaranteed the separation of powers. 
As the time went by, the Union Libérale became mostly republican, being the seed 
of the future Centre-Gauche. The defeat against Germany led to the imprisonment of 
Napoleon III and the sudden fall of the Empire. Thus, some members from this political 
family led the transition towards a new form of government. Garrigues indicates  (1997, 
pp. 19-43) that the Union Libérale served as a common place for many opponents to the 
Second Empire. Its main personalities, such as Adolphe Thiers, Casimir-Perier or Léon 
Say had large parliamentary experience and they used their political influence to secure 
the young Republic and unify all the moderates around a new bourgeoise regime. The 
convergence between liberals was possible because of common factors threatening to all 
of them: The risk of a ‘communist-anarchist’ revolution as in the Paris Commune, the 
return to an ultra-Catholic legitimist regime as before the Orleanist period, or the 
 
6 This statement is directly extracted from the description that Maurice de Foblant -a former monarchist 
conservative politician under the Second Republic who resigned after Napoleon III drift towards 
authoritarianism- made in a series of letters in 1863, that can be consulted in Gallica, in the following link:  
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k54298536.r=union%20liberale%20second%20empire?rk=21459;2&
ticket=ST-9508-cKmGeFBVdlKLeRtRamoy-diaz01.bnf.fr.#. 
7 Unlike to the Second Republic, they promoted the creation of a second chamber, the Senate, that would 
serve as a barrier for political radicalism. It was a concession given to Orleanists when the Constitution of 
the III Republic was being discussed. It was interpreted as a signal of the political moderation of the new 
regime, which would never allow an extremist force to seize power, such as Napoleon III during the Second 
Republic, or the Paris Commune in 1871 (Mayeur, J.M., 1984, pp 52-58).   
29 
 
emergence of a new populist leader that reproduced the hardest years of the Bonapartist 
regime, characterised by repression. Garrigues (ibid, pp. 24-28). 
II. The Paris Commune and the difficulties of the early times. 
In 1870, France was shocked by the defeat in Sedan. The emperor Napoleon III had been 
captured by Bismarck and imprisoned, and the whole imperial institution had collapsed. 
In Paris, after the public proclamation of the Third Republic in the place de l’Hôtel de 
Ville, a group of politicians formed the ‘Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale’, the 4 
September 1870. It was considered a transitional solution towards a new regime, putting 
all their efforts in ending the armed conflict with Germany. Marx8 pointed out that French 
population accepted this sudden change of regime pacifically, mainly because of the rapid 
advances made by German army in French territory. Some months later, the 8 February 
1871, legislative elections were organised, since the German Empire would only 
negotiate with a legitimised and rightful government. A general agreement led to the 
election of Adolphe Thiers as the president of the new Republic. He was an experienced 
politician who had been minister under the monarchy of Louis Philippe (1830-1848) and 
had changed his political affiliation towards moderate republicanism. He became in one 
of the most important opponents to the Second Empire of Napoleon III in the past twenty 
years. His main motivation was signing the treaty of peace as soon as possible, at the 
lowest possible -political- price. His program, also called the “Pacte de Bordeaux” -the 
pact of Bordeaux- recognised the necessity of pacifying the country, reorganise the 
institutional framework, and promote the creation of employment9 by encouraging 
national production.  
Despite the goodwill of the new government, Bismarck and Germany had different 
plans for France. The peace conditions were abusive. First, they demanded the annexation 
of Alsace and a great share of Lorraine, including Metz. Second, the German army would 
march over Paris, in an exercise that would be an exhibition of national strength and pride. 
Last, the war compensations would rise to eight billion francs, an amount that surpassed 
 
8 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2010). La comuna de París (Vol. 219). Ediciones Akal. 
9 More information about the bibliographical figure of Adolphe Thiers can be found at the online repository 
of the National Assembly of France, in the following link: http://www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/sycomore/fiche/%28num_dept%29/7032. Although the elections of 1871 gave strong 
institutional support to monarchist groups -Orleanists and Legitimists, particularly-, his appointment to the 
presidency of the Republic was taken as a consensus, given his large experience and led by the need to have 
a legitimate government that could carry out the negotiations with Germany successfully.   
30 
 
every prediction made by Thiers -finally, it was reduced to five million francs in the final 
agreement-10. French government, with a limited margin of manoeuvre, finally accepted 
German conditions, giving rise to a generalised mistrust among French population. 
Although it seems that public opinion wanted a rapid end to the armed conflict, the 
draconian conditions imposed by Germany were interpreted as a double defeat and an 
excessive punishment. The Journal Officiel de la République Française of 28 February 
1871 attempted to justify governmental decisions, by saying the following: 
The preliminary conditions of peace were signed yesterday and will soon be voted in the 
National Assembly. Despite all the efforts of the government, German troops will march 
over Paris. (…) We appeal to the patriotism of Parisians, and we beg them to stay calm 
and united. The dignity in bad times is the honour and the force of those who were 
abandoned by the fortune and must be our hope for a better future. 
The main French newspapers avoided to attack French government directly, 
attempting to justify its actions as well. Le Gaulois, in a series of articles analysing the 
peace treaty the 1 March 1871, followed a similar line than the Journal Officiel. They 
concluded in the following manner: 
The march of German troops over Paris is the result of the negotiations in Versailles. 
We have been told what France has obtained in exchange -the town of Belfort would 
continue being French-. Paris has suffered so much in the past, and we are sure that the 
city will suffer again. It is in its honour and that of the whole nation. No matter how 
painful it is, Paris and Parisians will fulfil their duty. 
Although it is impossible to know, it is reasonable to think that both French 
politicians and journalists were aware of the social disappointment generated after the 
signature of the peace treaty and avoided to contribute to an increase of social tension. 
The example of Le Gaulois is very representative, since it became in one of the most 
belligerent newspapers against the 3rd Republic and republican politicians. French 
newspapers, thus, may have reached a temporary ‘entente’ with the new government, 
justifying the humiliation represented by the march of a foreign army over the capital. 
Factors such as the move of the government to Versailles -the symbol of French 
monarchy- and the dismantling of the weapons of the Garde Nationale -a police division 
 
10 See Broche, F. (2001). La IIIème République. Tome 1, 1870-1895, de Thiers à Casimir-Périer (Vol. 1). 
Pp 94-98. Pygmalion Editions. 
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which had historically been close to revolutionary movements- were also important in the 
scalation of public discontent.  
However, in French parliament, the peace conditions were rejected by numerous 
political factions. The extreme left (socialists-Blanquists), the Radicals of Clemenceau, 
and the Union Républicaine of Gambetta voted against the abusive conditions imposed 
by Germany. The remaining republican forces, those “republicains du gouvernement”, 
sought the support of conservatives to sign the peace and end the negotiations. They 
mostly belonged to the Centre Gauche and the Gauche Républicaine, whose leaders, such 
as Léon Say or Ferry, were aware of the negative effects derived from continuing the 
war11. Some days after the peace agreement was signed, a generalised uprising took place 
in the city of Paris, in 18 March 1871, proclaiming the Commune. 
The revolt was the consequence of an eclectic movement which shared a limited set 
of political goals: The refusal to sign the treaty with Germany, confronting the invasion; 
the reformation of a regime that re-distributed the national wealth appropriately, and the 
promulgation of new laws that allowed for more political freedom and participation. 
Winock and Azéma (1970, pp. 73-74) refer to the first stages of the Commune as an 
ideologically heterogeneous movement. Never before, such a large proportion of 
craftsmen, industrial workers, and little bourgeoises had participated in French politics. 
Contemporaries who supported the revolt, such as Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin, 
signalled the existence of a class conflict, that could only be solved through a generalised 
revolution. The First International of Workers encouraged French people to revolt across 
the country, as a way to spread the revolution. Karl Marx considered it as the first example 
of the dictatorship of the proletarians. Bakunin, although refusing the definition provided 
by Marx, agreed upon the rapid spread of the uprising, and attempted to promote a 
communal organisation in Lyon12. The Commune adopted a series of radical measures to 
democratise the city and guarantee the political rights of the citizens. Engels cited some 
of them13: It declared universal suffrage; the abandonment of parliamentarianism and its 
substitution by assemblies of workers; the abolition of the regular army; the establishment 
of a universal system of public secular education. 
 
11 Goguel, F. (1958). La politique des partis sous la IIIe République (Vol. 1), p. 34. Seuil. 
12Encyclopaedia Britannica:  
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Karl-Marx/Role-in-the-First-International 
13 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2010). La comuna de París (Vol. 219). Ediciones Akal. 
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After some initial hesitation, French government counter attacked and fought 
against the communards. Pressured both by conservatives and Germans, the repression 
was brutal, causing massive destruction in the city and thousands casualties. The 
desperate defensive actions of the revolutionaries did not resist the continuous attacks of 
French army. The whole city burned, and the combats on the streets lasted for days. 
Broche (2001, p. 127), estimated the number of deaths between 20,000 and 100,000. 
Moreover, the court who judged the main responsible personalities of the revolt, send 
about 5,000 people to deportation. The energic measures taken by French government, 
extensively criticised by its cruelty, were probably the main cause of disappointment 
among left-wing members. Adolphe Thiers became very unpopular, and the new regime 
was soon associated with repression and authoritarianism by socialists, anarchists, and 
Blanquists. Nevertheless, French public opinion supported governmental action; they 
were probably feared a continuation of the conflict against Germany, the spread of the 
revolution across the country. In addition, ideologically, the identification with extreme 
left was much lower outside of Paris, where population was -in general- conservative.  
III. The early years of the new regime, and the “Republican 
Republic”1871-1885. 
In the difficult post-Commune scenario, republican forces experienced a decrease of 
popularity, for the benefit of conservatives, who had obtained the majority in the 
parliament after the elections of 1871. Conservatives were composed of the following 
political groups: The Legitimists (legitimistes), the monarchists supporters of the Bourbon 
branch. This was the most reactionary group in French parliament. Tied to Catholic 
church, it defended a return to French “traditional values”, and a limited parliamentary 
regime under a powerful king. The Orleanists (Orléanistes), who advocated for a 
restoration of the house of Orléans, dethroned in 1848, supporting a liberal monarchy. 
Last, the Bonapartists, with a limited political force after the fall of the Empire, they will 
soon be engaged in far-right activities in the subsequent years. The left was composed of 
the following forces: First, the Centre-Gauche, a moderated republican party. Second, the 
“Opportunistes”, divided in two groups, the Union Républicaine and the Gauche 
Républicaine. They had a liberal political view, although were much less conservatives 
than the Centre Gauche.. Last, the Radicals, who, characterised by a deep anticlericalism, 
claimed for a more “social” Republic. Socialist movements were very weakened during 
the first years of the new regime. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of the votes to right-wing parties, 1871-1898 
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Source: Goguel, F. (1970). Géographie des élections françaises sous la Troisième et la Quatrième 
République. Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques. 
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Figure 3 shows the evolution of the votes to the French right-wing parties by 
department, from 1871 to 1898, the year where the Dreyfus Affair reached its maximum 
levels of polarisation. The darker the colour, the larger the share of votes obtained by 
conservatives. They tended to obtain more political support in the North-West and the 
South. Initially, the period 1871-1876 was dominated by a conservative chamber, who 
attempted to restore the monarchy under the figure of the Henry of Chambord. However, 
discrepancies about the flag broke the agreement between conservatives, and the 
restoration failed. Thus, a new set of Constitutional Laws were enacted in 1875, 
legitimising the 3rd Republic. In the elections of 1876 and 1877, republican forces 
obtained the control of the parliament. Soon, the growing divergences between the new 
government and the conservative (monarchic) president of the Republic Patrice de Mac 
Mahon started to increase political tensions. Republicans, fearing a coup d’état of the 
president, forced his dismissal in 1879.  
The new elections of 1881 gave a clear majority to republican parties, particularly 
to the Opportunistes. They implemented a new set of reforms to stabilise the new regime 
and modernise the country. First, a new law of secularisation removing Catholic Church 
from public education. The idea of this law was to educate a new generation of patriotic 
republican students, who believed in the values promoted by the new regime. Second, a 
process of modernisation of the army -military leaders, weapons, strategies-, to create a 
well-prepared country for an eventual war. Third, the creation of a more participative 
regime, in an attempt to reconcile the division created by the fall of the Empire, the 
German invasion and the repression of the Paris Commune. 
In a democracy, differences between the right and the left do not remain static 
across time, as well as the perception that public opinion has about the political 
organisations of a country. After 1881, French people found a growing level of political 
alternatives, which was in line to its ideological heterogeneity. The ideology of the main 
political parties during the 3rd Republic experienced substantial variations across time. 
Thus, a process of natural evolution took place in ideological terms, as a result of the 
changing idiosyncrasy of the 3rd Republic and as an example of the adaptation of French 
political parties to new challenges. Soon, Republican parties created strong links with 
French bankers and industrials, starting to participate in business activities. The new 
alliance between the political and economic power was reinforced due to the reactionary 
positions taken by conservatives once they were removed from power. Whereas the right-
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wing progressively evolved towards far-right, and the extreme left remained -yet- 
marginalised, republican parties reinforced their influence upon French high-bourgeoisie, 
giving rise to a new and persistent collaboration (Garrigues, 1997). 
The existence of these links will become very unpopular once the subsequent 
scandals of corruption started to arise, such as that of the Décorations (1887) -which 
indirectly involved the president of the Republic- or the Panama Scandal in 1893. These 
problems, joined with a relative weakening of republican forces during the elections of 
1885, and a rising Antisemitism promoted by French far right, paved the way for the surge 
of new political and social tensions during the period 1887-1900. Republicans -
particularly, opportunists- started to be seen as a corrupt political family, that needed to 
be overthrew. It is impossible to understand the social success of a broad movement such 
as the Boulangism without considering the failures committed by republican forces the 
years before. Moreover, these problems gave to conservatives the opportunity to 
reorganise themselves and fight against a common enemy. It is within this tense social 
atmosphere result of the long process described above, where the studies presented in this 
thesis are framed and should be understood. An extremely conservative sector of French 
society was ready to challenge the young Republic, and the rise of Georges Boulanger as 
a populist personality was the definitive trigger of a widespread campaign of political, 
social and ethnic tension.  
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The following article was published at the Financial History Review, in 2018. Whereas the literature review 
has been moved to the introduction, the rest of the article holds the same format than in the published 
edition. It can be consulted in the following link: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565018000148.  
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
Political connections and stock returns: Evidence from the 
Boulangist campaign  
39 
 
Political connections and stock returns: Evidence from the 
Boulangist campaign 
 
 
 
 
Miguel Ortiz-Serrano 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The decade of the 1880s was a turbulent period for the French Third Republic. Corruption 
scandals that discredited republican parties and a lacklustre economic performance after 
the Paris Bourse crash of 1882 gave rise to a generalised disenchantment of large sections 
of the public opinion with the republican political elites. The rise of the Boulangist 
movement was the most representative example of this disillusionment. Since 1887, 
Georges Boulanger, an Army’s general and former minister of war, orchestrated a 
populist mass campaign against the ruling republicans and the parliamentary regime. His 
political agitation, supported by a heterogeneous coalition of socialists, radicals and 
royalists, reached a climax in January 1889, when, after winning a Paris by-election, he 
had an opportunity to stage a coup d’état that eventually did not materialize. To 
understand whether French investors perceived the Boulangist campaign as a real threat, 
I use an original dataset of daily stock prices to analyse the effect of the January 1889 by-
election on the value of politically connected firms listed on the Paris stock market. The 
results show that firms with links to the republican parties experienced positive 
cumulative abnormal returns after Boulanger’s refusal to stage the coup, while there was 
no effect on firms connected to the royalist parties or with no political ties. These findings 
suggest that French investors perceived Boulanger as an actual threat to the republican 
regime and reacted positively to the prospective subsiding of his movement. 
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I. Introduction. 
The Boulangist movement represented a dramatic novelty in the political life of the young 
French Third Republic and a serious challenge to its survival (Irvine 1988; Garrigues 
1992 and 1999). Inspired by Jacobin values of the revolutionary tradition, it emerged in 
1887, when General Georges Boulanger undertook a successful mass campaign against 
the republican government. The movement, galvanized by a winning streak of electoral 
successes in 1888, reached its peak on 27 January 1889, when Boulanger’s victory in a 
by-election in Paris created propitious conditions for a coup d’état which he eventually 
decided not to stage.  
The mass popularity of Boulangism, “born of the radical left yet issuing in a radical 
right” (Hutton 1976, p. 86), was the result of a concurrence between socialists, radicals 
and monarchists, unified by the common desire to oust republican parties from 
government. Given the heterogeneity of his supporters, what kind of political regime 
would follow to Boulanger’s seizure of power was highly uncertain. However, his call 
for radical political reforms (condensed in his famous platform ‘dissolution, division, 
constituante’) and his violent attacks on industrialists and bankers for corrupting the 
parliamentary regime spelt hard times for the business elites that had established strong 
connections with the republican forces since the creation of the Republic.  
In order to assess whether the Boulangist crisis was perceived by French investors as a 
real threat that challenged the stability of the republican regime, this paper analyses the 
effects of the political events of January 1889 on the performance of stocks of politically 
connected firms quoted on the Paris Bourse. I find that in a window of two and ten days 
after the by-election, firms with connections to republican parties experienced positive 
cumulative abnormal returns, while no abnormal returns are found for those connected to 
conservative parties or with no political connections. These findings suggest that French 
investors perceived Boulanger as an actual threat to the stability of the Third Republic 
and reacted positively to his renunciation to a violent overthrow of the republican regime. 
This chapter connects to the wide literature analysing the effects of political connections 
on firms’ value, and continues the path started by Fisman (2001) on his research of the 
effect caused by the rumours about Suharto’s death on the firms linked to his family. The 
results appearing in this article connect naturally to the outcomes obtained by Ferguson 
& Voth (2008), Braggion & Moore (2013) and Lehman-Hasemeyer & Opiz (2017), who 
analysed the importance of political connectedness through an historical perspective. It 
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also links with the literature showed in the introduction of the present dissertation. The 
present work aims to complement Garrigues (1997) on the study of the relations between 
politicians and businessmen in late 19th century France, by showing empirical evidence 
on the existence of these links. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a narrative of the events of 
1888-89 against the background of political developments in the 1880s. Section III 
presents the dataset. Section IV empirically assesses the impact of political connections 
on stock trading in the months preceding the events of January 1889. Section V and VI 
describe the empirical strategy used to estimate cumulative abnormal returns and present 
the main findings. Section VII concludes. 
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II. Historical context of the Boulangism. 
After the tribulations that characterized the early political life of the Third Republic, with 
a National Assembly dominated by monarchists and persistent uncertainties about the fate 
of the republican regime, the late 1870s inaugurated a period of stability, especially after 
republican Jules Grévy replaced monarchist General Mac-Mahon as President of the 
Republic. The legislative elections of 1876-77 and 1881 marginalized right parties 
(Bonapartists and royalists) and gave republicans (dominated by Leon Gambetta’s Union 
Républicaine and Jules Ferry’s Gauche Républicaine) a solid majority both in the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Moderate republicans (also termed “Opportunistes” 
by their radical opponents) controlled French governments during the last quarter of the 
19th century, and successfully rallied banking and industrial elites to support the 
republican regime. The “contract” between the new ruling class and the “milieux 
d’affaires”, cemented by a significant expansion of government spending on public works 
and infrastructures (such as the Freycinet Plan: Le Bris 2012), shaped legislation on 
sensitive issues (such as railways, colonial expansion and trade policy) and led to the 
proliferation of connections between MPs and business (Garrigues 1997, pp.70-71 and 
73-82).  
However, the frequent eruption in the press of corruption scandals that involved 
politicians and financiers generated an increasing disillusionment of large sections of the 
public opinion towards the “Republique des hommes d’affaires”. The turning of popular 
sentiment against republicans became visible in the legislative elections of October 1885, 
which resulted in a hung parliament, with the ruling parties losing votes both on their 
right (to the alliance between Bonapartists and royalists) and left (to radicals and 
socialists).  
Against this background of renewed polarization and political stalemate, the figure 
of Georges Boulanger emerged as a catalyst for public discontent. A young Army General 
and a protégé of radical leader Georges Clemenceau, Boulanger had served as Minister 
of War in the governments of Charles de Freycinet and René Goblet (1886-87). He 
enjoyed an increasing popularity for his policy of modernization of the army, as well as 
for banning members of former royal families from military cadres, which initially 
alienated monarchists from him. His aggressive anti-German posturing (claiming the 
reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine) also met popular sentiments of revenge for the defeat 
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in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, earning him the nickname of “General Revanche”. 
However, his animosity turned into a source of embarrassment for the French 
government, quite wary of a diplomatic and military escalation with Germany, and 
eventually costed him a reappointment in the new cabinet of Maurice Rouvier in May 
1887.     
Boulanger’s exit from government marked the start of his intense campaign against 
“opportunist” republicans and parliamentary corruption, advocating a “honest Republic” 
and a strong executive. Initially backed by radicals, socialists and disillusioned 
republicans, with the support of newspapers such as ‘La Cocarde’, ‘Le Gaulois’ and 
‘L’Intransigeant’, his anti-establishment movement soon attracted the interest – and the 
generous funding – of conservative forces, who saw its growing popularity as a golden 
opportunity to return to power by democratic means (Irvine 1988; Garrigues 1992). 
Especially harmful for the moderate republicans was the ‘Scandale des Décorations’ 
(December 1887), which forced the resignation of the president of the Republic, Grévy, 
and the prime minister Rouvier. Boosted by a relentless press campaign (a radical 
innovation that announced the advent of political mass mobilization) now supported also 
by conservative newspapers such as the influential ‘Le Figaro’, the movement also 
developed an efficient organization based on the Ligue des Patriotes, a nationalist league 
whose militants were mobilized for electoral rallies and street actions. The populist tide 
continued to rise in the following months, reaching out to the provinces as Boulanger 
travelled the country to run for by-elections across the French territory.14 After his success 
in three simultaneous by-elections (Somme, Charente-Inférieure, and Nord) in August 
1888, the government realised that Boulanger had turned into a serious challenge and 
calls for a dialogue with monarchists were voiced from the “opportunist” press (Garrigues 
1999, pp. 188-195).  
Boulangists saw the call of a by-election in the Department of the Seine in January 
1889 as an opportunity for the movement to show its power in Paris, a republican 
stronghold with a special symbolic value. In fact, all parties interpreted the election as a 
plebiscite on the republican regime. In the evening of Sunday 27 January, as Boulanger’s 
victory over the republican candidate was announced, an enthusiastic crowd gathered in 
 
14 By-elections were common practice in the parliamentary regime of the Third Republic. When a MP died 
or renounced his seat for any other reason, a “partial” election was called in the region (‘département’) in 
which he had been elected in order to replace him. 
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Place de la Madeleine, ready to march on the Élysée (Garrigues 1999, pp. 225-234). At 
the same time, the government called an emergency meeting, waiting for the unfolding 
of events. Chronicles suggest that Boulanger, uncertain about the degree of support he 
enjoyed in the Army and the Paris police, hesitated for long hours. He finally refused to 
stage a coup d’état, arguing that a government born out of bloodshed would lack 
legitimacy, and postponed seizing power until the legislative elections scheduled for 
September 1889. With no news from the General and disappointed by his inaction, the 
crowd left the square in the early morning hours of Monday 28 January.15 The following 
hours and days saw a sudden reversal of the political fortunes of the movement. Divided 
republicans joined forces, Boulanger made no public appearances, and the ‘end of 
Boulangism’ became a leitmotiv in the press. 
Two weeks later, on 13 February, the Parliament reformed electoral rules to 
reintroduce individual constituencies (scrutiny d’arrondissement) and prohibited multiple 
candidatures, with the aim of containing the Boulangist movements. Soon after, the Ligue 
des patriotes was dissolved. Boulanger’s parliamentary immunity was revoked, and the 
General was accused of conspiracy against the State. On 1st April 1889, to escape arrest, 
Boulanger fled to Brussels; he received a sentence to life imprisonment in absentia in 
August of the same year. His movement, whose campaign was systematically obstructed 
or repressed by the mobilization of the State in support of republican candidates (Fulton 
1991), failed to make a decisive breakthrough in the elections of September-October 
1889. Although the monarchist-Boulangist alliance won almost as many popular votes as 
the front between republicans and radicals (Rudelle 1982, pp. 258-262), the new electoral 
rules and the success of republican candidates in borderline seats (for a very narrow 
margin in most cases) returned a comfortable majority for the government. Boulanger 
would die in exile two years later, in September 1891. 
  
 
15 A sentence attributed to Georges Thiébaut—a Bonapartist militant journalist and one of his 
most fervent supporters—conveys this quick disappointment among his partisans: “Minuit cinq. 
Depuis cinq minutes, le boulangisme est en baisse” (‘It’s 00:05. The Boulangism is decreasing in 
popularity since five minutes ago’). 
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III. Data collection and stylised facts. 
Boulangism promised to fight parliamentary corruption and the connections between 
politics and business. If this promise was perceived as credible, investors would have 
expected a Boulangist regime to penalize heavily firms connected to republican parties. 
In this case, the sudden vanishing of the Boulangist threat after the by-election of 27 
January 1889 should have been received with relief and optimism, as it implied a 
stabilization of the republican regime, at least in the short- run. As a consequence, we 
should observe positive abnormal returns on stocks of firms with links to republican 
forces. To test this hypothesis, I have built an original database covering a sample of 73 
firms listed on the Paris Bourse in the period from 1 March 1888 to 16 February 1889.  
To make the sample suitable to an event study, I have selected large firms with 
liquid stocks and available information about the board. Liquidity is proxied by the 
number of days in which stocks were traded out of the total number of trading days in the 
period. Daily prices of common stocks are from the official bulletins (‘Bulletins de la 
Cote’) published by the Compagnie des Agents de Change.16 Data on firms’ nominal and 
paid capital, dividends, and composition of board of directors are from shareholder annual 
reports (available in the archives of Crédit Agricole and belonging to the historical 
collection of Crédit Lyonnais) and stock brokers yearbooks (Annuaires des Agents de 
Change, available in the archives of the Centre des archives économiques et 
financières).17 The full dataset is described in Appendices 2 and 3. 
Politicians sitting in the board of directors were identified mainly on the base of the 
information provided by shareholder reports. A complementary source were biographies 
of French deputies, senators, and members of the government from the online repository 
of the Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat Français18, drawing on Robert and Cougny 
(1890) and Jolly (1960). Politically connected firms are defined as firms whose board of 
directors included in 1888 at least one MP (deputy or senator, either in office or elected 
in previous legislatures), a member of the Conseil d’état (a body acting as a legal adviser 
of the government and a supreme court of administrative justice), diplomatic corps 
 
16Available from Gallica, an online repository of the National Library of France: 
http://gallica.bnf.fr 
17 See https://www.economie.gouv.fr/caef.  
18 See: http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/recherche; and 
http://www.senat.fr/senateurs-3eme-republique/ 
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(appointed by the government, such as consuls or ambassadors), politicians at a regional 
and local level, or directors directly appointed by the government (such as in the case of 
colonial banks).19 “Republican” firms are those connected to republican parties. 
Republican groups were heterogeneous and changed across time. In 1881, there existed 
three groups, essentially: The ‘Centre-Gauche’, the ‘Gauche Républicaine’, and the 
‘Union Républicaine’. In 1885, the two last groups merged into one, giving rise to the 
‘Union de Gauche’. However, in most cases, in the sources, these members are only 
labelled as ‘republicans’. Thus, MP belonging to any of these groups were classified as 
republican. In turn, “conservative” firms are those connected to any of the right-wing 
parties that joined the Boulangist movement: the royalist factions of ‘Légitimistes’ and 
‘Orléanistes’, who supported the dynastic rights of the Houses of Bourbon and Orleans 
respectively; and the ‘Bonapartistes’, who aimed at restoring the House of Bonaparte and 
the Empire. In a few cases of politically “mixed” boards (nine firms with politicians from 
both camps), the sign of the connection has been attributed on the base of political 
prominence.20 As a result, seven firms were assigned to republicans and two to 
conservatives. State counsellors and diplomate corps were classified as conservatives or 
republicans depending on whether they were appointed during the Second Empire -or 
during the monarchist MacMahon government, 1873-1879- or after the arrival of 
republican forces to power, respectively. Overall, the sample includes 25 firms with no 
political affiliation and 48 politically connected firms (two thirds of the sample), of which 
18 linked to conservatives, and 29 to republicans. 
Table 1 summarizes the economic characteristics of the firms included in the 
sample, divided by political affiliations (republican, conservative, non-connected). 
Politically connected companies were on average much larger (both by market 
capitalization and nominal capital) and significantly more liquid than non-connected 
firms. Republican and conservative companies had similar average market capitalization 
 
19 Of course, a MP in office might be politically more influential than a former MP or a state 
counsellor. However, robustness checks confirmed that dividing political connections into strong 
(deputies and senators in office) and weak (former deputies and senators, state counsellors or 
local/regional politicians) does not affect the results. Regressions are not presented to save space 
but are available upon request. 
20 For instance, the board of directors of ‘Société Centrale du Dynamite’ included Alfred Naquet, 
a Boulangist MP, and Paul Barbé, who in 1888 was Minister of Agriculture. In this case, the firm 
was classified as connected to republicans. The inclusion of a new variable identifying ‘mixed’ 
boards was leading to collinearity issues, which has influenced the decision of identifying these 
boards as ‘republican’ or ‘conservative’ based on prominence. 
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(167 and 165 million FF respectively) and book-to-market ratios (1.31 and 1.29 
respectively), although conservative firms were slightly larger by nominal capital. The 
book-to-market ratio shows that assets from non-connected firms had less market value 
than republican and conservative companies.  Politically connected companies were far 
more internationalized (72 per cent of republican and 63 per cent of conservative firms 
had investments abroad) and included more firms with guaranteed assets (e.g. railways 
and some colonial banks) (17 per cent of republican and 21 per cent of conservative) than 
companies with no political affiliation. Approximately two thirds of stocks of politically 
connected firms (against 44 per cent of non-connected firms) were allowed to be traded 
both ‘au Comptant’ and ‘à Terme’ (allowing spot and forward operations). In turn, there 
were no significant differences between politically connected and non-connected firms as 
far as dividend policy is concerned, although the share of dividend-paying firms was 
slightly lower among those affiliated to the conservatives. Table 2 shows the sectorial 
distribution of firms by affiliation.  
As far as sectorial distribution is concerned, banks were dominant in all camps, 
although they were slightly more represented among republican and non-connected firms 
(45 and 44 per cent respectively) than among conservative firms (32 per cent). On the 
contrary, railways were the second largest group among politically connected companies 
(24 per cent of republican and 26 per cent of conservative firms), while only 4 per cent 
of non-connected companies operated in the railway sector. Figure 1 shows the frequency 
of political connections by firms’ size, measured by their market capitalization in 1888. 
Of the top twenty largest companies, virtually all were politically connected (with one 
exception); and so were 80 per cent of the top forty largest companies. On the contrary, 
non-connected companies slightly prevailed among the bottom 33 firms of the sample. 
Overall, these numbers confirm that virtually all largest French companies – and more 
prominently those operating in strategic sectors such as banking and railways – had 
developed political connections under the Third Republic. 
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Table 1: Average firm’s economic values, by type of connection. 
Data on Market Capitalization, Book-to-Market and Capital show the average values for each group, by type of 
connection. Investments Abroad, Guaranteed Assets, Admission, and Liquidity (trading frequency), show the 
percentage share of firms, by type of connection, with these characteristics. Liquidity refers to the average trading 
frequency for each group, in percentage terms. Market Capitalization was calculated by multiplying the number of 
ordinary shares and the daily price of each stock. Book-to-Market ratio was constructed by dividing common 
shareholders’ equity by market capitalization. Data were collected from primary sources, particularly from the 
‘Archives du Crédit Agricole’ and the ‘Annuaires des Agents de Change’.  
Variable Republican Conservative Non-Connected 
Market Capitalization 167,000,000 165,000,000 27,700,000 
Book-to-Market ratio 0.431 0.551 0.718 
Capital 71,900,000 91,000,000 19,900,000 
Investments Abroad 72.5% 63.15% 52% 
Guaranteed Assets 17.2% 21.05% 5% 
Admission (ACAT) 60.27% 63.16% 44% 
Liquidity (trading frequency) 78.06% 80.10% 56% 
Dividends 1887 96.55% 89.47% 96% 
Dividends 1888 96.55% 84.21% 92% 
  
 
 
  
Table 2: Sectorial distribution of firms, by type of connection. 
Industrial Sector Republican Conservative Non-Connected 
Banking 44.82% 31.57% 44% 
Canals 6.89% 5.26% 0% 
Gas & Electricity 3.44% 5.26% 8% 
Docks & Water 0% 10.53% 12% 
Insurance 0% 5.26% 4% 
Iron 3.44% 0% 4% 
Mines 0% 5.26% 0% 
Railway 24.14% 26.31% 4% 
Transports 6.89% 5.26% 16% 
Various 6.89% 5.26% 8% 
Warehouse 3.44% 0% 0% 
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IV. The impact of political connections on trading frequency. 
In the months that preceded the Paris election of January 1889, the rise of the Boulangist 
movement and its electoral successes in French provinces generated a huge uncertainty 
about the balance of power between republican and conservative parties and more 
generally about the immediate future of the Republican regime. Therefore, politically 
connected firms were especially sensitive to political news and shifts in investors’ 
expectations, which should be reflected in more intense trading of their stocks. Did 
political connections contribute to the frequency with which stocks were traded in the 
Paris Bourse (a proxy for liquidity) during the agitated months of the Boulangist 
campaign? To answer this question, I use a Logit regression to explore the determinants 
of the conditional probability of a stock being traded in the period from 1 March to 31 
December 1888.  
 
ln[𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒�� > 0|𝑋)] = 𝛽� + 𝛽�𝑃𝑜𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛� +  𝛽�𝑍� +  𝜀�� (1) 
  
Figure 1: Distribution of politically connected firms by market capitalization. 
 
Own elaboration from primary sources. Firms have been divided between connected and non-connected. 
The chart shows the distribution of connected firms in the sample, organized in groups from the highest 
to the lowest market capitalization. 
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The empirical specification assumes that this probability depends on structural 
characteristics of firms, including the presence of politicians in their board of directors. 
The dependent variable, Trade, is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the stock 
of firm i was traded on day t, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variable of interest is 
PolCon, which captures whether or not a firm was politically connected. In a first 
regression (Table 3) this variable (Connected) takes the value of one if a firm had at least 
one politician (of any denomination) or a state counsellor in its board and zero otherwise. 
In a second regression (Table 4) political connections are specified by affiliation, so that 
the equation includes two dummies, Republican and Conservative, taking the value of 
one if the firm was affiliated to republicans or conservatives, respectively. The regression 
includes a vector Z of control variables, which are potential structural determinants of 
trade frequency: firm’s size (the log of market capitalisation); firm’s value (the book-to-
market ratio); and a dummy taking the value of one if the firm had investment abroad; a 
dummy taking the value of one if the firm had a capital change in the year 1888; a dummy 
taking the value of one if the firm shared dividends in the year 1888. Since in the Paris 
Bourse forward transactions (‘à Terme’) largely dominated securities trading (Hautcoeur 
and Riva 2012, Lagneau-Ymonet and Riva 2018), I also include a dummy taking the value 
of one if, upon the terms of admission to the Parquet, a stock was tradable both cash (‘au 
Comptant’) and forward (à Terme), and zero if only the former were permitted21. Standard 
errors have been clustered by industrial sector. 
Results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. As expected, size, value and the existence 
of capital operations increased the frequency with which stocks were traded. Dividend 
payments during the year in question have no statistical effect. Table 3 shows the marginal 
effects of the Logit regressions. It seems that, after controlling for other determinants, 
political connections (to any faction) increased trade frequency relative to non-connected 
firms. Stocks tradable both spot and forward also were traded more frequently. Table 4 
shows that the magnitude of this positive impact was very similar for republican 
connections, although for conservative connections the significance disappears when the 
variable measuring spot and forward operations enters into the regression.  
  
 
21 In spite of their dominance, forward transactions were officially banned until 1885, when a new law gave 
forward contracts legal status, which made them enforceable by courts. 
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Table 3: The relationship between political connections and liquidity 
 
The table shows the marginal effects from the logistic regression expressed in the text. Dependent 
Variable: Trade, a binary variable taking value 1 if the stock was traded in the day in question, and 0 
otherwise. Connected is a dummy taking value 1 if the company contains politicians in the board of 
administration. Log Market Cap, the logarithm of market capitalization. Book to Market, the ratio 
between the book and market value of shares. Investments Abroad takes value one if the firm 
investments outside of France. Capital Change takes value 1 if the firm experienced capital changes in 
1888 and 0 otherwise. Div1888 takes value 1 if the firm shared dividends during 1888 and 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors have been clustered by Industrial Sector. Cash-Forward is a variable taking value 1 if 
the stock was admitted both to cash and forward trading, and zero if only cash trading was permitted. 
 
Variable 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
Connected 
 
0.238*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.114* 
(0.095) 
 
0.095 
(0.122) 
 
0.109** 
(0.046) 
 
0.112** 
(0.040) 
 
0.111** 
(0.040) 
 
0.097* 
(0.061) 
        
Log Market Cap  
0.112*** 
(0.000) 
0.127*** 
(0.000) 
0.134*** 
(0.000) 
0.132*** 
(0.000) 
0.133*** 
(0.000) 
0.105*** 
(0.000) 
        
Book-to-Market   
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.011** 
(0.011) 
        
Investments 
Abroad 
   
-0.085 
(0.205) 
-0.086 
(0.154) 
-0.087 
(0.155) 
-0.116** 
(0.031) 
        
CChange     
0.047* 
(0.053) 
0.047* 
(0.062) 
0.046* 
(0.066) 
        
Div1888      
0.007 
(0.604) 
0.006 
(0.623) 
        
Cash-Forward       
0.189*** 
(0.003) 
        
        
Observations 18,688 18,688 18,688 18,688 18,688 18,688 18,688 
     
Wald χ2 13.78 65.03 90.29 92.25 102.54 103.99 109.85 
        
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coefficients with significance levels p>0.1%*, p>0.05**, p>0.01***.  P-values in parentheses 
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Table 4: The relationship between political connections and liquidity (II). 
 
The table shows the marginal effects from the logistic regression expressed in the text. The sample of 
connected firms has been divided between firms connected to republican or to conservative parties: 
Republican is a dummy taking value 1 if the board contains republican politicians and 0 otherwise. 
Conservative takes value 1 if the board contains conservative politicians and 0 otherwise. Standard errors 
have been clustered by Industrial Sector. 
 
Variable 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
Republican 
 
0.225*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.121 
(0.110) 
 
0.105 
(0.146) 
 
0.122* 
(0.069) 
 
0.124* 
(0.065) 
 
0.124* 
(0.064) 
 
0.103* 
(0.074) 
        
Conservative 0.209*** 
(0.001) 
0.092 
(0.130) 
0.073 
(0.167) 
0.080* 
(0.07) 
0.083* 
(0.058) 
0.083* 
(0.061) 
0.083 
(0.102) 
        
Log Market Cap  0.112*** 
(0.000) 
0.128*** 
(0.000) 
0.135*** 
(0.000) 
0.133*** 
(0.000) 
0.134*** 
(0.000) 
0.106*** 
(0.000) 
        
Book-to-Market   0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.011) 
        
Investments 
Abroad 
   (-0.088) 
(0.149) 
-0.089 
(0.138) 
-0.089 
(0.139) 
-0.117** 
(0.032) 
        
CChange     0.047* 
(0.057) 
0.047* 
(0.057) 
0.046* 
(0.067) 
        
Div1888      0.007 
(0.603) 
0.006 
(0.623) 
        
Cash-Forward       0.187*** 
(0.004) 
 
Observations 18,688 18,688 18,688 18,688 18,688 18,688 18,688 
     
Wald χ2 15.62 76.79 134.24 221.74 347.38 441.91 261.91 
        
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coefficients with significance levels p>0.1%*, p>0.05**, p>0.01***.  P-values in parentheses 
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V. Empirical Strategy. 
As explained above, the Paris by-election of 27 January 1889 was interpreted by both 
political fronts as a plebiscite on the Republican regime. Boulanger’s electoral success 
could trigger a violent change with unpredictable consequences for republicans and their 
business connections. If ex ante investors anticipated this scenario as realistic, the ex post 
“surprise” of Boulanger’s inaction in spite of his victory should have generated a wave 
of optimism about the prospects of republican-connected companies, at least in the short 
run. This would be reflected in a relatively more positive stock market performance 
compared to the rest of firms in the days after the election. It is unclear to what extent a 
hypothetical Boulanger government would have a positive effect on stock prices of 
companies with conservative connections, therefore I have no prior as to the effect of 
Boulanger’s decision on them. In turn, the “surprise” should have no differential effect 
on non-connected firms. However, if investors considered a violent overthrow of the 
ruling government unlikely, Boulanger’s decision would have little differential effect on 
stock prices of any firm. To test these alternative hypotheses, I follow an event study 
approach based on a market model (Campbell et al. 1997, pp. 149-217; Kothari and 
Warner 2007): 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0          𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜀𝑖𝑡] =  𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
(2) 
 
Where Rit is the log return of firm i’s stock on day t, and Rmt is the log return of a 
market index on the same day. Following Le Bris and Hautcoeur (2010), I have calculated 
a daily market index based on my sample of 73 firms and weighted by market 
capitalization as follows:  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥73 =
∑ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1
73
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1
∑ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
73
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
− 1 (3) 
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Event studies allow researchers to capture and isolate the potential causes of 
variations in returns by analysing their “normal” performance in a control period before 
the event of interest (the ‘estimation window’) and their deviations from “normal” values 
in a treatment period in coincidence or immediately after the event (the ‘event window’). 
These deviations are defined by Campbell et al. (1997) as abnormal returns. The sum of 
abnormal returns in a given event window are Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑡�, 𝑡�) =   � 𝐴𝑅�
��
����
 (4) 
To make sure that the event does not affect “normal” returns in the estimation 
window, the latter should not overlap with, and should be located at sufficient distance 
from the event window. The event window should also include some days before the 
event, as investors could have anticipated its occurrence and discount its effect on prices 
in advance.  Figure 3 illustrates the timeline of my event study. A prior test excludes the 
existence of possible weekday effects on returns. Thus, they are not included in the 
estimation.  
  
Figure 2: Daily Return on Market Price Index of the Paris Bourse, from 1 March 1888 to 16 
February 1889. 
 
Own elaboration from primary sources.  
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Figure 3: Timeline of the Boulangist Campaign. 
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Following best practice in event studies, the analysis has been performed allowing 
for a 52 days gap between the estimation and the event window. Thus, the estimation 
window covers the period 1 March-26 November 1888 for a total of 230 trading days (the 
literature recommends between 120 and 270 days). The event window starts ten trading 
days before the event, on Wednesday 16 January 1889. Abnormal returns are calculated 
for two event windows of different duration to check the robustness of results: one ending 
two trading days after the election, on Tuesday 29 January (included); a second one 
ending ten trading days after the event, on Thursday 7 February (included). When testing 
the statistical significance of CARs, one must consider two potential issues that may arise. 
The first one is cross-correlation of abnormal returns, which might bias upward the tests 
of significance. However, this does not seem to be the case here. Campbell et al. (1997, 
p.168-169)) argue that, in case of multiple event windows, if they do not overlap, it is 
reasonable to assume the absence of cross-correlation, while Kothari and Warner (2007) 
(following Brav 2000, Mitchell and Stafford 2000, and Jegadeesh and Karceski 2009) 
suggest that cross-correlation is relevant only in long-horizon event studies. The second 
problem is event-induced volatility, which arises when different events are clustered in a 
short period of time, making it unclear which one is really affecting the variations in the 
estimates. This issue can be dealt with by implementing a standardised cross-sectional 
test, also known as a BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991), to solve potential issues in volatility 
changes. Furthermore, the chronicle of the events of January-February 1889 do not 
suggest the existence of other events likely to cause abnormal returns in the event 
windows analysed. 
VI. Results and robustness tests. 
First, I test the existence of abnormal returns for firms grouped by industry, in order to 
rule out the possibility that they interfere with the results obtained for political 
connections. As shown in Table 5, estimates for windows ending two and ten days after 
the election find no statistically significant effect. The transport industry is the only sector 
showing significant and positive CARs in the ten-day window; however, this sector 
represents a very small share of politically connected firms (see table 2). On the contrary, 
no sectoral CARs can be observed in highly politically connected sectors, such as banking 
or railways. 
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Table 5: CAR by Industrial Group. 
 
 2 Days 10 Days 
Banking 
-0.008 
(0.152) 
-0.008 
(0.210) 
Canals 
-0.170 
(0.689) 
-0.179 
(0.432) 
Docks & Water 
0.015 
(0.306) 
0.001 
(0.852) 
Gas & Electricity 
0.012 
(0.373) 
0.012 
(0.439) 
Insurance 
-0.0002* 
(0.100) 
-0.007 
(0.321) 
Iron 
-0.187 
(0.490) 
-0.136 
(0.527) 
Mines + Warehouse 
-0.002 
(0.801) 
0.008 
(0.567) 
Railway 
0.004 
(0.536) 
0.021 
(0.114) 
Transports 
0.023 
(0.221) 
0.051** 
(0.021) 
Various 
-0.013 
(0.295) 
-0.047 
(0.315) 
 
P-Value significance levels, p>0.1*, p>0.005**, p>0.01***, in parentheses 
 
 
The cumulative abnormal returns for connected (to any faction), republican, 
conservative, and non-connected firms are shown in Table 6. In both event windows the 
results suggest a positive effect of Boulanger’s step-back for republican firms. In the 
window ending two days after the election, they obtained, on average, 0.6 per cent higher 
returns than the rest of the firms in the sample at the 10 per cent level of significance. In 
the window ending ten days after the election, they show a 1.5 per cent cumulative 
abnormal return at 5 percent of statistical significance. No other group experienced a 
significant variation in returns after the elections in any of the event windows. However, 
this effect is not observable for politically connected firms in general (both to republicans 
and conservatives). In fact, neither firms connected to conservatives nor non-connected 
firms experienced significant abnormal returns. 
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Table 6: CAR by Political Affiliation. The effect of Boulanger’s refusal. 
 2 Days 10 Days 
Politically connected 
 
0.003 
(0.379) 
 
 
0.009 
(0.438) 
 
Republican Board 
 
0.006* 
(0.08) 
 
 
0.015** 
(0.028) 
 
Conservative Board 
 
-0.0006 
(0.929) 
 
 
-0.026 
(0.380) 
 
Non-Connected 
 
-0.022 
(0.206) 
 
 
-0.011 
(0.458) 
 
P-Value significance levels, p>0.1*, p>0.005**, p>0.01***, in parentheses 
 
 
 
  
Table 7: Placebo Test. CAR by Political Affiliation 
 2 Days 10 Days 
Politically connected 
 
-0.011 
(0.116) 
 
-0.01 
(0.442) 
 
Republican Board 
-0.006 
(0.117) 
 
-0.001 
(0.890) 
 
Conservative Board 
-0.019 
(0.258) 
 
-0.025 
(0.375) 
 
Non-Connected -0.01 (0.287) 
-0.013 
(0.117) 
P-Value significance levels, p>0.1*, p>0.005**, p>0.01***, in parentheses 
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To check if the findings illustrated in Table 6 were only driven by political factors 
and not by other exogenous causes, I perform a placebo test, choosing a new ‘event date’ 
around which, according to information from the press, no relevant event occurred. The 
selected date for this placebo test is 20 December 1888, and an event study is performed 
around this date using comparable estimation and event windows. The results in Table 7 
show no significant variations in returns, which supports the findings from Table 6.  
 
Finally, following Goldman et al. (2009), I explore which variables may explain the 
observed significant variation in CARs. The set of explanatory variables include: log 
market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio (averaged for the three months before 
the event) as common-risk factors; firm-specific controls, such as the dividend yield (also 
a three-month average), and dummies taking the value of one if the stock was tradable 
Table 8: Cross-Sectional results. The effect of political affiliation on CAR, after 27 January 1889 
 2 Days 10 Days 
Ln Market Capitalization 
-0.000678 
(0.890) 
0.0048 
(0.646) 
Book-to-Market ratio 
-7.71e-09 
(0.198) 
-8.16e-0.9 
(0.519) 
   
Republican affiliation 
0.04000*** 
(0.009) 
0.0785** 
(0.016) 
   
Conservative affiliation 
0.02378 
(0.122) 
-0.01445 
(0.655) 
   
Dividend yields 
0.06715 
(0.229) 
0.08298 
(0.482) 
   
Admission 
-0.00935 
(0.537) 
0.014346 
(0.656) 
   
Headquarters 
-0.00461 
(0.815) 
-0.04219 
(0.316) 
   
Guaranteed assets 
0.00521 
(0.857) 
-0.05356 
(0.386) 
   
Industry Controls YES YES 
R-Squared 0.4853 0.42 
N 73 73 
Prob > F 0.0016 0.014 
 
P-Value significance levels, p>0.1*, p>0.005**, p>0.01***, in parentheses 
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both spot and forward, the company had its headquarters in France, and if the company 
had guaranteed assets (as in the case of railways and some colonial banks); finally, 
dummies for republican and conservative affiliations. Industry fixed effects are also 
included. The results, shown in Table 8, confirm that political connections to republicans 
is the only variable with a positive and significant effect on CAR’s for both windows. 
 
VII. Conclusion. 
This paper explored investors’ reaction to the rise of Boulangism, a mass political 
phenomenon that shook the foundations of the French Third Republic between 1887 and 
1889. The main objective of the paper was to understand whether the Boulangist 
movement was perceived as a credible threat to the republican regime, and especially to 
the symbiotic relationship between republican parties and business elites. For this 
purpose, I reconstructed political connections for a large sample of 73 companies quoted 
in the Paris Bourse, in order to identify “republican”, “conservative” and non-connected 
firms. I found that political connections were widespread (two thirds of the firms in the 
sample had at least one politician on board), especially among large firms (80 per cent of 
the top 40 firms by market capitalization were politically connected). Among the 48 
politically connected firms in the sample, links with republican parties largely prevailed 
(63 per cent, against 37 per cent linked to monarchist forces). I also found that political 
connections contributed positively to the frequency with which stocks were traded in the 
Bourse in the period March-December 1888, which saw the escalation of the Boulangist 
movement. Finally, I implemented an event study around a critical date, 27 January 1889, 
when Boulanger, after winning a by-election in Paris that political forces regarded as a 
plebiscite on the Republic, surprisingly decided not to stage a coup d’état against the 
expectations of his supporters. I found that the stocks of “republican” firms experienced 
positive cumulative abnormal returns in a window ending from two to ten days after the 
election, whereas no abnormal returns can be observed for “conservative” and non-
connected firms. This finding suggests that investors considered Boulanger’s threat 
credible and reacted positively to his surprising decision to abstain from a violent 
overthrow of the regime, as well as to the sudden subsiding of his political movement in 
the days after the election. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Fake news and corruption in late 19th century France: The 
case of the Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Panama 
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Fake news and corruption in late 19th century France: The 
case of the Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Panama 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The Panama Scandal was a major case of corruption in the late 19th century in France, 
which affected numerous French politicians and journal directors accused of receiving 
payments to publish false positive information about the company. In addition, the 
scandal contributed to the spread of Anti-Semitism and generated an environment of 
pessimism about French politics during the 1890s. The present work studies the effect of 
media coverage in the value of the stock of the Panama Company, in the weeks around 
the failed subscription of 26 June 1888. Particularly, it studies if the massive press 
campaign developed by some newspapers contributed keeping the stock price artificially 
high. Using data on the volume and tone of news regarding the Panama Company, and 
adding new data on prices and firms' characteristics, we obtain surprising and promising 
results for further research; biased news about the Panama company had a negative effect 
on investors’ mentality, who sold their shares when new information appeared in press. 
We advance hypotheses for this counterintuitive finding. 
  
Miguel Ángel Ortiz-Serrano 
Carlos III University of Madrid – SciencesPo Paris 
Germán Forero-Laverde 
Universidad Externado de Colombia 
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I. Introduction 
In this paper we wish to discuss how fake news circulated by four different newspapers 
in France may have affected the stock of the Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Panama 
(Compagnie or Panama Company). This episode takes place during 1888, while the 
company is attempting to issue securities to fund its cash-strapped operation. Performing 
a study of this nature in present day is subject to several caveats. First, traders dealing in 
securities in markets across the world can shield themselves from fake news by resorting 
to reputable sources of information such as Reuters and Bloomberg or gathering their 
information from well-reputed financial journals such as the Financial Times. Secondly, 
the spread of algorithmic (computer-based) trading and the fact that traders do not usually 
trade based on information from social media (Facebook, Twitter, or Reddit) tilts the odds 
against finding an effect of fake news affecting global markets. Thirdly, even if private 
investors and households were to be affected by fake news, their individual impact on 
market prices is negligible due to the size of their operations when compared with that of 
institutional investors. However, this was not the case in the Paris Stock Exchange (PSE) 
during the 19th century. The market had few liquid stocks when compared to present day 
exchanges, investors in the market were tightly linked to each other, and information had 
to be gathered from hearsay and printed media (Ortiz-Serrano, 2018). 
The Compagnie Universelle planned to issue a large number of bonds to finance 
the restructuring of its project and obtain liquidity to re-pay its debts: the obligations à 
lots22. From historical accounts we know that there was pay-to-play between the 
Compagnie and the editors and journalists of at least 11 journals and periodicals between 
1880 and 1888. The idea was to attract the maximum number of investors when the issue 
took place. Furthermore, we know that payments occurred extensively between April 
23rd, when the issue of the obligations à lots the company was backed by a technical 
commission, and June 26th, when said issue took place and was substantially 
undersubscribed. Consequently, we test whether these payments had the desired effect of 
 
22 These obligations were a form of debt issue that offered a fixed interest payment and a balloon capital 
payment at the end. However, with certain frequency the company would randomly select a subset of a 
bonds in a lottery and would prepay the full amount of said bonds. Since the lottery component of the bond 
made the maturity date of the issue stochastic, bearers of the bond were paid an above market coupon on 
the security. 
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raising the stock’s price and return so as to bait potential new investors, or if, otherwise, 
these payments had no substantial effect on investors’ behaviour.  
To answer this question, we build a new database of daily news coverage on the 
Compagnie by four different French newspapers between 1 March and 26 June 1888. The 
choice of this period is warranted both from a historiographical and a statistical 
perspective. First, most of the payments (bribes) to journalists took place in this period 
(see Bouvier, 1964, pp. 101-108). Second, this time interval represents a turning on 
investors’ mentality. We use these data to complement the database built by Ortiz-Serrano 
(2018) that offers broad daily coverage of 73 liquid stocks from a variety of sectors traded 
in the Paris Bourse from 1 March 1888 to 16 February 1889, used to study the economic 
effects of the Boulangist campaign, testing if political affiliation of firms affected their 
value during a period of political turmoil. We have expanded the time span of the previous 
database until 10 November 1887, by adding daily price data of the correspondent 73 
firms and its internal information from 1887 and 1889. Including additional past 
economic information allows us to use a broader set of tools of statistical analysis on 
finance. From a methodological perspective, we use two different pricing models: the 
CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Black, 1972) and the Fama-French (1992, 1993) 
three factor model, to establish whether news coverage and tone had an effect on the 
excess return on the Compagnie’s stock beyond the expected effect of market, size and 
value factors. Furthermore, we test whether this effect was different in the days prior to 
the announcement of the issue on 23 April 1888 and during the days running up to its 
failure (26 June 1888). We find evidence of a negative and significant effect for both 
news coverage and tone throughout the period of study. The effect disappears or becomes 
substantially less significant for news prior to the announcement of issue on April 23rd. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient for news under a variety of specifications is negative, which 
indicates that an increase in news coverage and a more positive tone redounds in lower 
excess returns for the stock of the Compagnie. This result is robust to several tests, the 
inclusion of control variables, and after controlling for days in which positive and true 
news appeared in the media. 
To make sense of this counterintuitive finding. We test if it is possible that investors 
in the market knew already that the company’s issue was going to underperform and, 
consequently, observing very positive news in the media produced a cognitive dissonance 
that redounded in increased selling pressure. We find this is not the case since the 
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dividend yield, which according to Fama (1970) efficient market hypothesis incorporates 
all available information, decreases as positive news ensue. This confirms that prices do 
increase with positive news, regardless of their veracity, but that they increase well below 
what is predicted by our pricing models.   
Consequently, to test why stock prices increase less than what the model predicts, 
we explore whether it is possible that a subset of investors, who were privy to the planting 
of fake news, were extracting rents from the markets. It would be possible that they 
purchased stocks before the news were published and that, as prices increased with the 
news they would undo their positions at a profit. To test this, we use leads in our measures 
of coverage and tone and find that the coefficient for both becomes positive and 
significant five days before the news are published.  in advance to the occurrence of 
variations in the excess returns. These results merit further research as to the possibility 
that investors would buy stocks before the positive news would appear, and as prices 
increased, they would sell the stock on the day that news were published. This suggests 
that investors were following the market adagio “buy with the rumour and sell with the 
news”.  Since we know that the news that would appear at time t had no support in reality, 
it is impossible that there was a rumour to buy on at time t-5. Consequently, we expect 
that the same people that were planting the news were exploiting a market manipulation 
scheme. 
The Panama Canal Scandal is interesting and relevant as an object of study because 
it shook French public opinion in 1892, when a massive network of corrupted links 
between politicians, journalists, and the managers of the Compagnie Universelle du Canal 
Interocéanique de Panama became public. The use of check-book journalism and 
lobbying was extensive, and the Compagnie’s director, Ferdinand de Lesseps, used 
money and moral suasion to warrant good coverage for the company.  Furthermore, the 
case represented a turning point in the social perception of corruption in France, definitely 
contributing to the process of discredit in which republican parties had been immersed 
since the ‘Krach de l’Union Générale’, in 188223. Additionally, it paved the way for the 
subsequent strengthening of far-right forces when the Dreyfus Affair broke out in late 
1894 (Celestin & DalMolin 2007, p. 117). In the same line as socialists and anarchists, 
 
23 The fourth article of the present dissertation offers a wider explanation of the Krach de l’Union Générale. 
Apparently, it was a typical case of bankruptcy. However, it finally affected to French daily political and 
social life. The Union was created to be the bank for French Catholics, and its direct competitors were 
closely related to the Rothschilds, a well-known French Jewish family. 
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the French far-right movement criticized the progressive process of industrialisation and 
political liberalization in France, although in their case they did so from a nostalgic point 
of view: They considered that the new republic and its economic framework had made 
France lose its national identity and social values, sustained historically by the Crown and 
the Catholic Church. Moreover, they blamed the new liberal bourgeoisie for the situation, 
addressing most of their hostilities against prominent French Jewish families. The fact 
that the main implicated were Jews—Jacques de Reinach and Cornelius Herz—, gave rise 
to a wave of Anti-Semitism in the country. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section II presents the historical context. Section III presents data collection and stylized 
facts. Section IV presents the methodology. Section V presents the results and provides 
potential explanations of the outcomes obtained. Section VI advances some hypothesis 
for further research. A final section concludes. 
II. Historical Context. 
The weeks around the Congress of the “Société de Géographie de Paris” of May 1875 
(the Geographical Society of Paris) were characterised by a generalised optimism about 
the feasibility and the positive implications that this project had for France. The main 
debate concerned the most feasible way to build the canal (Bouvier 1964. pp. 34-35). On 
the one hand, there were partisans of a canal made of locks (sluice-gates) crossing 
Nicaragua. On the other hand, there was a proposition for a sea-level canal that would 
cross the isthmus of Panama. While the costs of the second option were much higher, its 
construction was more ambitious and resulted more attractive for De Lesseps who would 
be named president of the Compagnie after his success in building the Suez channel 
(inaugurated in 1869). De Lesseps, when issuing the first set of stocks and bonds to fund 
the works in December 1880, assured that the sea-level canal was a feasible option, and 
the costs would not be more than 500 million francs.24 The emission would be 
 
24 In a legal report from 1893 belonging to the investigation of the Panama Canal, Jules Fabre, an officer 
from the Civil Court of the Seine registered that the initial intention of De Lesseps was to spend no more 
than 500 million francs in the project. He was completely sure about this because the engineering firm in 
charge of the works, Couvreux et Hersent assured the construction of the sea-level canal at this price. The 
author extensively criticized De Lesseps for the unrealistic promises made to potential investors from the 
early beginning of the project, which final costs -of the unfinished canal- rose in 1888 up to 1,335,000.000 
francs. The digitized report, obtained from the Archives du Crédit Agricole, is available in Appendix 2.   
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complemented with a massive press campaign that could attract the maximum number of 
investors.25  
The plan for the Panama Canal was approved in an atmosphere of generalised 
enthusiasm and optimism. A new society was created and planned to issue securities to 
finance at least the early stages of the work. Ferdinand De Lesseps believed that his 
condition of national hero was to attract investors, based on his previous success in Suez. 
Since the first attempt to issue a set of  shares a year before had been an absolute failure, 
De Lesseps developed an intensive agenda publicizing the new project as a promising 
enterprise that would be highly profitable during the following decades. Figure 1 shows 
the path  of the Panama Canal, as planned in 1886, still without locks, crossing the isthmus 
of Panama from North (Atlantic Side) to South (Pacific Side). The original idea, in 1880, 
was similar to the map shown in the figure, trying to avoid the maximum number of 
natural obstacles. 
A consistent analysis of the future works would have revealed that the terrain 
presented numerous difficulties that would make the sea-level option impossible. A less 
ambitious lock-canal would have allowed to control for every event, such as landslides 
or the rainy season. As works were supposed to evolve gradually, a technical commission 
 
25 The next section shows archival evidence of the large initial investment in advertising 
performed by the Compagnie Universelle. 
Figure 1:  Map of the works in the Panama Canal, 1886. 
 
Source: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b53022647k/f1.planchecontact.r=panama%20canal 
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would have control of the project at every moment. Degos & Hauret (2008) study the 
causes of the fall of the Panama Company, signalling three unforgivable mistakes in the 
organization of the project, since inception. First, production issues as there were no 
consistent technical studies. Information was at best partial regarding the expected 
duration of the project, the machinery to be employed during excavations, and the 
geological composition of the land where they had to work. Second, financial forecasts 
and capital budgeting were incomplete; De Lesseps was not a specialist in stock markets, 
and promoted the creation of assets that, in general, were unattractive to investors: The 
Second Empire had promoted the construction of expensive and big infrastructures, under 
the railway-mania. However, the crisis of 1873 and the progressive technological 
transition taking place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries may have changed investors’ 
mentality, who were probably more likely to invest in other projects that required less 
time to be profitable: Improvements in private transports and its efficiency, the expansion 
of the electric grid, the boost of communications -telephones, telegraphs, etc.-, or the lack 
of support from the central state to this kind of infrastructure works may have contributed 
to the apparent lack of investor interest. Additionally, the works coincided with a period 
of economic downturn in France, affected by an economic crisis since 1882, and investors 
might have been reluctant to acquire stocks from companies immersed in projects 
perceived risky, or economically futile. Finally, there were issues with communications 
and marketing. Despite the massive flows of money to newspapers, the Panama Company 
used traditional methods to attract investors, trusting in the magnetism of Ferdinand De 
Lesseps. However, markets had progressively transformed into dynamic places in the late 
XIX century, where competition increased substantially, and economic agents had to find 
alternative ways to promote their products and attract new capital. The project might have 
never been perceived by investors as a solid enterprise, partially due to the lack of 
consistent information about it, and the progressive expansion of international markets, 
which offered less risky investments around the globe.  
As an example, the process of colonisation -among other things- could have opened 
the gate to invest in cheap and potentially more profitable markets, requiring lower initial 
costs. In addition to this, the progressive integration of world markets may have offered 
new investment opportunities, more attractive and less risky than the construction of a 
canal in Panama. As an example of the progressive diversification of French capital since 
the 1880s to the First World War is shown below in Tables 1 and 2, extracted from Esteves 
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(2011). In this work, the author gathers a new set of French financial data to show the 
composition of the French foreign portfolio and its evolution during the Belle Époque 
(1880-1913). The article provides information about the sectorial distribution of French 
capital, and its concentration, among other characteristics such as the market value of a 
typical French portfolio. As can be observed in Table 1, investors diversified it during the 
30 years prior to the First World War; initially focusing most of their capital in Europe, 
it progressively was addressed to different places, such as Latin America, the US and 
French African and Asian colonies. Nevertheless, between 1880 and 1890, when the 
Panama Company was actively working in the isthmus, Latin America enjoyed of little 
attention, capturing 4.5 and 6 percent of total French foreign investment, respectively. At 
the same time, continental Europe and Africa received far more capital. Particularly, 
Europe was the destination of about 70 percent of French capital, and Africa -on average- 
received the 20 percent.26 
Table 1: Geographical distribution of French private portfolio. 
Region 
 
France 
1882 1892 1900 1913 
     
Europe  69.2 70.7 53.4 39 
(with Turkey) 73.7 74.7 60.2 43.9 
North America 1.1 0.8 1.7 12.8 
(United States) --- --- 0.5 10.1 
Latin America 4.5 6.0 10.6 21.2 
Africa 20.7 18.5 27.4 19.8 
Asia/Pacific 4.5 4.0 6.9 7.25 
(without Turkey)   0.1 4.9 
Total in billion francs 1.5 2.4 2.9 10.1 
Source: Rui Esteves (2011). The values are expressed as a percentage of the total market value. The 
original document can be consulted in the following link: https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/oxfwpaper/534.htm 
 
 
26 Additionally, the Colombian nineteenth century is plagued by civil wars and political instability which 
may have further discouraged foreign investors. The civil war between centralists and federalists (1812-
15), the War of Supremes Guerra de los Supremos (1839-41), civil wars (1851, 1854, 1860-62, 1876-7, 
1884-5, 1895), the War of a Thousand Days Guerra de los Mil Días (1899-1902). Additionally, Colombia 
has 9 political constitutions during the nineteenth century: 1811, 1821, 1830, 1832, 1843, 1853, 1858, 1863, 
and 1886  (Bushnell, 2013).  
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Table 2 offers a decomposed analysis of French investment in the same period as 
Table 1. We can see some evidence of the progressive productive and technological 
change taking place in the late 19th century society, from the point of view of a French 
investor: If expensive projects such as railways received most of capital by 1892, it had 
decreased in 19 percentage points in 1913. Additionally, public-funded projects became 
progressively less important on the eve of the First World War. On the other hand, 
investment in raw materials showed a clear growth since 1880, as well as manufacturing 
activities.  
 
It is difficult to establish a causal relationship between this apparent structural 
change in the world economy and the lack of interest of French investors regarding the 
works in Panama. Probably, the enterprise would have captured more interest if it had 
taken place during another period, when large-scale projects were more popular among 
investors. For example, the construction of the Canal of Suez had occurred less than a 
decade before (1869), and it was strongly supported by the Egyptian administration, 
Table 2: French portfolio composition by sectorial distribution. 
Sector 
France 
1882 1892 1900 1913 
     
Provincial and Municipal 0.7 0.0 0.0 3.5 
Railroads 48.7 56.9 36.2 38.1 
Public Utilities 16.8 16.6 20.0 11.8 
Finance 28.3 20.2 15.8 26.1 
                         (Banks) (15.6) (8.8) (5.3) (12.0) 
                         (Real Estate) (9.5) (10.0) (8.8) (13.7) 
                         (Insurance) (3.2) (1.4) (0.4) (0.1) 
Raw Materials 4.4 3.9 22.1 14.5 
                         (Mining) (4.4) (3.9) (22.0) (9.7) 
Industrial and Other 1.1 2.4 6.0 6.3 
                         (Manufacturing) (1.1) (2.4) (6.0) (5.8) 
Source: Rui Esteves (2011). The values are expressed as a percentage of the total market value. The 
original document can be consulted in the following link: https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/oxfwpaper/534.htm 
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whose Viceroy had a close friendship with De Lesseps27-. On the other hand, the political 
instability that Colombia experienced during the whole period, characterised by armed 
conflict and the geopolitical pressure of the United States, could have made that French 
investors saw this area as dangerous and unattractive.  
The company issued its first—successful—tranche of securities in late 1880 and 
was incorporated with a capital of 300 million francs  (600,000 shares of 500 francs). In 
a report from 1880 obtained from the Archives du Crédit Agricole28, it is specified that 
the costs would vary between 550 and 600 million francs, although the “competent 
parties” estimated that they would never be more than 450 million francs. As the firm had 
developed an extensive campaign of advertising to attract the maximum number of 
investors, investing close to 800,000 francs (Bourson, 2000; p. 17), the pamphlet devoted 
most of its pages encouraging French capitalists to invest in the project. As an example, 
the paragraph below shows the tone of the final part of the document: 
Honour is due to M. de Lesseps. To his genius it was reserved to make better what 
was imperfect in the creation. The success of his first work is a warrant for the second. 
(…) Any capitalist shall subscribe; Panama is worth four times as much as Suez29. 
  
 
27 For further details on the construction of the Canal of Suez, Hamza and Abdel Latif (2003) offer an 
extensive analysis of the origins, works and engineering activities regarding the project. 
28 We cannot identify the tabloid publishing the brochure in question. It could have perfectly been “Le 
Capitaliste”, a financial newspaper that was published four times per month. Moreover, it seems to be 
formal document that enjoyed from certain credibility, and the information provided coincides mostly 
with that appearing in the extensive research of Bouvier (1964), Mollier (2014) and Bourson (2000). 
The whole document is available in the Appendix 2.  
29 The document is also available in English at the online repository of the University of California, in 
the following link: https://library.ucsd.edu/dc/object/bb82962678. The statement has been extracted 
from the English version. 
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Table 3: Expected dividends and prices for shares of the Suez and the Panama companies. 
Forecast done in 1880 
 
 
Compagnie de Suez Compagnie de Panama 
 
% yearly 
growth 
Year Dividends Stock Price Dividends Stock Price 
      
10% 
1886 42.4 1,060 101 2,531 
1887 46.78 1,169 116.75 2,920 
1888 51.16 1,279 135 3,375 
1889 55.54 1,388 154.90 3,862 
1890 59.92 1,498 176.50 4,412 
      
      
5% 
 
1891 64.30 1,607 188.75 4,720 
1892 68.68 1,717 201 5,025 
1893 73.06 1,826 214.75 5,370 
1894 77.44 1,935 229 5,725 
1895 81.82 2,045 224 6,100 
      
Source: Archives du Crédit Agricole. Cote : DEEF 2371-1 
 
The Canal was supposed to provide substantial benefits to investors its first years 
of functioning, from 1886 to 1895. Table 3 shows the main expectations expressed in the 
1880 brochure, about the dividends paid and the average stock price of the Compagnie 
du Canal de Suez, compared to the Compagnie Universelle de Panama. Table 4 shows 
the comparison between the expected traffic and income generated by the Suez and the 
Panama Canals, respectively. There was a generalised optimism with respect to the future 
profits derived from the project. 
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Jean Bouvier (1964, p. 77) indicates that by 1886, the Compagnie’s advertising expenses 
associated with publicity for the new issues in French newspapers was substantial. Thus, 
although shareholders and particularly the international press were aware of the problems 
experienced during the works, the French press ignored them and showed a positive tone 
and confidence in the company. For instance, Le Figaro expressed the newspaper’s 
opinion in the following manner -when the Assembly of Shareholders was taking place, 
in July 29th, 1886: No disagreement in the assembly. No hand raised against the 
company’s prospects. It was a great patriotic claim! Thus, there seems to be a contrast 
between the tone of news in France and abroad, in regard to the Panama Company. Figure 
2 shows the title of an advertisement encouraging people to invest in the first issue, as an 
example of the intensive campaign developed by De Lesseps30. Although the firm was 
created with 600,000 shares, only 590,000 were sold publicly in the Paris Bourse. The 
document follows with an optimistic text from De Lesseps, in defence of the project. In 
addition, it was accompanied by several statements from French government and 
financial press. For example, the newspaper Le Commerce from New-York described the 
works as a highly profitable enterprise, which traffic will never be less than six million 
tonnes per year. Moreover, Voisin-Bey,  a French engineer in charge of the technical 
 
30 The whole document is available in the Appendix. 
Table 4: Expected traffic and yearly income of the Suez and the Panama Canals. 1880 Forecast. 
  Suez Canal Panama Canal 
% yearly 
growth 
Year Traffic per tones 
Income 
generated  
Traffic per tones 
Income 
generated 
      
10% 
1886 71,080,000 192,000 110,500,000 303,000 
1887 75,460,000 204,000 121,800,000 334,000 
1888 79,840,000 216,000 133,880,000 367,000 
1889 84,220,000 228,000 146,945,000 403,000 
1890 88,600,000 240,000 161,500,000 442,000 
      
      
5% 
1891 92,980,000 252,000 169,620,000 465,000 
1892 97,360,000 264,000 177,915,000 487,000 
1893 101,740,000 276,000 187,030,000 513,000 
1894 106,120,000 288,000 196,480,000 538,000 
1895 110,500,000 300,000 206,380,000 565,000 
      
Source: Archives du Crédit Agricole. Cote : DEEF 2371-1 
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commission of the project, recommended the construction of the Canal in this area, 
apparently the best place from a geographical perspective. 
The first issue of stocks provided around 74 million francs used to cover advertising 
costs, first prospecting works, wages, etc. The only firm willing to develop a sea-level 
canal at the isthmus was the one formed by Couvreux and Hersent. The costs of the 
enterprise were always a persistent problem for the firm from the onset. During the first 
year of works, the initial costs were about 45 million francs, although the acquisition of 
the Panama Railroad Company for 91 million francs boosted them31. The main French 
banks, although initially reluctant to invest large amounts of money in the project, 
facilitated the emission acting as intermediaries -which reported to them high 
commissions from operations. In the same pages, Bouvier (1964) reveals that the French 
 
31 See Bouvier (1964, pp. 47-57), for a wider explanation about the initial costs of the Panama Company. 
Robert Courau (1932, p. 145) sets the purchasing costs of the Panama Railroad Company in 93 million 
francs. In any case, it seems that it oscillated around 90-100 million francs. In 1881 negotiations between 
the Panama Railroad Company (PRC) and de Lesseps began so that the Compagnie would purchase the 
PRC through a stock swap. The contract of 1878 established that compensation would have to be given to 
the PRC by the compagnie in case of a company purchase and that the Colombian government was entitled 
to half of it. However, since the merger occurred through a stock swap, no compensation was paid. While 
the Colombian government sued the PRC in the Supreme Court, nothing came of this proceedings 
(Cavelier, 2003). 
 
Figure 2:  Advertisement of the Panama Company in 1880. 
 
Source: Archives du Crédit Agricole.  Cote : DEEF 2371-1. 
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Haute Banque guaranteed the initial costs by creating a “syndicat”, which thereafter 
regained its investment plus some interests. Banks such as Crédit Lyonnais, Société 
Générale or Crédit Industriel et Commercial took part on it. These commissions, plus the 
sums paid for advertising soon increased the initial costs prospects. The extensive demand 
for liquidity required raising additional funding early on. De Lesseps, when hiring 
Couvreux and Hersent, had predicted a final cost of less than 600 million francs. In the 
advertisement mentioned in Figure 3, Mrs Couvreux and Hersent assured that the 
enterprises would never be more than 512 million francs. Both estimates seemed  
unrealistically low. 
The initial project had a longitude of 65 kilometres, and the route avoided numerous 
obstacles, such as mountains, that were present in alternatives routes. However, both the 
Culebra Massif at the core of the route, and the unsanitary weather conditions, were to 
play a key role in the project’s failure. Nowadays, this massif is known as the ‘Gaillard 
Cut’. As can be observed in Figure 3, it was the main barrier for the works, due to 
landslides. The more the workers attempted to cut the massif, the more numerous were 
the avalanches. These accidents caused important delays in the works and increased 
considerably the costs of exploitation. A canal of locks would have allowed for a better 
control of land, since the works would have evolved in a more gradual trend. Additionally, 
the climate conditions and tropical diseases in the massif caused numerous deaths, which 
contributed to the expansion of pessimism among workers. Yellow fever, choler, and 
malaria were among the most common diseases behind the death of around 21,900 
workers between 1882 and 1888. While some have indicated that the Company’s rivals 
exaggerated the number of casualties, it is true that the place represented a threat for 
workers’ health, specially to Europeans. The impossibility of progressing through the 
Culebra Cut forced Couvreux and Hersent to abandon the project in 1882. Despite that 
by 1885 the works had not experienced substantial advances, De Lesseps continued 
assuring that the canal would be operative by 1889. The few milestones achieved in the  
period 1881-85 elevated the expected costs to 700 million francs, which compromised 
the financial situation of the firm and the viability of the project. This led the firm to issue 
new securities that alleviated the situation, albeit temporarily. A set of bonds (obligations 
nouvelles), which should provide about 600 million francs, was raised in 1886.  
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In 1887, the doubts about the economic viability of the project spread amid 
investors. Financial markets mirrored these concerns with important sales during the year. 
The operational were increasing substantially, and there were no breakthroughs at the 
Culebra Cut. Finally, Ferdinand de Lesseps realised that the achievement of a sea-level 
canal was impossible in the time due. The sea-level canal represented an unbeatable 
challenge for the engineers, whose technology could not perform appropriately at the 
Massif: Avalanches had not stopped since the early times of the enterprise, and the 
number of workers’ deaths was inacceptable. Additionally, the continuous delays in the 
canal had increased the costs and worsened the economic health of the company. While 
the complexities of the operation ensued, the firm was experiencing liquidity shortages, 
and it was necessary to find new financing sources, as soon as possible, to obtain at least 
an additional amount of 600 million francs of funding and complete the project.  By late 
1887, De Lesseps recognised too that the canal was not to be operational in 1889, and he 
needed to restructure the project in a very short time span to motivate investors. He 
appointed the prestigious engineer Gustave Eiffel -who was building the ‘Eiffel Tower’ 
for the centenary of French Revolution-, to design a canal of locks over the same route.    
The new plan allowed for a better control of geographical accidents at the isthmus, 
and would lower the costs of the exploitation, which had more than doubled since 1880. 
Figure 3:  Graphical example of the Culebra Cut. 
 
Source: Coureau (1932, pp. 144-145). 
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De Lesseps promoted the issue of a completely new set of titles, the obligations à lots 
(lottery bonds) in March 1888. Two years before, due to similar reasons, the company 
had attempted to issue the same type of assets, but the request was refused by the 
Parliament, despite the comments of the ‘Rousseau’ report, which recommended the 
support of French government to the project  (Courau, 1932, p. 171). In the opinion of the 
expert, the construction of the canal would be impossible without additional funding and 
substantial changes in the planification. De Lesseps had attempted to obtain governmental 
permission -by addressing personally to the minister Maurice Rouvier to issue a set of 
obligations à lots, which in principle would provide 600 million francs of funding-. 
However, it was finally rejected by the technical commission evaluating the operation 
(Bouvier, 1964, pp 74-75). 
Table 5: Security emissions since 1881 to March 1888 (in francs). 
Date of Emission Number of titles 
Price paid in 
the market 
Income generated by the 
emission 
7 September 1882 250,000 shares of 500 francs. 5 %. 437.5 F 109,375,000 
3 October 1883 600,000 shares of 500 francs. 3 %. 285 F 171,000,000 
25 September 1884 478,762 shares of 500 francs. 4 %. 333 F 145,190,000 
3 August 1886 
458,802 ‘Obligations Nouvelles’ of 
1000 francs. 3 %. 
450 F 206,460,000 
26 July 1887 
258,887 ‘Obligations Nouvelles’. 
2
nd
 Series of 1000 francs. 3 %. 
440 F. 113,910,000 
14 March 1888 
350,000 ‘Obligations Nouvelles’. 
3
rd
 Series of 1000 francs. 3 %. 
460 F 35,031,000 
Source : Jean Bouvier (1964, p. 81) 
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Table 5 accounts for every security issue made by the company, and its conditions. 
It is noteworthy that in most cases the market paid less than the nominal value of the 
securities issued. This is an indication that funding was scarce, at least for the Compagnie, 
which may suggest that investors did not trust management to be able to fulfil its 
obligations 
De Lesseps implemented an extensive strategy of media coverage and advertising, 
to pressure French politicians. The commission in charge of studying the request of the 
Panama company submitted a favourable report the 23 of April 1888, and French 
parliament approved the request the 28 of the same month. During these days, an 
impressive growth in the value of the stocks of the Compagnie took place, mirroring the 
sudden enthusiasm of French investors regarding the future of the company. The final 
approval to the Obligations à lots was given by the French Senate on June 8th, enacting 
the law approving the new emission the following day. The emission was settled for the 
26th of June. Despite the massive campaign of promotion developed by De Lesseps—
which included the massive funds given to the main French newspapers and some 
important politicians—the emission failed. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the share price 
for the Panama Company. As it can be observed, the value of the stock experiences a 
sharp rise after the favourable report from the technical commission in charge, in April 
23rd. The price of the firm remains high until some days before the issue of June 26th, 
when the price drops substantially.  
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The sudden drop in the price was attributed by De Lesseps to the ‘attacks of the 
enemies of the company, who wanted to make the enterprise fail’, extending rumours 
about the death of De Lesseps.32 These declarations do not fit with the optimistic tone 
used by newspapers in the days around the emission. Authors such as Bourson (2000) and 
Mollier (2014) pointed that the firm, in the first months of 1888, had bribed numerous 
journalists (and politicians), in order to show a positive image of the company. This action 
would calm markets down and silence the existing rumours around the complicated 
financial situation of the firm, due to the difficulties experienced during the works and 
the high indebtedness. The tone of the articles can be observed as follows: 
• Le Gaulois, 20 June 1888: (…) The news regarding the subscription of the lottery 
bonds are excellent. It is true that the bearers of titles from the company of Suez 
will use their right of preference during the emission (…).  
 
32 Jean Bouvier, 1964 (p. 96) 
Figure 4: Price in francs of the main share of the Panama Company.    1st Nov. 1887 – 16th Feb. 1889. 
 
Source:  Own elaboration from the data of the ‘Bulletin de la Cote’, at Gallica. 
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• Le Temps, 16 June 1888: (…) We have really good news from the lottery bonds. 
We remind to the bearers of titles of Suez and Panama that they have preference 
for the emission of the next 26th of June. 
• Le Figaro, 23 June 1888: (…) We know that the subscriptions for the next lottery 
bonds of the Panama Company reach already an impressive amount. Why? The 
title is completely guaranteed, which is complemented with the expectation of 
earning extra profit after the lottery (…). 
The day before Le Figaro published this article, the stock from the Panama 
Company dropped substantially. The following days, these newspapers continued 
spreading excessively optimistic information regarding the emission and the financial 
health of the company. The market remained relatively calm after the 26th of June, until 
the late November, when De Lesseps attempted to issue a new set of bonds to save the 
company, which was in serious problems. The Parliament refused the new emission, and, 
the 15th of December of 1888 the firm declared its bankruptcy. The Compagnie de 
Panama was finally dissolved the 4th of February of 1889, 10 years after its creation 
without ever having completed the excavations at the Culebra Cut. 
III. Data collection and stylised facts. 
We use as a starting point the dataset from Ortiz-Serrano (2018) which includes a set of 
73 liquid firms of the Paris Bourse. We collect additional data for four months, on a daily 
basis, expanding it from 1st November 1888 to 16th February 1889, which allows us to 
have a sufficient control period for our econometric calculations. Table 6 shows the main 
variables contained in our database which includes: market capitalization, dividend 
yields, book-to-market ratios, and daily prices among others. The database was collected 
from the ‘Bulletin de la Cote’, the daily spreadsheets of the Compagnie des Agents de 
Change -the organisation in charge of managing and regulating transactions in the Paris 
Bourse- the Archives du Crédit Agricole and the Annuaire Chaix, a yearbook published 
by the company ‘Imprimerie Chaix’. The last two sources contain descriptive information 
on accounting and the composition of the board from most of the firms in the database. 
Additional information about the sources can be found at Ortiz-Serrano (2018) or is 
available upon request. 
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To test whether the press campaign of April-June 1888 had any effect on the value 
of the Panama Company, we have compiled data from 4 important newspapers, which we 
know received abnormal payments on the months before the issue: Le Petit Journal, Le 
Temps, Le Figaro and Le Gaulois. Jean Bouvier (1964; pp.101-104) points out that the 
experts Flory and Rossignol found that these newspapers, among others, received 
substantial payments specially after the emission of August 1886.  Particularly, Le Petit 
Journal received around 100,000F; Le Figaro between 30,000F and 50,000F; Le Gaulois 
10,000F and its directors around 20,000F. Bourson (2000; p. 62) shows that only the 
Table 6: Description of the main variables used. 
Price  Pt 
Closing prices for each firm in the database. Missing data were filled using 
the last available observation. 
Liquidity 
A dummy variable, taking value 1 if the asset has been traded during the 
day in question, and zero otherwise. 
Return 𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑡 𝑃𝑡−1⁄ ) 
Market Capitalization The price of the stock multiplied by the number of shares issued. 
Market Return Market return indices both equally weighted by market capitalization. 
Book-to-Market Ratio 
The ratio between the book value (common shareholders’ equity) and 
market value (market capitalization). 
Industry Industrial sector of the firm. 
Admission 
The way in which the stock is allowed to be traded, either ‘À Compte’ et 
‘À Terme’ (ACAT), or only ‘À Compte’ (AC). The stocks in the first group 
allowed both spot/cash and forward operations. 
Capital The capital of the firm. 
Investments Abroad If the company has investments outside of metropolitan France. 
Capital Change 1888 
A dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm changed its capital in 1888 and 
0 otherwise. 
Dividend Yields The dividend of the year in question divided by the price every day. 
Own construction from primary sources: Archives du Crédit Agricole, Gallica, and CAEF. 
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newspaper Le Temps, managed by the Senator Hébrard, received 1,500,000F. The 
amount the Compagnie destined to ‘advertising expenses’ almost doubled during 1888, 
based on Flory and Rossignol’s calculations. While it is difficult to estimate the exact 
amount of the payments, we know their goal was to paint an optimistic and positive 
picture of the Panama Company, without mentioning the weak financial situation of the 
firm.  Since we know that publications did not coincide with the reality of the company 
and overly optimistic expectations of the coming issue were unrealistic, we will refer to 
them as fake news. We have collected newspapers information from 1 March to 1 
September 1888, the period where payments are known to be at the highest levels33. 
Particularly, we count the number of paragraphs showing information about the Panama 
Company over the total number of paragraphs in the newspaper. A paragraph usually 
appears separated from other paragraph by either double space, asterisks (*), a straight 
line (- ) or a subtitle in bolds. Sometimes, there is no clear division between paragraphs, 
and the sheet is separated by columns. The procedure here has been dividing the columns 
in three parts, being each of these parts a ‘paragraph’. This action has been the same for 
all newspapers with a similar format, which allowed to control for the size of the article 
and establishing a common procedure for every newspaper. In addition, advertisements 
have not been counted as paragraphs, to prevent an artificial growth of irrelevant 
paragraphs in the newspapers. The only exception has been the advertisements of the 
Panama Company, which have been considered intrinsic information about the firm, for 
the obvious reason that it was an abnormal situation. Finding advertisements in non-
economic press encouraging people to invest in determined projects was uncommon.  
Thus, the sharp increase in coverage experienced by the Panama Company is in line 
with the findings of the accounting experts studying the Scandal in 1892-93. Furthermore, 
all the journals contained a daily story, occupying around one third of a page. As it was 
 
33 The Panama Company bribed numerous journals’ directors to spread positive information 
about the project and encourage French investors to subscribe to the issue of the 26 June 1888. The 
successive audits during the investigation of the 1890s found that the payments to journals increased 
substantially in 1888 (See Bouvier, 1964, pp. 101-118). Rossignol, in 1889, observed that the weeks 
before and after any issue since 1886, newspapers such as Le Petit Journal, Le Figaro, or Le Gaulois, 
received abnormal amounts of “advertising expenses”. Jacques de Reinach, the manager in charge of 
these expenses, had destined about 2,800,000 francs to French newspapers. He concluded that the 
public information about the company’s health was contradictory, and numerous important details were 
hidden. This conclusion was confirmed by the other expert, Flory, in 1892 (ibid). Bourson (2000, p. 
62) mentions the same journals, and reproduces the testimony of De Lesseps (ibid, p. 75), who 
recognised to have paid at least 50,000 francs out of advertising expensed to Arthur Meyer, the director 
of Le Gaulois. Based on this information, we assume that payments were higher in the selected period 
than in other time interval, when the company did not issue new shares. 
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common for all, these stories have been counted as one paragraph unless there is a clear 
separation with the symbols previously established. The reason is, again, to avoid the 
inclusion of irrelevant information in the index, leaving space only for current news and 
articles talking about French politics, economy, international affairs, cultural life, etc.  
The tone of the news has been accounted for, to capture substantial changes after 
two dates of interest, from the 23 April 1888 to 26 June 1888. It has been divided between 
positive, neutral a negative news, to see whether the effect of news varies depending on 
its tone. A piece of news is positive when it provides optimistic information about the 
economic performance of the firm, a financial product—such as the lottery bonds—or the 
future of the works at Panama. A report is neutral when it provides objective information 
about the performance of the firm. For instance, if the price of the stock has varied but no 
additional information was provided. A news report is negative when it offers negative 
information regarding the performance of the company or any of its financial assets. The 
amount of negative news is negligible. An easy way to characterise tone has to do with 
the use of adjectives and qualifying words in the article. Data on newspapers have been 
obtained from Gallica, the online repository of the National Library of France. Further 
information about the sources can be found in the Appendix of primary sources. 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of coverage as a percentage of the total number of 
paragraphs in the newspaper. In doing this analysis we separate dates between those in 
which we know true news-generating events took place (we will refer to them as noisy 
dates) and those in which there is no discernible news-generating event that may be 
driving the news-cycle. We find numerous noisy dates, based on the historical literature 
of Bourson (2000), Bouvier (1964), Mollier (2014) and Degos & Prat (2008): The 14 of 
March 1888, the day where the last of the series of the emission of 1886 was issued; the 
23 and 28 of April 1888, the days when the technical commission evaluates positively the 
request of the company to issue a new set of titles, and the day when the parliament 
approves the issue, respectively. The 8 of June 1888, when the Senate approves the issue 
definitively, and the 26 of June, the day of the failed issue of lottery bonds. The figure 
shows that there are two important peaks of coverage. The days around the issue of 14 
March and the days around the parliamentary approval. In addition, we observe a growing 
attention paid to the Panama Company after mid-May to early July, which corresponds 
with the period when the Senate authorizes the emission and the days around June 26th. 
As mentioned above, several newspapers received substantial payments the weeks around 
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the failed issue. It is impossible to know the exact amount, but it clearly exceeded the 
typical advertisement expenses.  
To encourage people to invest in the issue, newspapers did not hesitate to publish 
false information, such as the fact that the titles were guaranteed34 (as most of the stocks 
of railway companies, for example). The legal document found at the archives of Crédit 
Agricole put emphasis on the false information transmitted by the Company and some 
newspapers, apparently associated to the firm. In particular, it points out that: 
(…) using every mean of advertising, (the company) had eliminated every 
independent criticism regarding its (immoral) manoeuvres and made impossible to 
know how the real situation of the company was. 
 
34 See the article from Le Figaro, mentioned above.  
Figure 5: Evolution of newspapers coverage of the Panama Company. 1 March – 30 August 1888. 
 
Source:  Own elaboration from the data of the ‘Bulletin de la Cote’, at Gallica. 
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 Figure 6 compares the evolution of the daily returns (growth rates) of the Panama 
Company and the market-wide, capitalization-weighted market return that we discuss in 
section III. The stock of the Panama company experienced much larger variations than 
the market index during the whole period. Additionally, we observe clear positive 
(negative) changes by April 23rd (June 26th). The rest of the noisy dates previously 
mentioned show substantial variations in returns too. This is reasonable because 1888 
was a turbulent year for the Company, when all its liquidity problems became public and 
it declared its bankruptcy. 
This is confirmed by Figure 7, which compares the evolution of the price for the 
Panama company and the estimation of the volatility in its daily returns using a GARCH 
(1,1) model. This model allows for time varying volatility which is a usual finding in 
financial time series (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997)35. The idea of plotting prices 
and volatility of returns in the same figure is to understand simultaneously the idea of risk 
and return, which are essential traits of any financial assets. As a final characterization of 
both time series we use the algorithm by Bai & Perron (1998, 2003) to allow for the 
identification of endogenous structural breaks. 
 
35 Hansen and Lunde (2005) show that regarding financial data it is suboptimal to use computing time trying 
to optimize the parameter choice in a stochastic volatility model. GARCH (1,1) models seem to beat a wide 
array of choices when forecasting volatility. 
Figure 6: Daily returns for the Market Portfolio and the Panama Company Stock.  
 
Source:  Own elaboration from the data of the ‘Bulletin de la Cote’, at Gallica. 
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In the price series we find three structural breaks, one on April 21st, the second one 
on July 2nd, 1888, and the final one on November 13th, 1888. It is noteworthy that the first 
two breaks limit cleanly the period of where we expect to find significance for the news 
variable. With regards to the GARCH volatility, we find two structural breaks on July 
12th and November 13th, 1888. To signal for the structural breaks, dotted lines in Figure 
6 show the average value of the variable between breaks. Before April 23rd, 1888, the 
series are characterized by a moderate volatility, which can be attributed to the doubts 
regarding the viability of the project. A peak in the volatility is observed around that day, 
which coincides with the positive report from the technical commission. The sharp 
increase in the prices gives rise to a period of relative stability -with the price supported 
Figure 7: Stock Price and Volatility with averages between structural breaks. 
              The figure shows the evolution of both series. In green, the price series of the Panama Company. 
The dotted dark blue line shows the GARCH (1, 1) volatility trend of the main share of the 
Panama Company. The left axis shows the percentage change in volatility, whereas the right 
axis shows the price levels of the stock. 
 
Source:  Own elaboration from the Bulletin de la Cote, and the daily spreadsheets of the Compagnie des 
Agents de Change.  
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at high levels- until some days prior 26 of June 1888. After that date, the price and the 
volatility of the stock stabilize until late November, when a structural break is observed 
in both variables, before the unravelling of December 1888. While the period of interest 
runs from April 23rd until June 26th 1888, we will use the period beginning on March 1st 
and running until April 21st as a period of control, to show that the effect of news on the 
stock price changes during what we have termed the “fake news period”. 
IV. Methodology. 
To identify the role that news may have played in the evolution of the Compagnie’s stock 
price we perform linear regressions using two standard asset pricing models: the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) as in Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black, (1972) and 
the Fama and French three-factor model (FF) (Fama & French, 1992, 1993). We use both 
models using data from March 1st, 1888 to mark Lesseps’ decision to go along with the 
issue of obligations à lots until June 26th, 1888 when the issue was fixed. The fact that 
the Compagnie’s stock price series has a structural break on April 21st is irrelevant. Since 
a break is a change in levels, the series becomes stationary when we calculate the returns. 
That is, since both models use the first differences in the logarithms of stock prices as a 
dependent variable, there is no break in the trend. In results that are available upon request 
we show that the Bai & Perron (1998, 2003) algorithm shows no evidence of a break in 
the differenced series. The idea behind these models is that the excess return in the target 
company, in our case the Canal de Panama company, defined as the daily return (growth 
rate) after subtracting the risk-free rate has a linear relationship to a series of factors. In 
all cases, we obtain the risk-free rate 𝑟𝑓 from the 3% perpetual rentes issued by the 
government and usually traded in the Paris Bourse. 
Under the CAPM model, the excess return of a stock can be explained as a function of a 
single risk factor, namely, the behavior of the excess return on market portfolio where all 
but systemic risk is diversified away (Damodaran, 2011). 
𝑟𝑝 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) 
Where all growth rates are calculated as logarithmic first differences, 𝑟𝑝 is the daily return 
for the stock of the panama company, and 𝑟𝑚 is the daily return of a market-wide, well 
diversified portfolio of stocks. For the econometric specification we use the equation in 
the following form: 
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(𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓) = 𝛽(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) 
Which indicates that the excess return of the Panama stock is linearly related to the 
excess return of the market. To build the market portfolio we calculated the stock market 
capitalization of each of the 73 stocks in the database, excluding the Compagnie’s stock, 
for the first day of the series (November 3rd 1887) and constructed a capitalization 
weighted portfolio that is representative of the behavior of the Bourse at the time. While 
unreported here, results are robust to several different definitions of the market 
portfolio.36  
Fama & French (1992, 1993) extend on the CAPM model by including two 
additional factors that account for company size and for the book/market value ratio.  
(𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓) = 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽2SMB + 𝛽3HML 
Where SMB (HML) is a factor that accounts for the differences in returns of the 
stocks of large (high book-to-market value) companies vis-à-vis small (low book-to-
market value) companies. The intuition behind including SMB is that small companies, 
characterized by low market capitalization, should offer investors higher profits than big 
consolidated companies. Conversely, HML seeks to reflect that companies whose book 
value and market value are close (growth companies) which are at the beginning of their 
life cycle, should offer investors more returns that companies with a low book to market 
ratio (value companies) which are more mature and less risky. To build both factors we 
follow Fama & French (1993). For SMB we sort companies, excluding financials by 
market capitalization on November 3rd 1887.37 and take the companies in the first (tenth) 
decile to conform the small (big) company portfolio. We then calculate the return for the 
portfolios of both groups. Finally, we subtract the series for large companies from the 
series of small companies. For HML we sort companies, excluding financials by book to 
market ratio on November 3rd 1887.38 and take the companies in the first (tenth) decile to 
 
36 We keep the weights given to each stock constant as they are correlated with the evolution of each stocks 
price. We tested whether results head if we used the market capitalization on March 1st 1888, when our 
news coverage began. Additionally, we tested excluding financials from our stock coverage as financial 
institutions behave differently from companies in the real economy. Finally. we tested whether results 
would hold for equally-weighted rather than capitalization-weighted market portfolios.  
37 Fama & French (1993) exclude financial companies from their analysis because their leverage and 
profitability ratios are usually substantially different from those in other sectors. Results are robust to the 
inclusion of companies from the financial sector. They are also robust to performing the ranking based on 
data for March 1st 1888. 
38 Results are robust to the inclusion of companies from the financial sector. They are also robust to 
performing the ranking based on data for March 1st 1888. 
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conform the high (low) company portfolio. We then calculate the return for the portfolios 
of both groups. Finally, we subtract the series for growth companies from the series of 
value companies. 
Following Dubois & Louvet (1996) and Kiymaz & Berument (2003) we include 
dummies to account for the day-of-the-week effect.39 Additionally, following our 
historical context, we construct a dummy to control for “noisy dates”, defined as those 
where events took place and consequently we are unable to discern between true and fake 
news. These dates include March 1st, March 14th, April 23rd, April 28th, June 8th, and June 
26th.40 Additionally, in an advancing hypothesis for our findings we will use the dividend 
yield for the Compagnie, that Ortiz-Serrano (2019) provides on a daily basis. The intuition 
is that, under the efficient market hypothesis (Samuelson, 1965; Fama 1965, 1970; Fama 
& French, 2008) prices incorporate all available public information. Consequently, the 
dividend yield should reflect all the information that prices incorporate as they evolve and 
that should, be related to our news variables if investors take them to offer true and 
believable information for them to act upon. Regarding the evolution of news, for each 
of the surveyed newspapers we build two different time series. The first one, regarding 
total coverage, takes the total number of paragraphs of coverage of the Compagnie in a 
given day and divides it by the total number of paragraphs in the newspaper that day. In 
this measure, we do not account for whether the coverage is positive, negative, or neutral. 
Consequently, this series cannot take on negative values. The second series, related to the 
tone of news, subtracts the total number of paragraphs with negative coverage from the 
number of paragraphs with positive coverage on the company and divides the result by 
the total number of paragraphs in the newspaper on that day41. Note that if the number of 
negative paragraphs exceeds the number of positive paragraphs dedicated to cover the 
company, this measure can take on negative values. As a single coverage (tone) series we 
will use the simple average of the four different coverage (tone) measures. Figure 8 shows 
 
39 The literature has shown the existence of the day of the week effect on stock returns and liquidity. Dubois 
& Louvet (1996) find a day of the week effect for the growth rate of eleven indices in nine countries, 
including France, in 1969-92. Kiymaz & Berument (2003) find evidence of a day-of-the-week effect in 
volatility and volume for 5 countries, where France is not included. In no case do we find evidence for a 
day-of-the-week effect in the Paris Bourse during our coverage period. 
40 As a robustness test, we included not only the noisy date but a 3-day and five-day window around the 
noise date to account for the possibility that the market anticipated the news or that true news had a 
persistent effect. The coefficients for noisy dates ±3 and noisy dates ±5 were insignificant in all 
specifications and are unreported. 
41 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒−𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑠
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the evolution of both series. Note that, even though it is possible, the tone variable only 
takes on a negative value at the beginning of the series. This shows that, in general, the 
coverage of the company in our four chosen newspapers was positive. 
 
 
V. Results. 
In a first set of regressions, we use both the CAPM and FF models with day-of-the-week 
and noisy dates control (models 1 and 4). We then include the average news coverage 
variable (models 2 and 5), and finally include the interaction between the news coverage 
variable and a dummy that takes the value of 1 for dates on or after April 23rd, that date 
when the technical commission issued a favorable report on the issue of obligations à lot 
(models 3 and 6). Results using the coverage and tone variables are presented in the 
following tables. 
  
Figure 8: Evolution of the average news coverage and average tone in the news. 
 
Source:  Own elaboration from the newspapers obtained from Gallica. 
91 
 
 
  
Table 7: Regressions using average news coverage. 
Variables 
CAPM Fama-French 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Market excess return (𝛽1) 7.752*** 8.194*** 8.286*** 8.126*** 8.575*** 8.687*** 
SMB excluding financials (𝛽2)    2.51 2.529 2.526 
HML excluding financials (𝛽3)    -0.20 -0.224 -0.212 
Average Coverage (𝛽4)  -0.496*** -0.350  -0.502*** -0.3388 
Average Coverage post 04/23 
(𝛽5) 
  -0.224   -0.248 
Post 04/23 effect of coverage 
(𝛽4 + 𝛽5) 
  -0.573***   -0.586*** 
Monday -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.01 -0.009 -0.009 
Tuesday 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.01 0.068 0.006 
Thursday -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 0.00 0.000 0.000 
Friday -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.00 -0.004 -0.005 
Saturday 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.01 0.007 0.007 
Noisy Dates 0.205** 0.231** 0.223** 0.025** 0.027** 0.026** 
Constant -0.0001 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.012 
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 
AIC -434.2 -440.9 -440.3 -437.1 -444.6 -444.5 
BIC -413.4 -417.5 -414.4 -411.1 -416.00 -413.4 
Adjusted R-Square 0.264 0.318 0.320 0.297 0.354 0.359 
Note: Dependent variable is always the daily excess return for the Compagnie’s stock. Significance: * 90%, ** 95%, 
*** 99%. Significant coefficients of interest in bold. OLS regression without robust standard errors. Residual 
behaves as white noise according to a variety of tests. 
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Table 8: Regressions using average news tone. 
Variables 
CAPM Fama-French 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Market excess return (𝛽1) 7.752*** 8.074*** 8.097*** 8.126 8.464*** 8.491*** 
SMB excluding financials (𝛽2)    0.51 0.606 0.575 
HML excluding financials (𝛽3)    -0.20 -0.297 -0.264 
Average Coverage (𝛽4)  -0.449** -0.202  -0.469** -0.219 
Average Coverage post 04/23 
(𝛽5) 
  -0.344   -0.345 
Post 04/23 effect of coverage 
(𝛽4 + 𝛽5) 
  -0.546**   -0.565** 
Monday -0.004 -0.05 -0.05 -0.010 -0.008 -0.082 
Tuesday 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.005 
Thursday -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Friday -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 
Saturday 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.007 
Noisy Dates 0.020** 0.021** 0.019** 0.0247** 0.025** 0.0244** 
Constant -0.000 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.008 0.008 
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 
AIC -434.2 -438.2 -438 437.1 -442 -442 
BIC -413.4 -414.8 -412 -411.1 -413.5 -410.8 
Adjusted R-Square 0.264 0.299 0.304 0.297 0.337 0.343 
Note: Dependent variable is always the daily excess return for the Compagnie’s stock. Significance: * 90%, ** 
95%, *** 99%. Significant coefficients of interest in bold. OLS regression without robust standard errors. 
Residual behaves as white noise according to a variety of tests. 
  
  
93 
 
The tables show several interesting results. First, the noisy dates variable 
consistently has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This suggests that on 
the dates we are controlling for, the excess returns for the panama company were 
abnormally high when compared to the other days in the sample. Secondly, models 2 and 
5 show that both news coverage and the tone of that coverage played a role in explaining 
the growth rate in the company’s stock price. However, the sign of the coefficient is 
puzzling as we would expect that more news, particularly more positive news on a 
company, would coincide with an increase in the stock price42. The negative coefficient 
indicates that more news coverage and more positive news pushed excess returns 
downward. Still, models 3 and 6 show that this effect does not hold for the full sample. 
Once we control for news coverage and tone before and after April 23rd, we find that the 
negative coefficient is only statistically significant for the latter period (𝛽4 + 𝛽5 in both 
tables)43. To further confirm this finding, we run the Bai & Perron (1998, 2003) structural 
break tests on the coverage and tone variables. We found at least two breaks in each series 
according to the different information statistics. Interestingly, in both series one of the 
breaks occurs on April 21st, further warranting studying the effect of news before and 
after this date.44  
There are several findings in the tables that warrant further research. First, the size 
of the coefficient for the beta in the CAPM is surprisingly high. A search for sector 
specific betas for European countries at the time of this writing (July, 2019) shows that 
they range between 0.47 and 2.04.45 A value of 7 or more suggests that investors were 
 
42 In results that are available upon request we run the same regressions using the coverage and tone 
variables for each of the four newspapers independently. We find that the coefficients for coverage under 
the CAPM and FF models are negative and statistically significant for Le Figaro, Le Petit Journal, and Les 
Temps. We do not find evidence for Gaulois. Furthermore, we find that the coefficients for tone under the 
CAPM and FF models are negative and statistically significant for Le Figaro and Le Petit Journal. We do 
not find evidence for Les Temps or Gaulois. 
43 In results that are available upon request we run the same regressions, including the break in the 
coefficient after 23 April, using the coverage and tone variables for each of the four newspapers 
independently. We find that the coefficients for coverage after 23 April under the CAPM and FF models 
are negative and statistically significant for the four newspapers. Furthermore, we find that the coefficients 
for tone after 23 April under the CAPM and FF models are negative and statistically significant for Le 
Figaro and Le Petit Journal, and Les Temps. We do not find evidence for Gaulois. 
44 The remaining structural break occurred on March 14, a date we are already controlling for in the noisy 
news variable. Shortening the database further, to exclude  the march 14th break, would be ill-advised 
because the number of observations would be reduced from 97 to 83, which would make the exercise 
weaker.  
45 Data taken from http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ Data > Current data > Levered and Unlevered 
betas by industry > Europe. 
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charging the Compagnie over seven times the reward they were demanding from the 
market. As indicated in the introduction, the Compagnie’s was substantially riskier than 
the market, as its return was substantially more volatile, which would explain this result. 
A second surprising result is the lack of statistical significance for the SMB and HML 
factors. While it exceeds the scope of this article, we take this as an indication that market 
prices, or at least the price of the Panama Company stock was not necessarily driven by 
fundamentals. It would be of interest to confirm if this is a regularity for the other 73 
companies in the database or, rather if it is a firm-specific issue.  
a) Omitted market variables 
Given these results, it is possible that the news coverage or tone variables are proxying 
for some omitted market variable that is further driving the excess returns of the 
Compagnie’s stock. To test for this, following Tsay (2002) and Henning et al. (2011), we 
extract the first 3 principal components for the variance-covariance matrix of the returns 
of the 73 companies that we cover in the database.46 These factors explain over 57% of 
the variance in the Paris Bourse during our sample period. We then perform a two-stage 
least squares regression. In the first stage we regress the excess return for the Panama 
Company stock on the first principal components, achieving an R-squared of 0.68 (model 
1). In the second stage we regress the residual of the first stage on the average coverage 
a tone variables (models 2 and 4 respectively). Finally, we include the interaction between 
coverage and tone and the time dummy that takes values of one for dates on or after April 
23rd (models 3 and 5). We present results in the following table. 
Results indicate that even after controlling for the elements that may explain over 
two-thirds in the variance of the Compagnie’s stocks, coverage on the Company and its 
tone remains as an explanatory factor, but only after April 23rd. The coefficient remains 
negative and statistically significant, which suggests that our findings presented in tables 
7 and 8 are not driven by an omitted market variable. If we include the fourth principal 
component, regression in model 1 reaches an R-squared of 0.95. While, in results that are 
available upon request, we find news and the tone of news become insignificant after 
including the fourth principal component, it is noteworthy that neither of the variables are 
correlated with any of the principal components. However, accepting the results including 
the fourth principal component would imply that 95% of the variance in the Panama 
 
46 This idea resembles the implementation of the Arbitrage Pricing Theorem from Ross (1976).  
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Company stock is due to market changes and only 5% is due to firm specific events. 
Studies by Rey (2015), Passari & Rey (2015), and Miranda-Agrippino & Rey (2015), as 
well as several authors who study dynamic beta models (Ross, 1976; Campbell, Lo, 
Mackinlay, 1997; Cochrane, 2005; Lo, 2007; and Fama & French 1992, 1993, 2008), 
have shown that common factor models do not usually explain more than 40% of the 
variance of an individual stock47. Consequently, we argue that our results are sufficient 
to indicate that our news variables have explanatory power over the excess return of the 
company, which is firm specific and uncorrelated with market forces. 
Table 9: Explanatory power of news beyond market forces 
 
Stage 1 Stage 2 (Y is residual of stage 1) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Principal component 1 (𝛽1) -0.023     
Principal component 2 (𝛽2) -0.099***     
Principal component 3 (𝛽3) 0.228***     
Average Coverage (𝛽4)  -0.1956* -0.144   
Average Coverage post 04/23 (𝛽5)   -0.078   
Post 04/23 effect of coverage (𝛽4 + 𝛽5)   -0.222*   
Average tone of coverage (𝛽6)    -0.247** -0.178 
Average tone of coverage post 04/23 
(𝛽7) 
    -0.095 
Post 04/23 effect of tone of coverage 
(𝛽6 + 𝛽7) 
    -0.274** 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 
AIC -508.90 -515.90 -514.30 -516.90 -515.20 
BIC -498.60 -510.80 -506.60 -511.80 -507.50 
Adjusted R-Square 0.68 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
Note: Dependent variable in model 1 is the daily excess return for the Compagnie’s stock. Dependent variable in 
models 2-5 is the residual in model 1. Significance: * 90%, ** 95%, *** 99%. Significant coefficients of interest in 
bold. 2SLS regression. 
 
47 As an example, Fama & French (2008) use an 11-factor model, an extension of their 1993 seminal paper, 
to explain the monthly cross-sectional returns of the US stock market from 1963 until 2005. The highest 
R2 in their paper is 0.08 
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VI. Explaining the negative coefficients for coverage and tone. 
The fact that the coefficient for coverage and tone of coverage in Tables 7 and 8 is 
negative indicates that it is not that the market excludes the informational content in the 
news. Rather, what it signals is that positive or additional coverage in the news, 
particularly after April 23rd 1888 was taken as a signal to drive prices down. In our view, 
this can happen for one of two reasons. On the one hand, it is possible that the market 
believed that the additional coverage was an attempt either by the company or by the 
newspapers to trick them into buying the new stock issue. On the other hand, it might be 
that a market manipulation scheme was in place and that those who paid for the additional 
positive coverage were purchasing the stock before the news came out and selling as the 
news was revealed to the whole market. This would follow the market adagio of “buying 
with the rumor and selling with the news”. 
a) Dividend yields and news. 
As indicated earlier, the efficient market hypothesis states that prices, which result from 
discounting all future cash flows that the company will pay its stockholders, incorporate 
all available public information (Samuelson, 1965; Fama 1965, 1970; Fama & French, 
2008). Consequently, the dividend yield should reflect all of the information that prices 
incorporate as they evolve and that should be related to our news variables if investors 
take them to offer true and believable information for them to act upon. To test this 
hypothesis, we regress the dividend yield on a linear time trend and our noisy dates 
dummy (Model 1). Subsequently we include the average coverage and average tone of 
coverage variables (Models 2 and 4 respectively). Finally, we include the interaction 
between the coverage and tone of coverage variables with a dummy that takes the value 
of one on or after April 23rd. Results are presented in the following table. 
Results show that once we control for the difference in behavior before and after 
April 23rd, news have no explanatory power before the announcement of the issue but 
have a negative effect thereafter. The interpretation of this is that before April 23rd 
investors did not take news about the company into account, either in a positive or 
negative fashion. This, of course, warrants further research as it is surprising that 
professional investors would not include innovations in information in their expectations 
of dividends and, consequently, on their valuations of the stock. Conversely, after April 
97 
 
23rd, the coefficient takes on the expected negative sign meaning that prices were 
increasing with positive innovations in information.  
This suggests that, while stock prices were increasing with the appearance of news, 
regardless of whether they were fake or true, prices should have increased more, 
according to both valuation models. The following figure shows the observed prices of 
the Compagnie´s stock as well as the price-paths predicted by the CAPM and FF models 
using models (3) and (6) from table 7. The left-hand axis presents the prices for each of 
the series in French Francs (lines). The right-hand axis presents the accumulated 
difference in returns between what each of the models predict and the observed behavior 
of prices (bars) 
  
Table 10: The explanatory power of news over the dividend yield 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Average coverage (𝛽1)  -0.599*** -0.008   
Average coverage post 04/23 (𝛽2)   -0.98**   
Post 04/23 effect of coverage (𝛽1 + 𝛽2)   -0.106***   
Average tone of coverage (𝛽3)    -0.66** -0.044 
Average tone of coverage post 04/23 (𝛽4)     -0.041 
Post 04/23 effect of tone of coverage (𝛽3 + 𝛽4)     -0.084** 
Trend 
-0.00021 
*** 
-0.0002 
*** 
-0.00017 
*** 
-0.0002 
*** 
-0.00019 
*** 
Noisy dates 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Constant 0.782*** 0.0786*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 
AIC -826.2 -831.3 -835.3 -830.8 -829.4 
BIC -818.5 -821 -822.4 -820.5 -816.5 
Adjusted R-Square 0.759 0.773 0.785 0.772 0.771 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is the daily dividend yield for the Compagnie’s stock. Significance: * 90%, 
** 95%, *** 99%. Significant coefficients of interest in bold. 2SLS regression. 
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We find a consistent underperformance of the Company´s stock when compared 
with what the CAPM and FF models predict. A possible interpretation for this 
underperformance is that, in the face of positive news appearing in the newspapers some 
investors were buying the stock of the company while a subset of investors were 
purposefully selling the stock as the information appeared. The fact that the stock price 
increases indicates that demand was stronger than supply throughout the period. Thus, 
the number of investors selling the stock with the news was substantially smaller, and 
weaker, than the group of investors buying the stock. We can fathom two reasons to 
explain why a subset of investors would be selling the stock with the appearance of 
positive news. On the one hand, it is possible that they did not believe such positive news 
and but rather that the company was trying to trick new investors into buying the stock 
and, as holders of the security, preferred to liquidate their position. On the other hand, it 
is possible that some investors that were privy to the planting of fake news (insiders) tried 
to take advantage of it and purchased the stock before the news appeared in the media 
Figure 9: Observed price underperformance. 
 
Source:  Own elaboration from the newspapers obtained from Gallica. 
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and sold their positions with the news. To prove these hypotheses, ideally, we would need 
to have daily information about the composition of stockholders of the company to study 
whether changes were substantial throughout the period of study. Since this information 
is not available it is impossible to provide information about the first explanation to the 
presence of selling forces in the market. 
b) Planted news and insider trading. 
However, with the available information, we can delve deeper in the “insider trading” 
hypothesis. As a thought experiment, suppose agent A is going to plant a piece of fake 
“positive” news about company B in newspaper C. It would be in A’s best interest to 
purchase the stock of B before the news comes out (buying with the rumor) and then, as 
the news breaks, sell the stock of B to an unsuspecting agent D (selling with the news). 
This is a form of rent extraction, from D to A, through the use of fake news. To test 
whether this might be the case, we use the CAPM model specification in model 2 from 
Tables 7 and 8 but include news coverage and the tone of news coverage with several 
leads. This is a way of testing whether the future behavior of news may explain the current 
behavior of the stock return. A positive coefficient would indicate that the news that will 
come out in the future have a positive impact on the value of the return today, and thus 
may be a first indication of a market manipulation scheme.  
The figure below presents the value of the coefficient for coverage (left column) 
and tone (right column) to different leads under model 2 in Tables 7 and 8. The top row 
presents results for the full sample, the middle row presents results for the period before 
April 23rd, and the bottom row presents results for the period after April 23rd. The 
continuous line indicates the value of the coefficient while dotted lines indicate the 95% 
confidence interval. Red boxes mark coefficients that are statistically significant. Results 
for news coverage during the post April 23rd period show evidence of a negative 
coefficient contemporaneously and a positive coefficient with five leads (five trading 
days in the future). All other coefficients are statistically insignificant. In the case for tone 
in the news coverage, we also find the positive coefficient when we displace the news 
variable five days in the future. While this is not a smoking gun, it does coincide with our 
predictions that the future behavior of news may have some explanatory power on the 
present behavior of returns.  
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Our results suggest then that as fake news were planted for the following week, a 
group of insider traders with knowledge of the strategy would buy stocks with the 
intention of selling them once the news became public and make a profit with the price 
increase. Further research should be aimed at studying the volume and direction of 
intraday trades and to try to find contemporary accounts that support this finding 
Figure 10: Coefficients for leads on news time series. 
 
Source:  Own elaboration from the newspapers obtained from Gallica. 
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VII. Conclusions 
The results appearing in this paper shed light on the role and scope of press during the 
late 19th century in France. First, an extensive campaign of advertising and coverage over 
a particular asset or firm may have had a different effect than expected. In this case, 
economic reasoning suggests that the offensive performed by some newspapers -accused 
of corruption three years after- publishing an abnormal amount of -positive- news relative 
to the Panama Company, should have encouraged investors to massively participate in 
the issue of 26 June 1888. 
However, the negative coefficients indicate that investors interpreted this 
information in the opposite way. The excess of information regarding the Panama 
Company may have caused investors to interpret that the firm was experiencing economic 
difficulties, and that the ‘lottery bonds’ were not to be as profitable as both the company 
and newspapers were saying. Additionally, it is possible that there was some privileged -
hidden- information regarding the real situation of the Panama Company, that made 
investors distrust the newspapers. This is difficult to know, since there is no written 
evidence of this. However, it is plausible since investors in the late XIX century were, 
usually, a specialized group of people, normally belonging to an economic and political 
elite that had better access to information than the rest of the population. Bouvier (1964) 
points out that the big investors were always reluctant to invest in the project, since they 
considered that it had numerous intrinsic complications that compromised its viability. 
Finally, international press -and financial newspapers- may have offered a different 
portrait, giving details about the progress experienced at the isthmus of Panama and the 
economic circumstances around the Compagnie Universelle. This option deserves further 
research, through the analysis of the tone and the attention paid to the project by 
Colombian and European newspapers. 
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Abstract 
 
The present work analyses the economic effects of the Dreyfus Affair, from 1894 to 1899. 
We study if widespread campaigns of Antisemitism affected the performance of Jewish-
connected companies in the Paris Stock Market. By gathering a new dataset from primary 
sources, we find a negative short-term effect on Jewish connected firms after Dreyfus’ 
public humiliation, the 5 January 1895. Furthermore, in the long-term, we observe a 
persistent positive and significant effect on the performance of Jewish companies after 
Émile Zola published his famous articles J’Accuse!, the 13 January 1898. The subsequent 
campaign supporting Dreyfus’ rehabilitation may have caused this change in the overall 
value of firms with Jewish connections. 
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I. Introduction 
The present article analyses the economic effects derived from the most influential case 
of Antisemitism in the late XIX century: the Dreyfus Affair. It began in December 1894 
with the conviction of the Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a military officer of Alsatian and 
Jewish origins, accused of being a German spy. Even when an investigation in 1896 
identified Ferdinand Esterházy, another Army major, as the likely real culprit of treason, 
the evidence was suppressed and a military court acquitted Esterházy after a short trial. 
Dreyfus was then accused again with additional charges based on falsified documents. 
However, the news about the Affair quickly spread, culminating in the writer Emile 
Zola’s famous open letter “J’Accuse”. Public pressure led to another trial in 1899, 
resulting in another conviction with a 10-year sentence, but Dreyfus was pardoned and 
released. Eventually Dreyfus was exonerated in 1906 and reinstated in the French Army. 
The trial, its subsequent controversy, and the rehabilitation of the captain split the 
country in two sides, Dreyfusards (supporters) and Antidreyfusards (opponents). The 
situation reached its climax when Émile Zola published J’Accuse!, his famous column at 
L’Aurore, in January 1898. A wave of violence against Jews spread across the country -
specially in Algeria-, whereas the group supporting the rehabilitation of the captain grew 
more and more. Authors such as Burns (2014), Bon (2006), Joly (1992) or Birnbaum 
(2014), among others, have tried to provide an explanation to the social reactions 
regarding the Affair, by analysing the different trends followed by French Anti-Semitism 
during the XIX century. Even some decades after Dreyfus’ rehabilitation, some authors 
and a substantial share of French population still considered the captain to be the real 
traitor. This is the case of Henry Coston, a far-right writer considered as the ideological 
heir of the most-known Antisemitic personality in the XIX century: Édouard Drumont48. 
The last half of the XIX century was characterised by a rise of xenophobia in Europe, 
particularly Antisemitism. Jews have a long history of discrimination and repression, 
although they witnessed considerable achievements in their political rights after the 
multiple liberal revolutions of the 1800s. The pogroms of the early 1880s affected to their 
situation in Western Europe and gave rise to a wave of Anti-Semitism. In addition, it 
changed the ethnic composition of some countries such as France or Germany, since 
 
48 Coston took the direction of the journal ‘La Libre Parole’, founded by Drumont in 1892. He continued 
attacking writing with the same tone as his predecessor did. A recognised Anti-Semite and Nazi 
collaborationist, he published numerous volumes where he criticised Jews, including Dreyfus. Other groups 
that were object of his attacks Masons, Leftists and some bourgeois families. 
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many Jewish families emigrated to France. Other reasons that indirectly contributed to 
the rise of Antisemitism in France could have been the defeat against Germany in the 
Franco Prussian war, and the humiliating peace; the Boulangist campaign, and the 
multiple corruption cases of the 1880-90s -The Scandale des décorations, the Kratch de 
l’Union Générale, or the Scandale de Panama, among others-. As in the bribery scandal 
of the Panama Company, newspapers played a key role in the effect that the Dreyfus 
Affair had in French public opinion. In fact, among Anti-Semitic press, fake news 
regarding the captain and the evolution of the case dominated its tone and its rhetoric. 
These newspapers used every piece of information to throw multiple attacks; against 
French government, against the alleged economic alliance between Jewish bankers 
(industrials) and republicans that would destroy the country, and against the new liberal 
order that threatened the traditional Christian values of French society.  
As pointed out before, the best example of an Anti-Semitic newspaper was La Libre 
Parole of Édouard Drumont. Nevertheless, other newspapers such as La Croix played an 
active role during the Affair; this was the reference for French conservative Christians, 
who felt attacked by the young republican regime and its secular laws. Since 1881, French 
government developed an exhaustive campaign to reduce the influence of Catholic 
Church in the daily political and sociological life of the country to its minimum level. 
Promoted by Jules Ferry49, republicans enacted the law of universal and secular education 
in 1881, banned the access of religious orders to the educative system, and established 
the compulsory teaching of French language, causing a progressive abandonment of 
regional dialects. La Croix, founded in 1883, gave voice to Catholic discomfort and 
disappointment. Pierre Sorlin (1967, p. 117), analysing the role of this newspaper during 
the Affair, identifies three factors as its main objectives (trio de la haine). First, they 
attacked Protestantism, assumed to be an Anglo-Saxon invader aiming to replace the 
traditional French Catholicism. Second, the Jewry, whose members wanted to ransack 
the wealth of the nation. Last, the Freemasonry, which aimed to demolish the soul of 
France. Along its paragraphs, the newspaper related in multiple time this hypothetical 
trio with the financial power of modern capitalism, managed by international Israelites. 
During the Dreyfus Affair, its tone became progressively more aggressive against Jews, 
 
49 Jules Ferry was an important personality of the early 3rd Republic. Belonging to the parliamentary group 
of the ‘Opportunists’, he became the Minister of Education between 1879-1882, and Prime Minister in 
1880-81 and 1883-85. Apart from his passionate defence of French Colonialism, his most important 
heritage was the creation and development of a modern and universal system of public education, that 
aimed to educate a new generation of republicans, who identified themselves with the new regime. 
106 
 
justifying the episodes of violence taking place in different parts of the country, such as 
in Alger in 1898. Other newspapers such as Le Petit Journal or Le Gaulois -a former 
Boulangist journal- positioned always against Dreyfus, although their -Antisemitic- tone 
was less pronounced than La Libre Parole or La Croix, which clearly identified with 
Antisemitism. The division between Dreyfusards (pro-Dreyfus) and Antidreyfusards 
(anti-Dreyfus) newspapers had a strong effect in public opinion, which in the subsequent 
years positioned in one of these two sides. If in 1894-95 Dreyfusards were a clear minority 
and almost nobody questioned Dreyfus guilt’ except his family. When in late 1897, 
Mathieu Dreyfus -the captain’s brother- publicly accused the Commandant Esterházy to 
be the real guilt, the scandal broke out.  
Figure 1 shows an example of the attention paid to the Dreyfus Affair by La Croix; 
in particular it depicts the share of the total surface providing information about the 
Dreyfus Affair. As can be observed, La Croix devoted up to a 53% of its total surface to 
follow the scandal in late 1897. This trend is followed by every French newspaper in the 
same period, as will be shown in section IV, which analyses in more detail the role of 
press between 1894 and 1898. Although the main objective of the present research is to 
 Figure 1: Surface of La Croix covering the Dreyfus Affair, as a percentage of the total surface. 
 
Source: Sorlin (1967, p. 127). 
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study the economic consequences of the Dreyfus Affair, the wide coverage that it had in 
press is important to understand how it affected in sociological terms. Collecting daily 
information from a sample of five French newspapers, we study the evolution of 
Antisemitism in France during the Affair, and we interpret the information as an example 
of the perception of French society regarding Dreyfus guilt’ and the reopening of the case. 
Among other things, we observe that around 1897 there is a substantial increase in the 
coverage of the Affair, and a growth of social polarisation around the role played by 
Dreyfus, Esterházy, and by French government.  
The Dreyfus Affair can be framed within the increasing social tensions in France 
during the 3rd Republic, as well as the wide debate generated across time is considered by 
many French historians such as Jean Garrigues (1992) a direct consequence of the 
populist Boulangist campaign. This movement, initially supported by extreme left, 
received the public support of right-wing forces once they saw on it an opportunity to 
overthrow the liberal republican regime (Ortiz-Serrano, 2018). Even when we cannot 
assure that the Boulangism was at the origin of fascist movements in France, it gathered 
numerous far-right nationalists. Lyn-Fuller (2014) considers that it definitely served as a 
reference for the subsequent Antisemitic boost during the Dreyfus Affair. In his own 
words, without Boulanger a part of the Boulangist movement evolved towards irrational 
nationalism. This group, rather than providing a democratic alternative to the regime,  
became progressively more extremist, refusing the acceptance of republicanism made by 
some members of the right. They used all the necessary means to keep social tensions 
high, such as manifestations, strikes and riots.  
This increase in tensions is well reflected in the work of Michael Marrus (1972), 
where one may observe the evolution of Anti-Semitism in France in the years before the 
Affair, and how public opinion changed it perception regarding French Jews across time, 
up to considering them guilty of most of the problems affecting the country. A more 
recent study about French Jewish economic and political elite is that from Cyril Grange 
(2016). The exhaustive historical analysis made in this work represents the historical basis 
for the present study; the genealogical roots of the main Jewish branches based in France 
at the time of the Affaire Dreyfus are explained, as well as the work shows us how 
important families such as the Rothschild, Bloch, or Pereire were.  
Most of the Dreyfusards argued that he was arrested to hide the identity and protect 
the real traitor, Ferdinand Esterházy. The reasons for which French military authorities 
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protected Esterházy remain unknown. Some might say that it was because French 
politicians and officers, being aware of magnitude of their error, wanted to hide the proofs 
to preserve their professional reputation. Additionally, Dreyfusards argued that the Jewish 
condition of Albert Dreyfus affected negatively to the final decision of the court; in part, 
it was due to the massive Anti-Semitic campaign developed by French conservative press. 
It is known too that some members of the French military staff were extremely Anti-
Semites, such as the Lieutenant Du Paty de Clam50. These officers, probably highly 
influenced by Anti-Jewish propaganda, were convinced about Dreyfus’ guilt, and refused 
any alternative. It is difficult to know why the military court and French government 
constantly rejected reopening the case, keeping Dreyfus imprisoned event when most of 
the proofs against him were confusing and weak. Both the government and the military 
staff knew that the proofs had been manipulated. However, pressured by extremely 
conservative sectors, they might have acted to prevent a socio-political scandal -as finally 
occurred-, or to protect themselves for the errors that they had committed. 
We examine the influence and the effect of different events during the Affair on 
corporate behaviours and performances. First, we examine event dates that presented 
important surprise signals of revelations and changes of public opinion, of the 
government’s position, and of political movements. They include e.g. public revelations 
of important proofs in the trials, trial dates, demonstrations, publication of important 
articles (such as Zola’s “J’Accuse” or key articles on Drumont’s journal La Libre Parole), 
elections, etc. We will systematically encode the type of signals each of those dates may 
have revealed. Second, we collect a new database on firms with and without Jewish 
connections for the period 1894-99, based on Grange (2016) and Paul Levy (1960). The 
firm-specific information has been obtained from the Annuaire des Agents de Change51. 
The CAC52 was the organization in charge of registering, allowing and supervising every 
transaction at the Paris Stock Market. The Annuaires are available at the Archives of the 
French Ministry of Finance53 (SAEF). It was complemented with two additional sources: 
The internal information of firms listed at the Paris Stock Exchange obtained from the 
Archives du Crédit Agricole, and the Annuaire Chaix54 available at the National Library 
of France. The Annuaire Chaix was collected and published yearly by the Imprimerie 
 
50Bon, D. (2006). L'Affaire Dreyfus. Editions de Vecchi. 
51 For the years 1894, 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900 and 1914. 
52 Compagnie des Agents de Change. 
53 https://www.economie.gouv.fr/saef 
54 See Imprimerie Chaix, 1894. Annuaire-Chaix. Les principales sociétés par actions, Paris. 
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Chaix, an important contemporaneous printing house. The Annuaire Chaix contains full 
names of board members, instead of only surnames in the Annuaires des Agents de 
Change. Daily data on prices was collected from the Bulletin de la Cote, the daily 
spreadsheet published by the Compagnie des Agents de Change. It is available in Gallica, 
the online repository of the National Library of France55. 
We develop an extensive analysis of the Paris Stock Market, by selecting different 
dates that are assumed to be important, based on the existing literature and newspapers’ 
coverage. We use standard financial methodology as in Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay 
(1998), Fama-French (1992) and Fama-French (1993) to implement a series of statistical 
analyses as in Fisman (2001), Goldman et al. (2008), and Braggion and Moore (2013). 
We study the short and long-run evolution of the value of Jewish and Non-Jewish 
companies in our database, and if they were affected by the multiple episodes of tension 
and social polarisation around the Dreyfus Affair. In the short run, we see that bad news 
about Dreyfus -which usually were accompanied by a marked Antisemitism- during the 
period 1894-96 affected negatively to the performance of Jewish-connected firms. 
However, the long-run analysis shows a different picture after 1898. By using a 
Differences-in-Differences specification, we observe a persistent recovery in firms’ value 
after the publication of J’Accuse!, the 13 January 1898. After this date, the Dreyfusards 
developed a campaign to rehabilitate the Captain and to repeat the trial. Jewish-connected 
firms exhibited permanent higher returns. The results show that financial markets are a 
good indicator of changing preferences among investors and can be used as a tool to study 
the economic effects of discrimination. The Dreyfus Affair was not part of a generalised 
plan of extermination of Jews, as in the Nazi Period. However, it polarised French society 
and contributed to a growth of Antisemitism in the country, reaching episodes of violence 
in early 1898, specially in Algeria. The following paper sheds some light on the economic 
consequences of the Affair. Section II summarises the political, economic and 
sociological framework around the late 19th Century France, showing the evolution of 
Antisemitism before the Dreyfus Affair. Section III summarises the main events of the 
Dreyfus Affair. Section IV describes the process of data collection. Section V shows the 
main results, and section VI concludes. 
 
 
55 https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb32745962x/date.item. 
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II. Historical Background 
a) The situation of French Jews in the period 1860-1890 
The last decades of the 19th century witnessed a growth of Anti-Semitism in European 
countries. Jews were accused of treason and corruption, as they had ‘no nationality’ and 
‘no attachment’ to the nation where they lived in. For Anti-Semitic partisans, Jews were 
only Jews, and there was no possibility for them to be guided by Christian principles of 
personal integrity and patriotism. In France, however, they had enjoyed from a better 
situation than in other European territories since Napoleon I, who had confirmed many 
of the social rights acquired during the French Revolution. Thus, Jewish communities 
were given an equal legal status than any citizen in the country, which meant that they 
were, from this moment, allowed to pursue professional and political activities as any 
other French person. The 2nd Republic and Napoleon III improved considerably the civil 
rights of French ethnic minorities considerably. Is in this moment when most of the most 
known Jewish families come into business and political activities, as an attempt to 
integrate in French upper-class; they participated in railway companies, transports, 
textile, and banking activities, among others. This is the case of the Pereire family, whose 
members experienced substantial economic progresses under the Second Empire56. Other 
important families that improved substantially their condition were the Rothschild, the 
Halphen, or the Camondo. Some of their members participated actively in politics and in 
numerous industrial activities. However, this apparent success was one of the sources of 
Antisemitism in France, since French Jews will be criticised for accumulating too much 
economic power and having large political influence. 
The progressive integration of Jewish families in French cultural and social 
framework was known in France as ‘L’Assimilation’. This term implied not only a larger 
participation in French society, but a generalized acceptance of French political system 
and its cultural history; it implied a progressive abandonment of Jewish traditions, 
secularization (some members from the most prominent families abandoned the most 
orthodox branches of Judaism), and the adoption of a new social identity, completely 
integrated in the late XIX century. This trend did not change with the arrival of the Third 
Republic in 1870, when ‘L’Assimilation’ became the main option for most of them. It was 
not exempt of controversy, and the most conservative Jewish communities saw this as a 
 
56 Grange, C. (2016, pp. 99-106). For more information about the families (Jewish and non-Jewish) that 
dominated the economic life of the Second Empire, see Stoskopf (2002, vol. 7). 
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renounce to its cultural heritage. Marrus (1972) offers an extensive analysis of this 
process, and the main difficulties found by those Jews who accepted the French socio-
political framework. 
One may ask why Antisemitism grew in that proportion by the end of the 19th 
century, if most of French Jews have attempted to assimilate the cultural and social values 
of their country. It is probable that the reasons differed in each country. However, there 
could be some common factors contributing to the idea that Jews were different than no-
Jews. One of them was the growth of “scientific” racism in European societies. The idea 
of a superior race or nation, destined to dominate the world, with better culture, tradition 
and ideas than other ethnic groups, was very popular during these years. The debate in 
science (medicine, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, etc.) about the superiority of 
certain ethnic groups was normalised. Its analysis comprised the study of craniums, skin 
colour, social history, and the hypothetical personality that any ethnic group had. The best 
example in France was Ernest Renan, who attempted to provide a “scientific” explanation 
to ethnic differences, and specially tried to prove that “Semitic races” were inferior than 
other people. In his famous conference at the “Cercle Saint-Simon”57 called “The Judaism 
as a race and religion”58, he depicted the main points of his theory. To him, Jews were 
different to European Christians not only in cultural terms, but in racial terms -which is 
intrinsically linked to its religious affiliation-. Considered an intellectual authority for 
French far right, his ideas contributed to provide a -false- theoretical basis for French 
Antisemitism in the late 19th century59. 
Belonging to an ethnic group could be a pride as well. Marrus (1972, pp 24-42) 
demonstrates that some French Jews showed their condition as something positive, that 
made them different to other communities. To them, spreading knowledge about the 
history and culture of the people of Israel could help to fight against the growth of 
Antisemitism in France, as it happened in other countries. That was the case of the 
“Alliance Israélite Universelle”, an organisation that supported the rights of Jewish 
communities worldwide60. This society had the support of moderated Christians and 
seculars, as well as members of many political parties with no clear religious affiliation. 
 
57 An organisation that tried to expand French cultural and political influence around the world. 
58 Original name: Le Judaisme comme race et comme religion.  
59 A volume “showing” the differences between Jews and Christians is: Le judaïsme et le christianisme: 
identité originelle et separation graduelle (1883) 
60 Founded by Adolphe Crémieux, the minister who had given full political and social rights to Jews living 
in French Algeria.  
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However, it was also object of numerous criticisms from Anti-Semitic movements from 
its foundation, by arguing that their main goal was to attack the State and destroy its 
cultural and religious heritage. These actions pursued, in many ways, the integration of 
French Jews into modern societies. Paradoxically, these efforts were seen by Anti-Jewish 
groups as a perfect excuse to attack them: Because of the efforts of some of them to 
integrate in the French bourgeoisie, they were considered as one of the main supporters 
of the “political establishment”. 
b) The economic trigger of French Antisemitism in the late 19th century: The 
Crash of the Union Générale. 
The arrival and stabilisation of the 3rd Republic was not exempt of difficulties since its 
early beginning; the Paris Commune, the resistance of some conservative sectors to the 
reforms of the 1880, the numerous scandals of corruption among moderate republicans, 
or the populist Boulangist campaign were some of the factors contributing to the rise of 
polarisation among French society. Nevertheless, the Krach (Crash) de l’Union Générale 
could be considered at the origin of the rapid growth of Antisemitism in late 19th century 
France. Created in 1875, the Union Générale was initially conceived to operate as a 
Catholic institution; that is, it would search funding from religious institutions and 
catholic entrepreneurs and it would -in principle-, grab away the market share of Jewish 
and protestant bankers. Verdès (1965, p. 130), remarks the European orientation of the 
bank in her analysis, in terms of investments and financial activities. Particularly, the 
Union focused on Austria-Hungary, the “Catholic land par excellence”. In fact, the true 
reason was to create a powerful bank able to fight the interests of the Rothschild family 
in Austria-Hungary, by founding and controlling the Austrian Österreichische 
Länderbank61. When the Union Générale started to fund the construction of the Balkan 
railway, it witnessed a rapid increase on its market value. The stocks of the company 
became in an attractive product for speculators, who started to trade massively with its 
shares in the forward market. Investors renewed their contracts immediately after their 
settlement hoping to obtain higher profits (White, 2007, p. 128), believing that the upward 
trend of the prices would not stop. Had the speculative spiral of 1882 not attracted people 
from multiple social stratums -with little knowledge in financial markets-, the effect of 
the crash would have been much lower. As in every financial bubble, many small 
investors believed that it was an easy, fast and riskless way to obtain profits. The role of 
 
61 White, E. N. (2007). The Crash of 1882 and the Bailout of the Paris Bourse. Cliometrica, 1(2), 115-144. 
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press was crucial to spread positive and negative information before and after the crash, 
respectively62. Some journals encouraged people to invest in this firm, and many of them 
criticized this attitude -from very different points of view after the fall. Nevertheless, the 
market showed symptoms of exhaustion in early 1882. The fears of the big investors were 
reflected in the rising discount rates. Financing operations became progressively more 
expensive. 
White (2007, pp. 127-134) provides an extensive explanation on the collapse of the 
Union Générale and the Paris Stock Market; The cancelation of some contracts of 
exploitation from the Austrian Government triggered the fall in stock prices the 14 
January 1882. The firm had committed serious fraud -lower capital than officially 
reported, among others-, and entered in a spiral of illiquidity and default. The company, 
unable to repay its debts, ceased its activity five days later. Soon, the effects of the crash 
spread to other firms sharing interests with the Union Générale. Since most of the trades 
had been performed in the forward market, the liabilities of investors and brokers 
increased substantially, who had serious difficulties to cover the losses. The risk of 
collapse of the whole French financial system led to a bailout of the Paris Bourse, and the 
closing of the Lyon Stock Exchange. The crash of the Union Générale precipitated a 
period of economic downturn which lasted for almost twenty years. Additionally, it 
triggered a wave of Anti-Semitism since Jewish bankers were considered the main 
responsible of its bankruptcy. In particular, Antisemitic groups accused the Rothschild 
family.  
  
 
62 Verdès, J. (1965). La presse devant le krach d'une banque catholique: L'Union Générale: 1882. Pp. 133-
147. Archives de sociologie des religions, 125-156. 
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c) Antisemitism in political left and right 
When the Dreyfus Affair boosted, many revolutionary socialists and anarchists were 
reluctant to support him and his cause. As many other Jews, he was a member of the 
repressive high bourgeoisie. To them, Upper-class Jews were barely different to wealthy 
Christian families. In the end, they were related to the fierce capitalism that dominated 
the whole XIX century; a continuous clash between a small elite to control the majority 
of economic resources. Nevertheless, Antisemitism was unevenly distributed among 
them. We find important revolutionary authors who criticized -wealthy- Jews frequently. 
Proudhon showed a marked Antisemitism in many occasions, and this attitude persisted 
in Bakunin, other famous anarchist leader. In the French case, for instance, divergences 
between the different members of the socialist movement grew specially after 1897. 
Personalities such as Jean Jaurès63 had backed down, becoming in a convinced 
Dreyfusard. However, on the other hand, Antisemitism was particularly common among 
Blanquist socialists, who had a Jacobin and nationalist orientation. Even despite the 
scandal that followed the publication of J’Accuse!, they continued observing the Affair 
with scepticism. The publication of the manifesto of the Jeunesse Blanquiste de Paris 
Adhérente au Comité Central Socialiste Révolutionnaire64 is an appropriate example that 
shows what led the socialist Blanquist faction to not support Dreyfus: 
The ‘pornographer’ Émile Zola, a man who comes from the underworld of French 
bourgeoisie, a man who is a fervent catholic, allows himself to speak on behalf of the 
socialist movement and the revolution, to make working class to walk under the flag of 
Jew that had been condemned for treason (…). 
(…) Among the allegedly humanitarian supporters of Dreyfus, we have never found any 
negative attitude against the rest  of the enemies of the revolutionary France (…). 
(…) We protest along with our fellows from the Central Socialist-Revolutionary 
Committee of Paris against the massive accolade given -by some members of the 
socialist movement- to the cause of Dreyfus (…). 
 
63 He would later write the work “Dreyfus: Le preuves”, where he analysed the whole set of ‘proofs’ against 
the captain, and the development of the process. 
64 Blanquist Youth associated to the Central Socialist-Revolutionary Committee of Paris. The whole 
manifesto can be found in Gallica: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58140273.texteImage 
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(…) The socialist movement had nothing to do in the religious war between Christians 
and Jews. Their conflict is nothing but a family dispute, and if socialists do not remain 
united, Jews and Christians will reach an agreement to defeat our movement. 
Since they believed that, at some point, both Jewish and Christian economic elites would 
collaborate to hold their privileges intact, they found no reason to fight for an unknown 
captain who, apart from being a traitor, belonged to a wealthy family of Jewish industrials. 
De Jong (2008, p. 147),  identifies the terrorist attack against the Russian Tsar as the 
trigger for Eastern Europe pogroms, consisting of sudden outbursts of rage against 
autochthonous Jewish population. He mentions five important consequences from the 
pogroms, depicted below: 
1. The massive migrations of Jews to western countries, such as Germany, France 
or the United Kingdom. 
2. The search of a traditional way of life, in part as a response to the repression 
that they were suffering.  
3. Others aimed to assimilate the culture and traditions of the societies where they 
lived in.  
4. Since migrations introduced a new phenomenon, the “Jewish proletariat”, 
many of them became in revolutionary activists.  
5. The Zionism, or the search of a desired land. The author points out that the 
events of the 1880s and the Dreyfus Affair strongly influenced the growing 
feeling that pursued the creation of a ‘Jewish nation”. 
The migration of poor Jews contradicted the generalised perception that all Jews 
were rich, powerful, and active collaborators of a corrupt capitalist system. From now on, 
the workers’ movement will integrate many people with Jewish origins, who pursued the 
same goals than the rest of workers. Additionally, the publication of J’Accuse! can be 
considered as the turning point for many socialists and anarchists with respect to 
Antisemitism -with the notorious exception of the Blanquists, as observed above-. Some 
years before, in 1895, Jean Jaurès had attacked Jews from Algeria for causing  the misery 
of non-Jewish population. Since they had -in theory- the economic control of that 
territory, they used it in its own benefit. This attitude contrasts with the one expressed in 
1898, in his work about the Dreyfus Affair: “Les preuves”, published in September of the 
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same year. Even though he was so cautious speaking of the court that judged Dreyfus, he 
criticised the investigation carried out by military authorities. He accused them to have 
protected the real traitor and accused Antisemitic press –“the Clericaux”-of having 
developed an extensive campaign of hate against French Jews. In the preamble of “Les 
Preuves”, we find the following statement: 
From the attentive exam of the facts, documents and testimonies, we conclude that: 
1. Dreyfus was illegally condemned, violating the essential rights of an 
accused man. 
2. Dreyfus was condemned due to a possible miscarriage of justice. He is an 
innocent man who is suffering exile, for the crime that he has never 
committed. The cumulous of lies and reaction do nothing but perpetuating 
the suffering the torment of an innocent. 
The Paris Commune and the Crisis of 1873 gave a new impulse to alternative ideas 
to the liberal system, which had dominated the European political and economic system 
during the whole century. Liberalism, originally considered as a revolutionary ideology, 
had progressively lost this label as long as countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
or United Kingdom consolidated their regimes adopting most of its social and economic 
principles. If freedom and equality before the law were important concepts, most of the 
people claimed for a step forward in the socio-political organisation of their countries. 
The lack of social-rights, the living conditions of the working class and the high-income 
inequality characterising that period -which widened the income gap between an 
economic elite and the rest of the population-, were some sources of social tensions.  
Figure 2 depicts wealth inequality in France from 1810 to 2010. We observe that 
by 1890, the Top 10% owned around the 80-90% of the total wealth. In 1848, the year of 
the Communist manifesto, it was at similar levels. In the light of this scenario, Marxist 
and Anarchist ideas spread rapidly across Europe and adapted to the country-specific 
conditions of every nation. In France, during the Second Empire, the left had been 
repressed and some of its members imprisoned. The revolutionary events of the Paris 
Commune were followed with especial interest by Marx and Bakunin, who attempted to 
have influence on their leaders65. Its subsequent repression diminished the force and 
 
65 The Paris Commune is more extensively explained in the introduction of the present dissertation. 
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capacity of action of French left, which rallied around the Radicals and some -yet- 
insignificant socialist groups. When Boulanger was appointed to French government in 
1886, he enacted some laws that displeased conservative parties66. In some ways, he 
represented a hope for those leftist activists, disappointed with a republican government 
that they considered as corrupt and inefficient. When he was removed from government, 
these groups supported him massively. The alleged socialist profile of the subsequent 
Boulangist movement shared three characteristics far-left groups: Jacobinism -the belief 
in a centralised State with a strong government-, Blanquism -revolutionary socialism 
based on the ideas of Louis Blanc- and Nationalism -arguing that the existing regime had 
renounced to defend France against its enemies-. Thus, the initial stages of his campaign 
can be classified as the “leftist Boulangism”.  
Some personalities from the left, such as Henri Rochefort or Maurice Barrès, 
adopted Antisemitic positions and were inflexible Antidreyfusards. Henri Rochefort is a 
good example of a contemporary leftist who mixed his social claims with Antisemitic 
beliefs: A radical socialist (Blanquist), he was a fervent Antidreyfusard and one of the 
main opponents of the III Republic. Coming from a royalist family, he soon became in a 
 
66 See Ortiz-Serrano (2018). 
Figure 2:  Wealth inequality in France, 1810-2010. 
 
Source: Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the XXI Century. Harvard University Press. 
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socialist activist, actively criticizing the Empire of Napoleon III. After the German 
invasion, he supported the government of National Defence, abandoning it because of the 
humiliating peace. He indirectly participated in the Paris Commune which cost him the 
exile. Rochefort had extensively criticized the new republican elite and their -apparent- 
alliance with French Jewry, attacking Gambetta, Grévy, and Reinach, among others. A 
convinced Boulangist, he used his journal ‘L’Intransigeant’ to support his campaign and 
communicate the main ideas of the movement. He was since the beginning an 
Antidreyfusard, who defended the honour of the Commandant Esterhazy and accused 
international Jewry to be responsible of the act of treason. As pointed out above, Jews 
were associated to capitalism and usury, opposed to the hardworking French people. It 
partially explains why some socialists shared Antisemitic views with far-right. This idea 
was present during the whole Dreyfus Affair, when the socialists hesitated between 
supporting Dreyfus and fighting for an innocent man and a fair process or considering the 
situation as a ‘Bourgeois Affair’, that had nothing to do with popular classes (Sternhell, 
1995, pp 46-48). Maurice Barrès, a contemporary writer and politician considered himself 
a socialist nationalist (Blanquist). However, his Antisemitism was attractive for many 
right-wing voters, being him one of the most extreme Anti-Dreyfusards personalities67. 
On the other hand, the radical right had little debate about Dreyfus’ guilt and did 
not hesitate to consider Jews as an oppressive foreign elite: guided by an infuriated anti-
clericalism, they had infiltrated in republican institutions with the only purpose of seizing 
power and subjugate French people68 -commonly associated to an international Jewish 
conspiracy-. For instance, the most conservative political factions considered that the 
Crash of the Union Générale to be a direct attack from the young republican government, 
which refused to help the bank on its liquidity crisis. Additionally, Bontoux accused 
directly the Rothschild family of manipulating investors, to eliminate its rival. The late 
French 19th century witnessed a boost in Antisemitic literature. In words of Weinberg69, 
 
67 For more information about these two historical figures, please visit the online repository of the French 
National Assembly: http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/fiche/%28num_dept%29/8033 for 
Henri Rochefort, and http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/fiche/%28num_dept%29/434 for 
Maurice Barrès. 
68 There are multiple references for the previous statement. The most notorious one is La France Juive 
(1886), of Édouard Drumont. Already in the introduction, he pointed out that usury and avidity were two 
intrinsic characteristics of “Jewish nature”. He showed the example of the Rothschild family, who 
“extracted 3 billion francs from French people”, whereas they had nothing when they arrived at France 
some decades before. As pointed out above, other author who “studied” the differences between Jews and 
other ethnic groups was Ernest Renan. 
69 Weinberg, H. H. (1983). The Image of the Jew in Late Nineteenth-Century French Literature. Jewish 
Social Studies, 45(3/4), 241-250. 
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had he novel showed a benevolent Jew, without stereotypes, the audience would have 
considered it as boring. After the publication of La France Juive, most of the novels 
contained implicit or direct attacks against Jews. For instance, Le Baron Vampire70 from 
Le Charnacé, indirectly spoke of the Crash of the Union Générale and the (hidden) role 
of Jews in the fall of the Catholic bank. (Weinberg, 1983, pp 243-244); Jews were 
depicted as greedy people, with permeable ideology if necessary, anxious of wealth and 
influence. Whereas an ascending bourgeoisie allied with the new political elite71 enriched 
and progressed, the low- and middle-income classes impoverished in relative terms. The 
scandals of corruption such as that of “Les Décorations” caused indignation among public 
opinion, and a generalised atmosphere of disappointment regarding the republican regime 
spread across the country.  
This mistrust converged in one political movement that threatened the stability of 
the republican regime: The Boulangist campaign of 1886-1889. This was the definitive 
opportunity for reactionary forces, to overthrow the republican regime. Initially only 
supported by the extreme left, he soon obtained the political -and specially- the economic 
support of the right: Orleanists, Legitimists, Bonapartists and an extremely conservative 
Anti-Semitic faction joined to the movement. Thus, one of the consequences of the 
Boulangism was the progressive rally of reactionary forces, which shared in common 
their hate for the liberal republican regime, wishing a return to the ancient values of 
honour, respect and order that only a strong monarchy could provide. The Boulangist 
campaign of 1888-89 was also the rallying point of many Antisemitic individuals, which 
started to be part of a coordinated movement which only goal was fighting against 
international Jewry. 
Table 1 shows some of the extreme right organisations that were created during the 
last 30 years of the 19th century, As can be observed, most of them arose after the fall of 
the Boulangism in 1889. They were never numerous, and they were not created -in 
principle- with electoral purposes. However, they contributed to the growth of 
Antisemitism in France, which rapidly spread when the Dreyfus Affair boosted in 1897 
(Joly, 1992). The Affair was seen for far-right nationalists and Antisemitic as another 
opportunity to attack the liberal republican regime and its Israeli allies, once the 
Boulangism had failed in its institutional assault. Figure 3 shows electoral propaganda 
 
70 de Charnacé, G. (1885). Le Baron Vampire. Dentu. 
71 Garrigues, J. (1997). La république des hommes d'affaires: 1870-1900. Editions Aubier. 
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from Adolphe Willette, belonging to the “Antisemitic Party” and running for a seat in the 
parliament in the parliamentary elections of 1889. 
 
The candidate showed an extremely aggressive tone against Jews, by considering 
them as the main enemies of France, remarking the need and “the opportunity to protest 
against their tyranny”. Figure 3 also demonstrates the normalisation of Antisemitism in 
the late 1880s. A part of French society accepted and tolerated it and considered it to be 
another choice among the rest of parliamentary forces. 
 
Table 1:  Antisemitic and far right groups created in France (1870-1900). 
Ligue des patriotes. November 1896. 
2nd Ligue Antisémitique. 1897. 
Jeunesse Antisémitique. 1894. 
Jeunesse royaliste. 1890. 
Comités royalistes. Beginnings of the 3rd Republic. 
Comités bonapartistes. 1894. 
Union nationale. 1893. 
Blanquistes révisionnistes. 1889. 
Jeunesse blanquiste de Paris. 1891. 
Source:  Joly, B. (1992). Les antidreyfusards avant Dreyfus. Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 
(1954-), 39(2), 198-221. 
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Figure 3: Antisemitic electoral propaganda for the candidate Adolphe Willette. 
 
Source:  National Library of France (Gallica). 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b90118383.r=willette%20antisemite?rk=42918;4 
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III. The chronological evolution of the Dreyfus Affair, 1894-99. 
There is a wide range of literature studying the Dreyfus Affair. Piers Paul Read (2012 & 
2013) develops an extensive analysis of the whole case, criticizing governmental 
actuation and the inherent xenophobia of some members of the army. Bon (2006) and 
Duclert (2012) highlights the role and the evolution of the main personalities implicated, 
as well as they provide information on the international repercussion of the process. 
Whyte (2005) offers probably one of the most complete chronological analyses of the 
whole Affair, in a daily basis. Sharon Vance (2017) focuses on the rise of Antisemitism 
in French Algeria in 1897-98, and the hesitations of some members of political left. 
Birnbaum (2014) provides a detailed study on the growth of Antisemitism during the 
Dreyfus Affair, and puts emphasis on the daily tensions derived from J’Accuse! and the 
acquittal of the Commandant Esterhazy, in early 1898. Boussel (1960) describes the 
progressive interest shown by French press in the Affair, providing multiple examples. In 
the same line, Sorlin (1967) shows the key role played by the catholic newspaper ‘La 
Croix’ in the spread of Antisemitism through its reactionary articles. Winock (1985) 
stresses the underlying political conflicts existing in French society in the late 19th 
century. In his own words, the Dreyfus Affair represents two different systems of ethical 
values: On the one hand, the Dreyfusards, who fight for the universal rights of every man, 
the truth, justice and reason. On the other hand, the Antidreyfusards, who are the 
expression of xenophobia, authoritarianism, and nationalism. The Affair was, in the end, 
the fight of a man who was unjustly condemned. 
The origins of the Affair take place some months before, during the summer of 
1894. The cleaning woman at the German Embassy in Paris worked as a French spy. She 
discovered a document at the bureau of the German military attaché containing 
information about French army -this piece of paper was further known as “Le Bordereau”. 
Soon, an investigation to capture the traitor started, managed by the General Mercier and 
the Colonel du Paty de Clam -a recognised Antisemitic-, who after some days they 
conclude that the captain Dreyfus was the true spy. Had the military authorities arrested 
a non-Jew, the scandal would probably have never boosted. Even when Dreyfus was 
completely unrelated with the facts described in Le Bordereau, never doubt about his 
guilt. His ethnic condition and his Alsatian origin was the perfect combination for those 
who wanted to see a foreigner working for the worst enemy of France: Germany. The 
proofs against him were extremely weak, and the writing test were not conclusive 
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regarding his authorship. First, he never went into manoeuvres as was stated in Le 
Bordereau. Second, he had been recently promoted from being student-officer from the 
Military School, so it is difficult that he had access to information about ammunition or 
war machines. Third, false proofs were added to the Bordereau, in order to reinforce the 
accusation (Bon, 2006)-. Despite the little evidence against him, nobody in the 
government or in the chiefs of the military staff questioned the official version. The 
Dreyfus Affair made public when, the 1 November 1894, the Anti-Semitic journal ‘La 
Libre Parole’ published an article describing the arrest of a Jewish captain, accused of 
espionage. Soon, Antisemitic newspapers started a campaign of hate and xenophobia, to 
pressure French government and military authorities. They accused Jews to conspire 
against the country, in collaboration with republican politicians. For example, La Libre 
Parole showed this tone regarding the trial against Dreyfus, the 15 December 1894. 
It seems that the efforts made by Jews and the Opportunists (Republicans) to save the 
captain Dreyfus will turn against them. (…) They have developed a strategy consisting 
of spreading the idea of an acquittal, in some related press. (…) We can say that the 
main battleground used by the friends of the traitor has been dismantled. 
(…) The attitude of French government towards Dreyfus is merciful (…) This attempts 
of corruption (…) are very serious (…) we look forward for the court-martial (…) but 
the coup will be made, Dreyfus will be saved.  
The tone used by La Libre Parole was not exclusive; La Croix, Le Petit Journal, or 
even newspapers that will become in Dreyfusards in the future -e.g. Le Siècle- used an 
aggressive tone against Dreyfus. However, the captain never stopped defending his 
innocence and claiming for his release, although only a very reduced group of people 
believed him -mostly his family-. The 22nd December 1894 Dreyfus was sentenced to life 
deportation to French Guyana. The public ceremony of degradation took place the 5 
January 1895. Figure 4 shows the most important events of the Dreyfus Affair, between 
1894-95 and 1897-1898. As observed, it focuses on the first months after the captain 
arrest, and the boost of the Affair in late 1897. I excluded the events of post-deportation 
in 1895 to mid-1897 because they had less relevance, in relative terms. 
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 Figure 4: Timeline of the Dreyfus Affair. 
 
Source: Own elaboration from Bon (2006) Boussel (1960), and Whyte (2005). 
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 After the deportation of Dreyfus, the debate ended. The traitor was had been 
publicly humiliated and went into life exile. The honour of the army was restored, the 
government avoided the scandal and the extreme pressure that an acquittal could provide, 
and Antisemitic groups were satisfied with the sentence. However, the whole case 
boosted almost three years later when Mathieu Dreyfus accused the Commandant 
Esterhazy publicly, in November 1897. Mathieu had spent the previous months 
investigating case and looking for the real guilt. Some years before, in mid-1895, the 
colonel Picquart had been promoted as the new chief of the “Section de Statistique” (the 
French intelligence agency) and few time later he discovered a document known as “Le 
Petit Blue”; this letter, written by the colonel Esterhazy, provided information about 
French military actions. Picquart realised too that he had been seen twice inside the 
German Embassy. When the Petit Blue was compared with the Bordereau, Picquart 
became aware of the truth: The author of both was Esterhazy, since the writing was the 
same. After some months of fighting for a reopening of the case, Picquart was removed 
from his position and sent to Tunisia. Is after his removal when the military authorities 
gave the order to include additional false proofs against Dreyfus to Hubert Henry, another 
military officer. The subsequent document will be known as the “faux Henry”. Soon, the 
family of the captain was aware of the truth. 
When Mathieu Dreyfus accused Esterhazy, it gave rise to a new wave of 
Antisemitism in press, and the positions became very polarised among public opinion, 
splitting the country in two sides: The Antidreyfusards, those against the reopening of the 
process and convinced about Dreyfus’ guilt, and the Dreyfusards, those supporting the 
captain’s innocence. The group of important people supporting Dreyfus started to growth 
progressively during the whole 1897: First, the colonel Picquart, who discovered all the 
false proofs against the general and the real traitor. Second, the journalist Bernard Lazare 
-who had always been against Antisemitism- gave public notoriety to the Affair during 
the period 1895-98. Third, the famous writer Émile Zola, who always rejected the marked 
Antisemitism of the whole Affair. Last, the senator Scheurer-Kestner, who promoted all 
the possible legal means to reopen the case, especially during the last months of 1897. 
Esterhazy was judged the 10 and 11 of January 1895, being acquitted. Birnbaum (2014) 
enumerates multiple riots and social turmoil after the acquittal, with episodes of extreme 
violence against Jews. 
126 
 
The indignation among the Dreyfusards reached its maximum when Émile Zola 
published its famous article, J’Accuse!, the 13 January 1895., at L’Aurore. The author 
blamed the army and French government to have imprisoned an innocent man This letter 
mobilised French intellectuals and represented a turning point in the perception that 
political left had regarding the Affair. Personalities such as Clemenceau and Jean Jaurès 
had taken party for Dreyfus, and a growing share of French population started to support 
a reopening of the process. Figure 5 shows the header of L’Aurore with the Zola’s article. 
After the he publication of J’Accuse!, Zola was judged and condemned for having 
insulted the army and government. The months of January and February 1898 were 
characterised by an extremely high tension which lasted until the end of the year. The 
support to Dreyfus and Zola became massive, the criticisms against Anti-Semitic journals 
and political groups widespread, and some newspapers developed a campaign to restore 
their honour. Moreover, the German parliament denied any relationship with Dreyfus and 
this was used by Antisemitic press to attack the Dreyfusards. In May of the same year 
legislative elections took place, where numerous Antisemitic groups were elected. In 
addition, the Colonel Henry, the man who had falsified the proofs, committed suicide in 
August. Dreyfus was pardoned in August 1899, although he was not completely reinstated 
and decorated until 1906. 
  
Figure 5: Header of L’Aurore, the day Zola published J’Accuse! 
 
Source:  National Library of France (Gallica). https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k701453s.item 
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IV. Data Collection. 
a) Economic and internal information of firms. 
We have hand collected a new set of daily economic information plus newspapers articles 
to estimate the effect of the widespread campaign of Antisemitism during the Dreyfus 
Affair. Investors may have changed their economic preferences based on the series of 
events derived from the Affair, which contributed to a growth of political and social 
tensions. As in Ortiz-Serrano (2018), we compile price data on a daily basis from the 
Paris Stock Exchange (or Paris Bourse). They can be extracted from the Bulletin de la 
Cote, the daily spreadsheet of the Compagnie des Agents de Change72. This can be 
consulted in Gallica, the online repository of the National Library of France (BNF). This 
group was in charge of the organisation of the operations of the Bourse. Its members were 
selected by French government and constituted a close group of control of the 
“parquet”73. They recorded every daily transaction for every asset (public debt, bonds, 
stocks) listed at the Paris Stock Market. Essentially, we find two types of stocks, which 
main difference is whether they are allowed to be traded cash (Au Comptant) or cash & 
forward (Au Comptant and À Terme). The latter group was traded much more frequently, 
and the firms issuing them were generally more known. We have included stocks from 
both categories, to have a more appropriate idea on the behaviour of the Paris Bourse. We 
collect an extensive set of firms’ internal characteristics and information, from a wide 
range of primary sources. As in Ortiz-Serrano (2018), we have three potential sources: 
First, the Annuaires des Agents de Change, the yearbooks of the Compagnie des Agents 
de Change. If in the Bulletin they mostly registered information on transactions, in the 
Annuaires they compiled yearly information on multiple internal characteristics. For 
instance, we can find here data on capital, book value of shares, different changes in 
capital, previous dividends, the headquarters (if French or not), if the company has the 
assets guaranteed by French State74, or the members of the board -although in almost all 
the cases it only showed the members’ surnames-. These data can be consulted at the 
 
72 https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb32745962x/date.item. 
73 There was other place where many trading operations were effectuated, with no government control. It 
was known as ‘La Coulisse’ or ‘Marché en Banque’. This place can be considered a “free-market”, and it 
would be very interesting to perform analysis to compare assets’ behaviour in both markets. Nevertheless, 
few records have remained until nowadays, so this task is, for the moment, impossible. See Gallais-Hamono 
and Hautcoeur (2007) for more information about the Paris Stock Market. Additionally, Lagneau-Ymonet 
and Riva (2015) provide a detailed analysis of the historical evolution of the Paris Bourse. 
74 This was very common in railway companies. 
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Archives of the French Ministry of Finance (SAEF). Some volumes can be also found at 
the National Library of France. Because of the surname’s restriction of the data, we have 
used the Annuaire Chaix, the yearbook of the Imprimerie Chaix, a contemporary 
company. This source is more accurate in order to find complete information about the 
members of the board. The Annuaires Chaix can be consulted at the National Library of 
France. Additionally, we complemented this task by using some firms’ internal 
information from the Archives du Crédit Agricole. For some companies, we have 
information on the assembly of shareholders, as well as on balance sheets. We have 
constructed variables on market capitalisation, book-to-market ratio, dividend yields, 
firms’ returns, and a market index. In addition, we have collected daily price data for 
contemporary government bonds, the Rentes 3%, used as the risk-free rate. Figure 6 
provides an example of the information found at the Annuaires des Agents de Change, 
for the company “Sous-Comptoir des Entrepreneurs”. This information was used by 
contemporaries as a reference to know the financial health of a company, if it was 
profitable and to know their main projects. We have collected a sample of 140 liquid 
firms (more than 30% of trading frequency in the year 1894) for the period 1894-99. 
The data on the board composition was used to identify its members, political and 
ethnically. We use the data provided in the sources described above, and we confront it 
with the online repositories of the French Senate and Parliament75. This is based on the 
information provided by Robert and Cougny (1890), and Jolly (1960). In some cases, 
information about its political position is available in the reports of the Assembly of 
Shareholders and in the Annuaire Chaix. A firm is politically connected if the board 
member is (was) Senator or Deputy. Additionally, we assume a political connection if the 
individual is (was) State Counsellor, diplomatic corps, a politician at a regional or local 
level, or the director was directly appointed by French government76. 
 
75 For the Senate: http://www.senat.fr/senateurs-3eme-republique/.  
For the Parliament: http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/recherche. 
76 See Ortiz-Serrano, 2018, pp.6-7, for a wider explanation on how to identify political connectedness in 
the firms listed at the Paris Bourse in the late 19th Century. 
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If political connectedness might be important to introduce our analysis, the central 
axis of the present work is to observe if Jewish connected firms performed differently 
than the rest. This connection might be slightly subjective, since it could be based more 
on the perception that economic agents had regarding the firm in question -investors, 
clients, etc- than in the real ‘affiliation’ of the members of the board. Thus, there could 
be an individual with Jewish origin whose family (or him) converted to Christianity -or 
had no religious beliefs-, being no longer a Jew for the Hebraic community. To avoid 
potential problems of identification, we use two different sources. The first is probably 
the most accurate one, since it is based on the extensive research made by Cyril Grange 
(2016) on the most prominent French Jewish families from 1870 to 1940. The author 
makes a deep analysis on the origins and evolution of some Hebraic dynasties, such as 
the Rothschild or the Fould, among others. In addition, he studies their business activities, 
as well as their non-economic relationships, such as marriages, their cultural framework 
Figure 6: Internal information of the Sous-Comptoir des Entrepreneurs 
 
Source:  Annuaire des Agents de Change 1898. 
Source : Annuaires des Agents de Change 1898
F ure VII: Fi ancial information of the ‘Sous-Compt ir des Entrepreneu s’
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and their integration into French society. This is probably the most complete work in this 
area. Based on the information provided by Grange, we have compiled information on 
the main families described in his work. The family names can be consulted in Table 2: 
We have a list of 40 families. Their members developed multiple business activities 
and many of them belonged to the most important companies of the Paris Stock Market. 
It is reasonable to assume that individuals were perceived as Jews by their 
contemporaries. A company is classified as Jewish-Connected if at least one board 
member belonged to any of the families appearing in Table 2. We also create a variable 
of Jewish-Connection, measured as a percentage of the number of members of the board. 
We identify 39% of the firms as J-Connected. We also identify Jewish CEOs, who 
represent the 14% of the total. 
Table 2: Most prominent Jewish families in France by the late 19th century. 
Fould Bamberger Ellissen David-Weill 
Worms (de Romilly) Beer Koenigswarter Lazard 
Halphen (Halfon) Erlanger Kulp Raphaël 
Hollander Bardc Stern Warchawsky 
Rodrigues-Henriques Ephrussi Hayerm Porgès 
Eichtal Gunzburg Calmann-Levy Propper 
Rothschild Oppenheim Vanderheym Poliakoff 
Haber Weisweiller Bischoffsheim Louis-Dreyfus 
Javal Heine Cahen d'Anvers Reinach 
Pereire Camondo Kann Deutsch de la Meurthe 
Source: Cyril Grange (2016), p. 22. 
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We use an additional source as a second method of identification, and check 
whether there is statistical divergence between both. We use the Paul Levy’s work 
(1960)77 on the origins of Jewish surnames. A firm if J-connected if at least the surname 
of a member of the board appear in Levy’s list. This procedure is less accurate and more 
 
77 See: Lévy, P. (1960). Les Noms des Israelites en France. Histoire et dictionnaire. Paris: Presses 
Universit. de France 1960. 210 S. 8°. Presses Universitaires de France. 
Figure 7: Paul Levy’s list on the origins of French Jewish surnames. 
 
Source:  Paul Levy (1960). 
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subjective, since market agents may not have perceived these individuals as Jews, as in 
the case of the most prominent families. In fact, we find no statistical effect from this 
connection, which confirms that investors were not guided by surnames’ ethnic origin. 
That is, although an individual may have a surname with Jewish origin, it does not mean 
that public opinion considers him to be a Jew, as in the first case. Figure 7 shows an 
example of the information found at Paul Levy’s list, which is completely available in 
Appendix 3: 
b) The intensity of Antisemitism in public opinion: Data on press-coverage. 
We collect data on five contemporary newspapers, on a daily basis. The goal is to obtain 
a reliable measure of the intensity of the Dreyfus Affair and Anti-Semitism in France 
during the period under study. In general, newspapers had four pages: The front-page 
contained the header, the editorial line, and a summary of the most important news of the 
day. The second page expanded the information appearing on the first one. The third page 
was mostly devoted to regional and international information. The last page contained 
advertisements, essentially, so its informative value is much lower. We count the number 
of paragraphs devoted to the Dreyfus Affair as a proportion of the total number of 
paragraphs. Since newspapers’ format differed from each other, we standardize the 
process to avoid divergences. As in Forero-Laverde & Ortiz-Serrano (2019)78, we find 
that paragraphs are separated between them either by double space, asterisks ( ), a 
straight line ( ) or a subtitle in bolds. Additionally, some articles may not show 
a clear division. In these cases, we divide the columns in three parts, being each of them 
considered as a “paragraph”. Since we use the same procedure for all the newspapers, we 
have been able to control for the size of the articles and divergences in the format. 
Advertisements have not been considered as paragraphs, so we avoid the introduction of 
irrelevant information. Moreover, the number of advertisements varied substantially 
between newspapers, so it could have affected to the coverage estimates. Furthermore, all 
the journals contained a daily story, occupying around one third of a page. These stories 
have been counted as one paragraph unless there is a clear separation with the symbols 
previously mentioned. The reason is, again, to avoid the growth of irrelevant information. 
To ease the identification task, a list of keyword was created, containing the 
following words either related to Dreyfus or to typical Antisemitic expressions: Dreyfus, 
 
78 See Chapter 3 of the present dissertation.  
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capitaine, affaire, traitre, trahison, juif, juives, juiverie, israélites, cherche-midi, Île-du-
Diable, jugement, syndicat, Zola, Esterhazy, Mercier, Picquart, Espion, Espionnage. A 
dummy variable measuring peaks on the intensity of Antisemitism has been created. It 
takes value 1 when news related to Jews or Dreyfus appear in at least one third of the 
surface, or they occupy the 20% of the paragraphs of the surface. We have selected a set 
of newspapers playing an important role in the evolution of the Affair, for the reasons 
explained below.  
• Le Siècle: A mainstream newspaper, and one with the largest circulation. In 
political terms, liberal and close to moderate republicans. It actively supported the 
captain Dreyfus after the second half of 1897. 
• Le Petit Journal: Another popular newspaper, particularly because of its weekend 
supplement. Antidreyfusard. 
• La Croix: The newspaper of French Catholics. It contributed substantially to 
spread Antisemitism, playing a key role during the Dreyfus Affair. Sorlin (1967) 
provides a wide explanation about this Antidreyfusard newspaper. 
• La Libre Parole: Founded by Édouard Drumont, the author of the Antisemitic 
work of reference “La France Juive”. Its only goal was spreading and support hate 
against French Jews, from a very conservative, liberal -and anticapitalistic- point 
of view. Most of its editorials depicted an unrealistic picture of French society and 
political class, where Jews were actively collaborated with the corrupted 
republican forces to destroy the nation and its traditional values. 
• L’Aurore: We include data from this newspaper only after mid-October 1897, 
when it was founded. Associated to Clemenceau and the Radical Party -on the left 
of the political spectrum-, it was the main reference for Dreyfusards, especially 
after Émile Zola published his famous column J’Accuse! 
The data on newspapers have been collected from Gallica, Retronews, the online 
repositories for French press of the National Library of France (BNF)79. Additionally, we 
have obtained the data for “La Libre Parole” directly from the archives of the BNF. Figure 
8 shows the evolution of coverage of Antisemitism and the Dreyfus Affair for all the 
newspapers together. We observe an important relative growth during the weeks after the 
captain was arrested, reaching an important peak of overage (around 40% of total 
newspapers’ surface) by his degradation. Nevertheless, the accusation of Mathieu 
 
79 The link to the newspapers can be found in Appendix 3. 
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Dreyfus triggered the coverage, which remained extremely high during the last months 
of 1897 and the whole year 1898. Figure 9 merges the previous timeline of Figure 4 with 
four newspapers, for the period between 1 November 1894 & 30 January 1895, and 1 
November 1897 & 28 February 1898, respectively80.  
 
80 We exclude Le Petit Journal from these graphs to facilitate the interpretation. Nevertheless, the coverage 
trajectory of this newspapers follows almost exactly the same trend.  
Figure 8: Evolution of coverage for all newspapers, 1894-98. 
 
Source:  Own elaboration from primary sources. 
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Figure 9: Evolution of coverage in a reduced period, 1894-95 and 1897-98. 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Own elaboration from primary sources. 
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In the first period, we observe a divergence in the coverage of Antisemitic vs non-
Antisemitic press, especially the weeks before the trial. If it is true that all of them believe 
in Dreyfus guilt’, La Croix and La Libre Parole developed an intense campaign of hate 
against French Jews. The second chart shows a different picture, and we observe a 
common pattern in terms of coverage. First, the accusation of Mathieu Dreyfus triggers 
the number of paragraphs devoted to the Affair. Moreover, the month of December shows 
a substantial increase in the attention paid by all newspapers. The Affair had spread 
towards French politics, with the senator Scheurer-Kestner promoting a reopening of the 
process and the arrest of Esterhazy. Furthermore, the number of Dreyfusards had grown 
substantially. We observe the highest peaks of attention around the process against 
Esterhazy and his acquittal, as well as during the Zola Process. J’Accuse! gave rise to a 
generalised political turmoil and a progressive polarisation of public opinion, which 
lasted for years.  
V. Methodology and results. 
a) Short-Term Analysis 
We study the effect of a widespread campaign of Antisemitism in the value of J-connected 
firms in the Paris Stock Market. I particular, we pay attention to the following events: 
• 1894-95: Dreyfus’ arrest, conviction and degradation. 
• 1898: J’Accuse!, Henry’s suicide, and the reopening of the process in 1899. 
We perform multiple Event-Studies as in Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), Ferguson 
& Voth (2008), Braggion & Moore (2013), Coulomb & Sangnier (2014) and Ortiz-
Serrano (2019), to find short-term effects. As in the Chapter 3 of the present dissertation, 
we have used the Capital Asset Pricing Models (CAPM)81 and the Three-Factor Model 
(FF) to estimate the 𝛽𝑖′𝑠. The first model uses the market portfolio and the risk-free rate, 
and the second model includes two additional factors, SMB (Small versus Big Market 
Capitalisation) and HML (High minus Low book-to-market ratio). We have a market 
portfolio of 140 firms, with daily prices from 1 January 1894 to 31 December 1899. 
Additionally, we use the 3% French Rentes as the risk-free rate. The Event-Study 
framework gives the following Cumulative Abnormal Returns, based on the dates 
described above: 
 
81 Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Black (1972), and Fama-French (1992 and 1993). 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + Ω𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝛽1 takes value 1 for the firms including Jews in their board of administration. 
We take an estimation window [-300,-60], which follows Campbell et al. (1997) 
recommendations of selecting more than 120 trading days before the event takes place. 
Additionally, we consider two different event windows [-1,1] and [0,2]. It allows us to 
see whether there is some persistence in stock returns derived from the event. Xi is a 
vector of control variables where we include information like sector dummies, the type 
of admission (Cash & Forward or only Cash), if the assets were guaranteed by central 
government, if the firm has investments outside of metropolitan France, if foreign 
ownership and if the company is politically connected. 
b) Long-Term Analysis 
We implement a Differences-in-Differences model to estimate the effects of 
Antisemitism on firms’ value after the massive increase in social tensions derived from 
the publication of J’Accuse!, the 13 January 1898. We base our choice on the fact that 
Zola’s article triggered an intense campaign to rehabilitate Dreyfus: Numerous 
intellectuals became publicly Dreyfusards, and some important politicians as well. In 
addition, French society split into pro and anti Dreyfus -and Zola- partisans, which caused 
the maximum levels of polarisation of the period under analysis. We observe, based on 
the information provided by Figures 8 and 9, that the attention level paid remained very 
high under the whole period of study. A Differences in Differences estimator captures the 
effect of a shock for a particular object of study82 (individuals, a region, city, etc.). To do 
so, a group of control (unaffected by the shock) and a group of treatment (affected) are 
selected. We calculate the effect of the shock (or intervention) as follows: 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡   𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 
{𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡} −   {𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡} =  𝛿 
The parameter 𝛿 captures the causal effect of the shock (intervention). We add time 
(to capture market variations) and firm fixed effects (sector, ownership, capital, etc.). 
 
82 See Angrist & Pischke (2008, pp. 227-247) for more information about the theoretical approach to the 
Differences in Differences model. 
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Standard errors are clustered by firm, to prevent from serial correlation. Our Diffs-in-
Diffs specification is as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 ∗ 1{𝑡 ≥ 𝐽
′𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒!} + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑖 + 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Our specification captures long-term changes in information environment, likely to 
affect the financial performance of firms. The date of the shock is the 13 January 1898. 
We run this specification under the null hypothesis of no-changes in firms’ value derived 
from the campaign to rehabilitate Dreyfus and its growing social support. The drastic 
change in the social perception regarding the captain’s innocence may have changed 
investors’ expectations about the future, profitability and performance of Jewish-
Connected firms, as a decrease in the social and media pressure towards French Jews.  
c) Short-Term Results: The Event-Study. 
Table 3 shows the outcomes of the Event-Study, performed for the most important dates, 
that is, the days when the coverage was at its highest level. Jewish-Connections are 
calculated as the percentage of Jewish individuals over the total number of board-
members83. The degradation of Dreyfus had a negative and significant effect on the firms 
with Jewish connections listed at the Paris Stock Market, which experienced high drops 
in their returns. This result is robust to all the specifications, which indicated that 
contemporary investors perceived this event as something negative; they may have 
interpreted that Jewish-connected firms were to experience some difficulties in the 
marketplace, or that some Antisemitic regulation could be enacted and their economic 
performance was to be compromised. The rest of the events do not provide a significant 
short-term effect. We can attribute the lack of significance of the arrest and the verdict to 
the fact that this was followed mostly by Antisemitic groups, and they did not have the 
same emotional component as the degradation ceremony. This can be confirmed by 
looking at Figure 9, which shows the scarce interest paid by the liberal newspaper Le 
Siècle, to the event). The effect of J’Accuse! could have long-run rather implications 
instead of short-run effects, due to its turning point nature. Consequently, the suicide of 
the Colonel Henry, and the reopening of the case could have been affected by this long-
run effect, and not perceived as a turning point by French investors. Figures 8 and 9 
 
83 We use Grange list to identify Jewish members. 
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provide a graphical explanation to this change in the general perception, after the 13 
January 1898. 
d) Long-Run Results: Firms’ returns after J’Accuse! 
The outcomes from the Event-Study show that investors perceived Dreyfus’ degradation 
as a potential threat for Jewish-connected companies. However, these results do not 
provide information regarding the effects of the widespread campaign of Antisemitism 
for the period under study. Our Differences-in-Differences specification sheds light on 
the real socioeconomic implications derived from the Dreyfus Affair. Table 4 shows the 
main results for the consequences of J’Accuse! on the returns of Jewish-Connected firms 
(as a percentage of the board). The results confirm the statistical significance J’Accuse!, 
for Jewish-Connected firms. The comprehensive campaign in press to fight against 
Antisemitism in French society, to defend Dreyfus’ honour and to support Émile Zola 
seems to have change investors’ perception. Thus, Jewish-connected companies 
Table 3: Event-Study on the most important dates of the Dreyfus Affair. 
 
 
Abnormal Returns Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 CAPM Fama-French 
CAPM 
[0,2] 
Fama-
French 
[0,2] 
CAPM 
[-1,1] 
Fama-
French 
[-1,1] 
Arrest 
0.149 
(0.769) 
-0.025 
(0.840) 
1.721* 
(1.005) 
1.572 
(1.041) 
1.331 
(1.175) 
0.917 
(1.267) 
Verdict 
0.175 
(0.965) 
0.145 
(0.974) 
1.677 
(1.422) 
1.261 
(1.552) 
0.758 
(1.303) 
-0.014 
(1.486) 
Degradation 
-2961* 
(1.568) 
-2.741* 
(1.503) 
-4.714*** 
(1.523) 
-4.891*** 
(1.490) 
-3.735** 
(1.551) 
-3.700** 
(1.547) 
J’Accuse 
-0.754 
(0.595) 
-0.354 
(0.671) 
-1.996 
(1.509) 
-1.000 
(1.668) 
-0.747 
(1.235) 
-0.502 
(1.234) 
Henry 
-.964 
(1.977) 
-0.882 
(2.056) 
-0.962 
(2.019) 
-0.213 
(2.636) 
-0.118 
(2.093) 
0.512 
(2.401) 
Retrial 
-0.743 
(0.796) 
-0.839 
(1.242) 
-1.027 
(1.313) 
-1.998 
(1.849) 
-0.664 
(1.166) 
-0.967 
(1.609) 
N 137 137 137 137 137 137 
Coefficients in percentage. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Jewish-Connection as a percentage of the board. 
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experienced substantial higher returns and abnormal returns after the publication of 
Zola’s article. This is confirmed by Table 5, which shows the effect of J’Accuse! for the 
firms whose CEO was Jewish. It is observed a persistent and significant positive effect 
on Jewish-connected firms from the publication of J’Accuse! The effect on Monthly 
returns seems unclear. This seems reasonable, since most of variations in returns take 
place on a daily basis, and a between-months estimation could not be able to capture these 
variations. To see graphically changes in firms’ performance, Figure 10 shows the 
evolution of  t average returns of J-companies between 1894 and 1898. 
 
Table 4: Firm Returns after J’Accuse!         (% Board) 
 
 
Daily Returns 
Abnormal Returns 
(CAPM) 
Monthly Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
J-connections*Post J’Accuse 
0.137* 
(0.080) 
0.165** 
(0.075) 
0.147* 
(0.081) 
0.175** 
(0.076) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
0.039** 
(0.019) 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.13 
Mean Return 0.019 0.019 0.04 0.04 0.005 0.005 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector*Month FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firms 131 131 131 131 131 131 
Observations 199689 199689 199691 199691 7703 7703 
Coefficients in percentage. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard Errors clustered by firm. 
Jewish connections as a % of the board. 
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Table 5: Firm Returns after J’Accuse!       (J-CEOs) 
 
 
Daily Returns 
Abnormal Returns 
(CAPM) 
Monthly Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
J-connections*Post J’Accuse 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.039* 
(0.021) 
0.048** 
(0.024) 
0.044** 
(0.022) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.13 
Mean Return 0.019 0.019 0.040 0.005 0.005 0.05 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector*Month FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firms 131 131 131 131 131 131 
Observations 199077 199077 199079 199079 7679 7679 
Coefficients in percentage. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard Errors clustered by firm. 
Jewish connections as a % of the board. 
Figure 10: Average yearly return of J-Connected firms. 
 
Source:  Own elaboration from primary sources. 
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Whereas J-connected companies showed little variation and negative returns for the 
years 1895, 1896 and 1897, there is a sharp increase in firms’ value during the year 1898. 
The Diff-in-Diff coefficients from the long-term analysis make us to reject the hypothesis 
of no significance of J’Accuse!. The publication of Zola’s article gave rise to widespread 
campaign for Dreyfus, and this reaction caused a growth in the value of Jewish-connected 
firms. It had long-run implications confirmed in a series of robustness checks in the 
following sub-section. 
e) Robustness Tests: Media coverage, government changes, and the effect for 
foreign companies. 
The Dreyfus Affair may have affected firms at the Paris Stock Market through different 
channels. We have seen that, in social terms, French press played an essential role in the 
transmission of information and news about the captain’s fate. We run the same Diffs-in-
Diffs approach to estimate the role of Dreyfusard (Antidreyfusard) press, by selecting two 
newspapers: Le Siècle and La Croix. These were amongst those with the largest volume 
and represented opposed views. Le Siècle was a generalist liberal newspaper which 
published a relatively objective information -with a moderate political tone-. La Croix 
offered a conservative catholic view; they criticised Jews, republicans and capitalism. We 
exclude other newspapers such as La Libre Parole or L’Aurore because their volume was 
lower, and their socio-political views were more extreme, so their clients could be more 
biased and unwilling to change their opinion about Dreyfus. Table 6 shows the results. 
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Table 6 shows an interesting result. All the coefficients for the interaction of Le 
Siècle with J-connection dummy are significant, whereas those for the interaction with 
La Croix do not show any statistical effect. We can attribute it to the fact that investors 
were more prone to read Le Siècle than La Croix. Although we have no evidence on the 
data, it seems reasonable to think that investors were generally more likely to read 
newspapers that exhibited some affinity with the “establishment”, and expressed little 
criticisms against financial world, the republican regime or the capitalist system. La Croix 
exhibited sometimes a very conservative profile, especially during the Dreyfus Affair, 
when it became in a clearly Antisemitic newspaper. Second, we observe a change in the 
sign of the returns, depending on the time span. For the period 1894-96 i.e. before Mathieu 
Dreyfus accused Esterhazy and Zola published J’Accuse!, we find negative returns for 
Jewish-connected firms, when some news about the Dreyfus Affair or related to 
Antisemitism appeared in Le Siècle. For the period 1897-98, when coverage relative to 
the Affair becomes massive, we observe a sharp and significant increase in the returns of 
Jewish-connected firms. This can be attributed to the progressive switch in the editorial 
Table 6: The effect of coverage in J-connected firms. 
 
 
Daily Returns Abnormal Returns 
 
(1) 
1894-96 
(2) 
1897-98 
(3) 
1894-96 
(4) 
1897-98 
Coverage by Le Siècle * % of board 
-8.444* 
(4.674) 
0.761** 
(0.385 
-13.262* 
(7.242) 
0.767** 
(0.386) 
Coverage by La Croix * % of board 
0.353 
(0.879) 
-0.624 
(0.57 
0.423 
(0.886) 
-0.636 
(0.575) 
Le Siècle = La Croix (p-value) 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.014 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Mean Return 0.014 0.028 0.014 0.028 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 119517 80041 119519 80041 
Coefficients in percentage. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard Errors clustered by firm. 
Jewish connections as a % of the board. 
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line of Le Siècle, which by the late 1897 became clearly Dreyfusard and supported the 
Captain and Zola during the whole year 1898. The results suggest that information about 
the Affair was not taken as irrelevant by investors, showing different reactions across 
time. 
To see whether returns of Jewish connected firms reacted to government, we have 
compiled the dates when French prime ministers seized power during the period under 
study. The results can be observed in Table 7. We focus our attention to the last two rows, 
that is, the cabinet Brisson and the second cabinet Dupuy. For both cases, Jewish 
connected firms show a positive and significant reaction in terms of daily and abnormal 
returns. Brisson, who became prime minister the 28 June 1898, supported a new process 
for Dreyfus. Firms exhibit high returns after his appointment to cabinet. We attribute the 
positive coefficients from the arrival of Dupuy (who was Antidreyfusard) to the fact that 
public opinion might have expected him to continue with the same path than his 
predecessor. The reason is that, unlike in 1895, social pressure about the Affair was 
Table 7: The effect of government changes, 1894-99. 
 
 
Daily Returns Abnormal Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
J-Conn * Dupuy 1 (May 94 – Jan 95) 
0.047 
(0.054) 
0.005 
(0.074) 
0.047 
(0.053) 
0.012 
(0.074) 
J-Conn * Ribot (Jan – Oct 95) 
0.054 
(0.047) 
0.001 
(0.061) 
0.109** 
(0.047) 
-0.036 
(0.076) 
J-Conn * Bourgeois (Oct 95 – Apr 96) 
0.119** 
(0.057) 
0.035 
(0.071) 
0.094 
(0.059) 
0.044 
(0.073) 
J-Conn * Meline (Apr 96 – Jun 98) 
0.049 
(0.046) 
-0.065 
(0.054) 
0.039 
(0.046) 
-0.053 
(0.055) 
J-Conn * Brisson (Jun – Oct 98) 
0.404*** 
(0.151) 
0.399** 
(0.163) 
0.460*** 
(0.152) 
0.407*** 
(0.162) 
J-Conn * Dupuy 2 (Nov 98 – Feb 99) 
0.245** 
(0.123) 
0.364** 
(0.155) 
0.299** 
(0.124) 
0.368** 
(0.155) 
R2 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
Sector*Month FE No Yes No Yes 
Observations 199689 199689 199691 199691 
Coefficients in percentage. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard Errors clustered by firm. 
Jewish connections as a % of the board. 
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extremely high, and the number of people supporting the rehabilitation of Dreyfus had 
grown substantially. Additionally, while Dupuy was in government, Émile Loubet was 
elected as the new president of the Republic, who was in favour of Dreyfus rehabilitation. 
This president gave the government pardon to the captain some months later. These 
factors together may help to explain the positive returns after Dupuy’s appointment.  
Table 8 depicts the results for foreign firms. We find no significance of the 
publication of J’Accuse! for Jewish-connected firms. This can be partially explained by 
the fact that investors saw the Dreyfus Affair as a strictly French issue, which 
consequences will only affect to French companies managed by Jews. Companies with 
its investments abroad were as well unaffected by the Affair, which could confirm the 
previous explanation. These results also demonstrate the existence of discrimination in 
the Paris Stock Market, and a strong effect of the information relative to the Affair 
appearing in newspapers.  
 
  
Table 8: Effect for foreign firms. 
 
 
Daily Returns Abnormal Returns (CAPM) 
 Inv. Abroad Foreign Inv. Abroad Foreign 
J-Connections * Post J’Accuse ! 
0.183 
(0.116 
0.174 
(0.171) 
0.190 
(0.117) 
0.179 
(0.170) 
R2 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.08 
Mean Return 0.022 0.015 0.040 0.028 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector*Month FE No No No No 
Observations 114979 33334 114979 33334 
Coefficients in percentage. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard Errors clustered by firm. 
Jewish connections as a % of the board. 
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VI. Conclusions 
The Dreyfus Affair was a major case of xenophobia that polarised public opinion and 
gave rise to an intense campaign of xenophobia by Antisemitic press. We argue that firms 
with Jewish connections in their board of administration experienced changes in their 
value due to this increase in social tensions. The present work sheds light on the short and 
long run consequences of the Dreyfus Affair. First, we find a strong negative effect from 
Dreyfus’ degradation on J-connected firms. Second, our long-run analysis offers a 
different view: There is a sharp and significant increase in the returns of Jewish firms 
after the publication of J’Accuse! This is confirmed by a series of robustness tests on the 
effect of press-coverage, political changes, and foreign firms. 
Results suggest that, in the short-term, negative information on Jews and Dreyfus 
might have pushed investors to sell their stocks of J-Connected firms. In the long run, the 
improvement of French Jews prospects mainly due to the increasing support that Dreyfus 
was receiving after the publication of J’Accuse!, would have contributed to a change in 
investors’ perception regarding J-connected firms. These companies became more 
attractive after the turning point of 13 January 1898, and their stocks reacted positively 
during the whole ex-post period. 
Finally, we confirm that the Dreyfus Affair was not economically irrelevant, 
affecting significantly to investors’ behaviour and to the performance of J-connected 
firms in the Paris Stock Market. Large volumes of information on Dreyfus or 
Antisemitism affected the stocks of J-connected companies. The present work opens the 
possibility to study the real factors behind the positive performance of Jewish firms after 
J’Accuse!, by applying additional Event-Studies around government changes, or 
analysing the real effect that legislative elections of 1898 had in investors’ mentality. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
A cross-sectional analysis of firms with Jewish and 
political connections in the Paris Stock Market, 1894-98.  
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A cross-sectional analysis of firms with Jewish and political 
connections in the Paris Stock Market, 1894-98 
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Abstract 
The present work is an introductory research on the relations of the economic agents at 
the Paris Stock Market, during the Dreyfus Affair, from 1894 to 1898. The findings 
indicate that, on average, politicians tended to participate in companies with higher 
capitalisation and more investments abroad. Second, I show that the Dreyfus Affair may 
have affected negatively to Jewish-connected companies, at least to its profitability. 
However, this statement deserves further research. Last, this work demonstrates the 
existence of a significant relationship between political and Jewish connections. Findings 
suggest that Jewish-connected firms were more likely to be politically related. 
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I. Introduction. 
The present work offers a descriptive view of the firms listed at the Paris Stock Market, 
for the period 1894-98. The time span coincides with the apogee of the Dreyfus Affair, 
as shown in Chapter 4, complementing its information.  
There is a large strand of literature studying the evolution of European and French 
capital during the Belle Époque. Feis (1930) makes which probably is the first study of 
European capital outflows between 1870 and 1914. He put special emphasis on the UK, 
France and Germany, the most advanced European economies, whose investors were 
probably the most active of the continent. This work is interesting because, among other 
things it provides a first analysis on the different behaviour and investment preferences 
across countries. These differences were determined by government regulations, nations’ 
history and the trade conditions which shaped divergences across investors’ mentality. 
Moreover, international lending was apparently guided by political preferences and 
international alliances, so borrowers were more prone to borrow from lenders whose 
nation was allied with theirs. Fishlow (1985) studies -among other things- the 
geographical distribution of French capital by 1914. This research was largely expanded 
by Rui-Esteves (2011), who provides a detailed study on French foreign investments 
during the Belle Époque, between 1880 and 1914. Daudin et al. (2008) provide a complete 
analysis about the progressive integration of European capital in the globalisation process 
that took place in this period. Particularly, it focuses on the linked between Europe and 
the rest of the world in terms of trade, migrations of knowledge transfers. Other authors 
such as Elise Huillery (2008 & 2011) focus on the long-term economic effect of French 
public investments in the former colonies of French West Africa. 
We focus our analysis on the study of French Stock Market, as a way to understand 
the existing links and economic relations between its participants. Neymarck (1888) 
provided a seminal work analysing the evolution in the value of French securities, the 
potential spillovers of financial activities to French population, and an attempt to calculate 
the volume of transactions made in this market. This work has been used in multiple 
occasions as a reference for anyone interested in the study of French financial markets. 
Table 1 summarises some of the results shows by the author, for the 24 March 1888. 
150 
 
The author found about 767 titles traded every day in the Paris Stock Market for the 
year 1888, which makes a total of 1,000 titles with the assets negotiated at the informal 
market known as “La Coulisse84”. We find a dynamic market in which a wide variety of 
titles were traded, offering to any investor the opportunity to create a heterogeneous and 
a profitable portfolio. The global value of all the securities traded in the Paris Stock 
Exchange in the early 1888 was about 80 billion francs85, providing an overall profit of 
between 4 billion francs. This volume was considered by the author as a very high amount 
and concluded with a political statement. As the data showed the dynamism of French 
investors, who contributed to the overall creation of wealth, they should have a better 
 
84 The Paris Stock Market was the official market and was managed by the Compagnie des Agents de 
Change, a group in charge of supervising and authorising every operation for each listed title. The informal 
market, La Coulisse or Marché en Banque, was independent from government regulations, becoming in a 
completely free market of securities. See Gallais-Hamonno and Hautcoeur, 2007) for further information 
85 60 of which were in French securities, and the remaining 20 foreign titles. 
Table 1: Titles listed at the Paris Stock Market. 
Values Au Comptant and À terme 
(Cash and Forward) 
Values only Au Comptant 
(only Cash transactions) 
  Stocks 
 Insurance 46 
  Canals 17 
Stocks 
Railway  33 
Banking 26 
French companies 93 Docks 5 
Foreign companies 26 Water 7 
Public Debt 
Spinning 2 
Gas 17 
French government 19 Mining and Iron 47 
Seine department and Paris  
metropolitan area 
13 Transports 14 
Foreign governments 57 Various 46 
  
Foreign companies 15 
Bonds 
Railway 98 
  Foreign companies 37 
  Various 78 
  Public Debt 
  French regions and cities 19 
  Foreign countries, regions and cities 52 
Total 208 titles Total 559 titles 
Neymarck (1888). 
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treatment from central government in fiscal terms. Thus, the government should be more 
intelligent and not disturb French capitalists. The value judgment expressed by 
Neymarck represents the beliefs of their contemporaries, and their views about their social 
position. In Marxist terms, this statement is very representative of the class-consciousness 
of the French high bourgeoisie. 
Arbulu (1998), updated and expanded this information, by providing a detailed 
analysis of the factors and mechanisms of the Paris Stock Market, showing that, for the 
period 1802-1918, it was an example of well-allocation of resources and transmission of 
information. The first part decomposes this study by showing the evolution of the Paris 
Bourse, by market capitalisation and by sector. Figure 1 shows an example of this growth. 
We clearly observe three different stages. A first period of growth under the 
Monarchie de Juillet86, a second period of development under Napoleon III, and a 
definitive boost to financial activities after the arrival of the 3rd Republic. The progressive 
integration of international markets, the rise of new business opportunities around the 
 
86 The name given to the monarchy of Louis Philippe of Orléans (1830-1848). 
Figure 1: Market capitalisation of the Paris Stock Market (in million francs), 1802-1910. 
 
Source: Own elaboration, using the data from Arbulu (1998, p.217). 
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globe -colonisation, construction of infrastructures in Latin America and Russia, etc.- and 
the improvements in transports and communications may have contributed to this sharp 
increase of economic transactions. The second part of the work analyses the efficiency of 
the different operations performed at the Paris Bourse, and its progressive adaptation to 
the changing environment of global financial markets. 
Gallais-Hamonno and Hautcoeur (2007) provided comprehensive study on the main 
characteristics of the Paris Bourse, and its characteristics across time. Thus, it goes since 
its origins in the early 1800s until the eve of the First World War. This volume has been 
widely used in the present dissertation, in every chapter, to understand the functioning of 
the Paris Stock Market, its main regulation, the role of the Compagnie des Agents de 
Change, the differences between the titles listed, etc. Le Bris (2011), in his thesis 
dissertation, presents an extensive research of the historical and persistent 
underperformance of stocks listed at the Paris Bourse, compared to other financial 
markets, since 1854 until 2007. Hautcoeur et al. (2010) focus on the regulatory changes 
in the Paris Stock Market in the late 19th century. Surprisingly, reforms aimed to control 
economic transactions such as that of 1893 improved market efficiency -although reduced 
substantially its volume-, whereas the more liberal reform of 1898 gave rise to an 
important decline in transaction costs. Le Bris and Rezaee (2017) develop an empirical 
analysis on the relationship between stocks and bonds before 1914, as a way to shed some 
light on the study of financial markets in absence of inflation, as during the post-2008 
scenario in the Eurozone. They find a high correlation between stocks and bonds markets 
when inflation is close to zero, which decreased during periods of uncertainty and crisis. 
These works show an interesting picture of the Paris Stock Market: It was a modernised, 
vibrant and dynamic place where multiple operations took place across time. Moreover, 
its competition with the Coulisse promoted a continuous adaptation of its agents to 
changes in regulation or in the global financial framework. Revisiting these volumes, we 
understand the progressive adaptation of the Paris Bourse to the changing political 
environment of the 19th century, plenty of wars and revolutions, characterised by contrasts 
regarding international trade policies, and specially by the opening of new business 
opportunities when France -with the other European powers- started the process of 
colonisation.  
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I have selected the period between 1894 and 1898 for two reasons: First, the present 
article is thought to complement Chapter 4 of the present dissertation, providing a set of 
descriptive characteristics and a new empirical framework based on the logistic 
regression of Ortiz-Serrano (2018). Second, to understand the social relations existing in 
the Paris Stock Market, in political and ethnic terms. Birnbaum (2014) and Grange (2016) 
show how French Jews from the upper-class progressed under the 3rd Republic, which 
became in the trigger for their definitive emancipation. Many of them had an active 
personal and professional life, which includes participating in politics. However, this does 
not mean that many of them fought against ethnic hate. Grange (2016, pp. 435-440) shows 
that most of politically connected Jewish branches87 attempted to reduce their exposure 
during the Dreyfus Affair, and avoided any public defence of the potential innocence of 
the Captain. It is reasonable to think that most of them, fearing the rising Antisemitism 
caused by the Panama Scandal and Dreyfus’ arrestation, thought that a passive attitude 
during the moments of maximum polarisation would draw the attention away from Jewish 
families. I believe, based on Chapters 1 and 3 of the present thesis and on Grange and 
Birnbaum, that the members of the most prominent Jewish families were more prone to 
be part of a board of administration if the firm was politically connected. 
I find that politically connected firms were, on average, more profitable (based on 
Dividend Yields), enjoyed from a much larger trading frequency and had a higher market 
capitalisation. Additionally, I show an interesting finding: A firm was more likely to be 
politically connected if it included Jewish personalities in its board of administration. A 
possible explanation could be that French Jews could enjoy from higher social integration 
among the French bourgeoisie by becoming in shareholders and members of the board of 
important companies of the Paris Stock Market. That is, despite the rising Antisemitism 
in France from the late 1894, members of the most prominent Jewish families may have 
believed that participating a wide range of business activities could help them to be more 
socially accepted, at least among the high bourgeoisie. Section II analyses the process of 
data collection. Section III shows some stylised facts. Section IV shows the empirical 
framework and provides the main results. Section V concludes.  
  
 
87 With the exception of the Reinach family, whose most known member at that time, Joseph Reinach 
(republican deputy) became in one of the first supporters of Dreyfus’ innocence, since the early beginning. 
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II. Data collection. 
I use the same database as in Chapter 4. This is a new collection of information from 
primary source, on a daily basis. The economic information comes essentially from four 
different sources: The Archives of the French Ministry of Finance (SAEF)88, the archives 
of the National Library of France, the Archives du Crédit Agricole, and Gallica -the 
online repository of the National Library-. From the first, I have compiled the yearbooks 
of the Compagnie des Agents de Change, the group that, under government authorisation, 
organised, supervised and registered the transactions taking place at the Paris Stock 
Market. In particular, these yearbooks contain information on the internal characteristics 
of the company. I use the books from 1894, 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900 and 1914 
to compile information on capital, book prices, changes in the capital composition, 
dividends, number of shares, nationality, the place where the firm invested, and the 
surnames of the members of the board of administration. From the second source I use 
the Annuaire Chaix, the yearbook of a famous printing company. I use the volumes for 
1894-1900 to complement the information on the identity of the members of the board. 
The third source has been used for some companies, to obtain information on the 
assembly of shareholders, so I could -for some cases- obtain balance sheets and the 
debates among the members of the assembly for the years 1889-9789. I use Gallica to 
obtain daily prices for all the stocks listed at the Paris Stock Market. These data can be 
obtained from the Bulletin de la Cote, the spreadsheets of the Compagnie des Agents de 
Change, who published this information every day90. I use, in total 140 firms every year. 
The information about the political and professional activities of the board members 
appears sometimes in the Annuaire Chaix and in the reports of the Assembly of 
Shareholders. To complement this process of identification, I use the online repositories 
of the French National Parliament (Assemblée Nationale) and the Senate (Sénat)91. As in 
Ortiz-Serrano (2018), I identify a firm as politically connected if the member of the board 
is (was) Senator or Deputy. Moreover, this connectedness is assumed if the politician is 
 
88 https://www.economie.gouv.fr/saef. 
89 This information is available upon request. In the future, it will be completely digitalised and published 
as an online repository. 
90 https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb32745962x/date.item 
91 For the Senate: http://www.senat.fr/senateurs-3eme-republique/.  
For the Parliament: http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/recherche. 
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(was) State-Counsellor, diplomatic corps, a politician at a regional or local level, or, as in 
the case of colonial banks, the manager was appointed by the government. As pointed out 
above, members of the most prominent Jewish families participated in many companies 
listed at the Paris Stock Market. I follow the same strategy as in Chapter 4. That is, I use 
the compilation of the main Jewish families based on the work of Grange (2016). In total, 
a list of 40 surnames belonging to the richest Jewish branches of the country. I also create 
a variable of Jewish-Connection, calculated as the proportion of Jewish members with 
respect to the total number of members of the board. 
III. Stylised facts: A descriptive analysis. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the average values of the sectorial decomposition of the firms on the 
database, for the years 1894 and 1898 respectively. First, we observe that in general, in 
both periods, the stocks from every industries were undervalued, with a Book-to-Market 
ratio above 1, reaching the value of 2 in the case of banking. Since most of stocks in the 
Paris Stock Market had a book value of 500 francs92, this means that their market value 
had been decreasing since they were issued to the stock market. That is, in general, they 
resulted unattractive to investors. In terms of trading frequency, the insurance sector had 
the lowest percentage, which was expected during the process of data collection, since 
many stocks from insurance companies were traded few times per year. The banking 
sector experiences a substantial decrease in dividend yields from 1894 to 1898, which 
could indicate lower profitability. Banking and Docks & Canals were the sectors 
including more politicians in their boards, whereas Jewish families concentrated specially 
in Gas & Electricity activities. Tables 4 and 5 show the average values found for the firms, 
by political connectedness, for the period from 1894 to 1898.  
 
  
 
92 Based on the information contained in the primary sources mentioned above. 
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Table 2: Mean values of the variables in the dataset, by sectorial distribution, 1894. 
Variable Banking 
Canals, 
Docks & 
Water 
Gas & 
Electricity 
Insurance 
Iron & 
Mining 
Railway Transports Various 
Market 
Capitalisation 
189,000,000 202,000,000 57,200,000 35,500,000 21,400,000 21,400,000 26,400,000 2,0800,000 
Book-to-
Market Ratio 2.13 1.02 1.02 0.98 1.12 1.12 1.85 1.05 
Capital 135,000,000 52,200,000 20,000,000 35,000,000 11,500,000 11,500,000 23,400,000 14,400,000 
Trading 
Frequency 
(% of trading 
days) 
72.13% 82.06% 66.04% 47.70% 71.31% 64.99% 82.70% 64.72% 
Investments 
Abroad 82.76% 42.85% 0.60% 33.33% 50.00% 50.00% 55.56% 36.00% 
Dividend 
Yields 5.48% 4.12% 4.90% 3.41% 4.55% 4.56% 4.05% 4.00% 
Guaranteed 
Assets 24.14% 14.28% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Cash and 
forward 
trading 
82.76% 42.85% 30.00% 66.67% 42.13% 23.08% 33.33% 12.00% 
Politically 
connected 72.40% 85.71% 40.00% 0.00% 47.57% 65.38% 66.67% 32.00% 
Republican 
board 58.62% 42.85% 0.00% 0.00% 42.13% 23.08% 44.44% 28.00% 
Conservative 
board 13.79% 42.85% 40.00% 0.00% 49.40% 42.31% 22.22% 4.00% 
Non-
Connected 27.60% 14.28% 60.00% 100% 47.57% 34.62% 33.33% 68.00% 
Jewish-
connected 27.59% 42.85% 80.00% 0.00% 46.15% 30.77% 55.56% 44.00% 
Source: Own elaboration from primary sources. 
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Table 3: Mean values of the variables in the dataset, by sectorial distribution, 1898. 
Variable Banking 
Canals, 
Docks & 
Water 
Gas & 
Electricity 
Insurance 
Iron & 
Mining 
Railway Transports Various 
Market 
Capitalisation 
188,900,000 254,000,000 54,900,000 30,600,000 33,700,000 23,800,000 35400000 24,600,000 
Book-to-
Market Ratio 2.06 0.61 1.13 0.84 0.77 1.10 1.32 0.90 
Capital 62,100,000 51,100,000 19,700,000 24,300,000 11,200,000 10,900,000 23,800,000 13,300,000 
Trading 
Frequency 
(% of trading 
days) 
78.06% 85.24% 57.86% 48.68% 80.43% 73.62% 78.07% 66.64% 
Investments 
Abroad 75.86% 42.85% 63.63% 50.00% 64.00% 70.83% 44.44% 46.43% 
Dividend 
Yields 2.94% 3.61% 3.72% 2.66% 3.46% 2.50% 3.37% 4.17% 
Guaranteed 
Assets 20.69% 14.28% 9.09% 0.00% 0.00% 70.83% 0.00% 0.00% 
Cash and 
forward 
trading 
75.86% 57.14% 18.18% 75.00% 24.00% 79.16% 44.44% 21.43% 
Politically 
connected 65.52% 71.14% 36.36% 75.00% 52.00% 70.83% 77.78% 25.00% 
Republican 
board 44.83% 28.57% 0.00% 25.00% 12.00% 54.16% 55.56% 21.43% 
Conservative 
board 20.69% 42.85% 36.36% 50.00% 4.00% 16.67% 22.22% 3.57% 
Non-
Connected 34.48% 28.57% 63.63% 25.00% 48.00% 29.16% 22.22% 75.00% 
Jewish-
Connected 27.59% 42.85% 72.72% 25.00% 32.00% 50.00% 33.33% 35.71% 
Source: Own elaboration from primary sources. 
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Table 4: Mean values for politically connected firms, 1894-1898. 
Variable 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 
Market Capitalisation 157,000,000 163,000,000 139,000,000 137,000,000 145,000,000 
Book-to-Market Ratio 1.45 1.50 1.38 1.65 1.66 
Capital 91,400,000 91,600,000 87,300,000 65,500,000 65,200,000 
Trading Frequency 
(% of trading days) 
75.10% 74.50% 76.81% 79.16% 78.41% 
Investments Abroad 60.7% 60.7% 63.75% 68.00% 68.00% 
Guaranteed Assets 25.00% 25.00% 27.50% 22.67% 22.67% 
Admission to cash and 
forward trading 
58.3% 58.9% 63.75% 64.00% 64.00% 
Republican board 60.06% 66.70% 65.00% 62.67% 62.67% 
Conservative board 33.3% 33.3% 35% 37.33% 37.33% 
Dividend Yields 0.059 0.05 0.051 0.03 0.031 
Source: Own elaboration from primary sources. 
Table 5: Mean values for non-connected connected firms, 1894-1898. 
Variable 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 
Market Capitalisation 17,100,000 18,000,000 18,800,000 25,000,000 27,000,000 
Book-to-Market Ratio 1.61 1.64% 1.51 1.42 1.38 
Capital 12,800,000 12,800,000 11,800,000 17,000,000 17,200,000 
Trading Frequency 
(% of trading days) 
64.54% 61.43% 70.56% 68.75% 67.05% 
Investments Abroad 46.00% 46.00% 49.09% 53.22% 53.22% 
Guaranteed Assets 10.00% 10.00% 7.27% 12.90% 12.90% 
Admission to cash and 
forward trading 
28.00% 28.15% 26.43% 29.03% 29.03% 
 0.04 0.039 0.033 0.052 0.048 
Source: Own elaboration from primary sources. 
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The data show clear differences between political and non-connected companies. 
We find that, on average, politically linked firms had, on average, a much higher market 
capitalisation, their book value (capital) was higher as well, and their assets were trading 
much more frequently. In the first chapter of the present dissertation, I showed that 
including republican politicians in the board increased a 10% the probability of the asset 
to be traded. Based on the main values, it is reasonable to think that the same conditions 
would hold during the period under study, 1894-98. We do not observe strong differences 
in terms of Book-to-Market value, being both groups of firms clearly undervalued, having 
for every period a ratio more than one. Firms included generally republican politicians. 
Since these political forces were in government, companies may prefer to have any 
connection with these parties, as a way to obtain future benefits from them, such as 
contracts, concessions, etc. We cannot demonstrate it empirically, however, we observe 
that in general politically connected companies had larger amounts of investments outside 
of France, and about the 25% of them had their assets guaranteed by central state. Thus, 
firms could expect  to obtain some advantages, such as concessions or public contracts. 
However, coefficients in dividend yields are not conclusive. If during the first three years, 
politically connected companies seem to be more profitable and had higher dividend 
yields, during the last two years we find the opposite result. Politicians may not be guided 
by the profitability of the company, but by personal reasons -such as a high wage, 
financial support to its political purposes, etc.-.  
One may ask about the characteristics of Jewish-connected companies. In general, 
I found that on average they had similar values to politically connected firms. However, 
there is a clear different in terms of Dividend Yields, which became higher during the 
whole events of the Dreyfus Affair. It can be observed in Figure 2, which shows the 
evolution of Dividend Yields for J-connected and non-connected companies, for the 
period 1894-95 and 1897-98, respectively. It is observed that, in general, J-Connected 
companies had lower Dividend Yields than Non-Connected during both periods. 
However, this difference becomes much wider in 1897-98, when the Dreyfus Affair 
captured its maximum attention and French society was very polarised. Thus, it is 
probable that J-connected firms shared lower dividends during the Dreyfus Affair, and 
that it affected to its economic performance at least until the publication of Zola’s article 
in January 1898.  
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Figure 2: Differences in dividend yields between J-connected and non-connected firms. 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration from primary sources. 
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Although J-connected firms had lower dividend yields, we have seen in Chapter 4 
that, in terms of returns, they experienced a significant and substantial economic recovery 
after the publication of J’Accuse!, the 13 January 1898. The progressive improvement of 
their economic situation may have been reflected in the dividends shared during the first 
years of the 20th century, when Dreyfus became completely rehabilitated. Moreover, 
dividends were shared once a year, whereas returns were available on a daily basis, so in 
order to see if dividends followed the same trend as returns after the publication of 
J’Accuse! would require an analysis focused on the very long-run. Further research will 
study the relationship between the captain’s public rehabilitation, the decrease of 
Antisemitic tensions, and the economic recovery of Jewish Connected companies after 
1898 and will be able to solve this remaining question. Table 6 decomposes the sectorial 
distribution of the share of Jewish connections for each company and Jewish CEOs for 
the whole period 1894-98. With the exception of Gas & Electricity sector, Jews did not 
represent a large share in the boards of administration. However, their inclusion seems to 
be enough to market forces to identify these companies as J-connected. The share of 
Jewish CEOs is high in Railway, Banking and Gas sectors, and small in the rest. In fact, 
J-connected companies from four sectors did not have any Jewish CEO. 
 
Table 6: Share of Jewish connected firms and Jewish CEOs in the Paris Bourse, 1894-98. 
 Share of J-connections Share of J-Directors 
Railways 0.078 0.289 
Banking 0.044 0.178 
Mining 0.056 0.068 
Gas and Electricity 0.177 0.386 
Insurance 0.039 0.091 
Iron & Heavy Industry 0.012 0.080 
Transports 0.051 0.149 
Food, Liquors & Tobacco 0.056 0.143 
Water 0.087 0 
Telephone & Telegraphs 0.057 0 
Docks/Warehouse 0.033 0 
Media 0.053 0 
Other 0.083 0 
Own elaboration from primary sources. 
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IV. Empirical section: Did French Jews participated in politically 
connected boards? 
Birnbaum (2014) and Grange (2016) argued that the richest French Jewish families 
created strong links with the political class of the 3rd Republic. Thus, the main purpose 
from this section is to empirically show whether French Jews were more likely to 
participate in politically connected companies. I use a panel data logistic regression to 
analyse the determinants of the conditional probability of a Politically connected firm to 
have Jewish personalities on its board, for the year 1894. The empirical specification 
follows Ortiz-Serrano (2018) logistic regression, as follows: 
 
ln[𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 > 0|𝑋)] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽𝑧𝑍𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
  
The dependent variable, POLC, is a dummy taking value one if the firms is 
politically connected, and cero otherwise. The explanatory variable, Jewish_Connection, 
is a dummy which captures whether there is at least one Jewish member in the board of 
administration, and zero otherwise. The vector Z includes the following control variables: 
The logarithm of Market Capitalisation, the Book-to-Market ratio, a dummy taking value 
one if the firm has investments outside of France and zero otherwise, a variable equal to 
one if the firm has shared dividends during the year 1894, and zero otherwise, and a 
variable known as Cash-Forward, which takes value one if the stock is allowed to be 
traded through Cash and Forward operations, or only through Cash operations. Results 
are available in Table 7. As expected, market capitalisation increases the probability of a 
firm to be politically connected. Stocks with highest capitalisation were probably the most 
commonly known, and thus politicians could have a clear preference for the most 
important companies, economically. A firm with investments abroad has also more 
probability of including politicians in its board. The variable of dividends do lose its 
significance when all the controls are included. As we have seen above, it is not clear 
whether French politicians participated in the most profitable firms. It is probable that the 
overall economic importance of the company (capitalisation) made it to be more known 
than its potential profitability in terms of dividends. They might have probably been 
guided by other factors including personal reasons.  
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The variable of interest, J-Connected, increases the probability of a firm to be 
politically connected as well, and is robust to the inclusion of controls. Thus, controlling 
by industry and other economic factors, a firm with at least one member of the board 
belonging to a well-known French Jewish family had 12.1% more probabilities of being 
politically connected than the rest of the companies. These results led me to reject the null 
hypothesis of no relationship between J-connections and politicians in the Paris Bourse, 
demonstrating that French Jewish bourgeoisie attempted to be close to political power. 
 
Table  7: Jewish-connected firms and Political connectedness.  
The table shows the marginal effects from the logistic regression. Dependent Variable: POLC, a 
dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm was politically connected. J-Connected, the variable of 
interest, is a dummy taking value 1 if the company has Jewish connections. Log Market Cap is the 
logarithm of Market Capitalisation. Book-to-Market is the ration between the book and market value. 
Investments Abroad takes value 1 if the firm had investments outside. Dividends 1894 takes value 1 
if the firm distributed dividends in 1894. Cash-Forward is a dummy taking value 1 if the stock was 
admitted both to Cash and Forward trading, or if only Cash operations were permitted. Standard Errors 
are clustered by industrial sector. 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
       
       
J-Connected 0.191*** (0.000) 
0.135* 
(0.06) 
0.132** 
(0.04) 
0.116* 
(0.08) 
0.117* 
(0.093) 
0.121* 
(0.081) 
       
Log Market Cap  0.140*** (0.000) 
0.193*** 
(0.000) 
0.188*** 
(0.000) 
0.180*** 
(0.000) 
0.169*** 
(0.000) 
       
Book-to-Market    0.048*** (0.000) 
0.041*** 
(0.000) 
0.483*** 
(0.001) 
0.042*** 
(0.000) 
       
Investments Abroad    0.128** (0.012) 
0.123** 
(0.025) 
0.109* 
(0.096) 
       
Dividends 1894     0.104* (0.504) 
0.095 
(0.522) 
       
Cash-Forward      0.053 (0.434) 
       
       
Observations 41,406 41,406 41,406 41,406 41,406 41,406 
     
Wald χ2 4.06 50.13 74.24 161.48 159.68 323.68 
       
Prob > χ2 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Coefficients with significance levels 0.10%*, 0.05**, 0.01***. P-values in parentheses. 
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Conclusions 
The present article sheds some light on the internal relationships inside the firms listed at 
the Paris Stock Market by the late 19th century. First, it shows large economic differences 
between firms with and without political connections. Politically related companies had 
a higher market value and trading frequency -more investors’ attention- as well as they 
seemed to enjoy from better market conditions than non-connected companies -higher 
average of guaranteed assets and investments outside of France-. It would confirm that 
including politicians in the board of administration, rather than being guided by 
profitability -no clear differences neither in book-to-market ratio nor in dividend yields-, 
politicians might have been attracted to participate in these companies guided by personal 
reasons, as well as firms may have expected that the inclusion of politicians would give 
rise to a better business opportunities.  
I confirm the intuition of authors such as Birnbaum (2014) or Grange (2016) about 
the existence of close links between politicians and the most prominent Jewish families 
by the time of the Dreyfus Affair. French Jews were more likely to be part of politically 
connected boards. This can be explained by a continuous attempt to be accepted among 
the French upper-class, as one of them. Thus, Jewish individuals, aware of the existing 
reluctances that some individuals have about them, may have developed a dynamic 
business life in order to be more integrated in the French bourgeoisie and political class. 
This interesting finding may partially explain the perception that public opinion had about 
the “close relations” between French politicians and Jewish bourgeoisie. We know, based 
on the literature shown in the introduction of this dissertation, that most of French Jews 
were blue-collar workers and did not have any political or economic power. However, 
the general stereotypes depicted a negative picture of French Jews, perceived as a part of 
the economic and political elite. They represented a minority; however, their economic 
activities may have contributed to the persistence of this negative perception across time.  
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Conclusion and final remarks  
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Concluding remarks 
This work has shown the importance of multiple non-economic events for the agents 
participating at the Paris Stock Market, in the last decades of the 19th Century. We observe 
that political connections determined investors’ preferences and shaped their economic 
decisions. France was politically divided, and tensions were extremely high when 
Georges Boulanger ran for elections the 27 January 1889. A potential change of regime 
may have caused multiple losses to those investors strongly linked with the republican 
parties in government, who directly rewarded these stocks once they confirmed 
Boulanger’s refusal to stage a Coup d’état.  
Moreover, this dissertation demonstrates that French investors sought new 
information on financial markets and had the capacity to distinguish between real and 
fake news. The massive campaign of briberies and corruption developed by the Panama 
Company during the year 1888 had the opposite desired effect, and many investors fled 
when the firm issued its last set of obligations. The negative relation between coverage 
and returns indicates that French investors were aware of the fake news disseminated by 
newspapers and did not participate in the issue because they may have inferred that it was 
a fraud. The extensive analysis of French Antisemitism shows that the Dreyfus Affair had 
a strong economic effect on the firms with Jewish connections. This event has historically 
been considered as a social problem, with no economic implications. However, we 
observe that Jewish-connected firms experienced losses in their value after Dreyfus 
public degradation, which could be indicate that they would fear a wave of Antisemitism 
in the country. The fact that this effect did not last for long could mean that investors soon 
saw that the situation for French Jews was not to worsen. We see significant positive 
effects from the widespread campaign to rehabilitate the captain Dreyfus after J’Accuse! 
was published the 13 January 1898. This would truly mirror market expectations about 
an improvement of the social consideration of French Jews and a progressive decline of 
Antisemitism in the country. 
Last, I provide some evidence on the strong links between French Jewish upper 
class and the political class, which would empirically demonstrate these connections, as 
some authors pointed out. Furthermore, it would evidence the existence of a close 
friendship between the economic and political elite, as was pointed out by Garrigues 
(1997), the author whose work was the inspiration for the present research. 
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Contribution and future research 
We contribute to the existing literature by showing the importance that non-economic 
factors had on investors’ decisions. It demonstrates that late 19th century investors were 
able to perform different market operations based on their political or personal 
expectations, and that was shaping market preferences. There is a wide strand of literature 
showing the existence of the influence of political connections, fake news or ethnic 
discrimination in financial markets nowadays. We demonstrate that these factors were 
also important to 19th century investors, both in the short and the long term. This happens 
during the Boulangist campaign, the case of the briberies of the Panama company and 
during the Dreyfus Affair. 
The significance of these events and the fact that they shaped investors’ mentality, 
it also contributes to expand the existing research on French financial history. The Paris 
Stock Market was a dynamic place where many operations took place every day and each 
of them was probably guided not only by economic reasons -economic crisis, tariffs, etc.- 
but also by a set of non-economic reasons that were important to individuals. As Braggion 
and Moore (2013) demonstrated for the London Stock Exchange, similar causes affected 
to the performance of the Paris Bourse. 
Some different paths must be taken after this dissertation. First, we are collecting 
data to perform a very-long run analysis on the evolution of the value of Jewish connected 
companies until the complete rehabilitation of the captain Dreyfus. Second, it would be 
interesting to deepen into the strong links between French politicians and Jewish 
individuals, and whether it could have influenced firms’ performance since the early years 
of the 3rd Republic. It would shed some light on the real significance of political and 
Jewish connections in the long term. Last, we continue with the analysis of investors’ 
mentality during the massive briberies paid by the Panama Company, by collecting a new 
set of newspapers and analysing the real effect of press-coverage. 
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Index of primary sources 
 
Chapter 2 
• Centre des Archives Économiques et Financières (SAEF) : Annuaires des Agents de 
Change (1887, 1888, 1889, & 1889). 
• Archives du Crédit Agricole: Numerous balances and reports from the Assembly of 
shareholders for a set of 39 firms. Years: 1887-1892. 
• Gallica : Bulletins de la Cote Officielle de Paris. Compagnie des Agents de Change ; 
Cours authentique de la Bourse de Paris. 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb32715573v/date.r=compagnie%20des%20agents
%20de%20change. 
• Gallica : Dictionnaire des parlementaires français. Depuis le 1er mai 1789 jusqu'au 
1er mai 1889. Robert and Cougny. 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k83709c?rk=21459;2. 
• Bibliothèque Nationale de France :  Dictionnaire des parlementaires français : notices 
biographiques sur les ministres, députés et sénateurs français de 1889 à 1940. Tome 
IV [et Tome V], [D-G] / sous la direction de Jean Jolly.  
 
 
Chapter 3 
• Archives of the French Ministry of Finance. Service des archives économiques et 
financières (SAEF) : Yearbooks of the Compagnie des Agents de Change de Paris 
(years 1887, 1888, 1889, 1890, 1891). 
• National Library of France (BNF). Annuaire Chaix (years 1887, 1888, 1889, 
1890), yearbooks of the Imprimerie Chaix. 
• Archives du Crédit Agricole. Internal reports from the assemblies of shareholders 
of the Panama Company, year 1879, 1880; advertisements and calls for 
subscriptions; private banking reports on the different issues of the Panama 
Company; information on the liquidation of the Panama Company 1890-1895; the 
different enterprises and projects regarding the construction of the Panama Canal, 
1879-1895 and 1895-1901. 
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• Gallica. Online repository of the National Library of France. Daily spreadsheets 
of the Paris Stock Exchange, from the Compagnie des Agents de Change. 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb32715573v/date&rk=21459;2. 
 
Data on newspapers 
• Le Gaulois : 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb32779904b/date1886.item.r=Le%20Gaulois.langFR 
• Le Petit Journal: https://www.retronews.fr/titre-de-presse/petit-journal 
• Le Temps : https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb34431794k/date1899.item 
• Le Figaro: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb34355551z/date1888.item 
 
 
Chapters 4 & 5 
 
• Archives of the French Ministry of Finance. Service des archives économiques et 
financières (SAEF or CAEF) : Yearbooks of the Compagnie des Agents de 
Change de Paris (years 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900, and 
1914). 
• National Library of France (BNF). Annuaire Chaix (years 1897, 1898, 1899, 
1900, 1901, 1902), yearbooks of the Imprimerie Chaix. 
• Archives du Crédit Agricole. Internal reports from the assemblies of shareholders 
• Gallica. Online repository of the National Library of France. Daily spreadsheets 
of the Paris Stock Exchange, from the Compagnie des Agents de Change. 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb32715573v/date&rk=21459;2. 
 
Data on newspapers 
• Le Petit Journal: https://www.retronews.fr/titre-de-presse/petit-journal 
• Le Siècle: https://www.retronews.fr/titre-de-presse/siecle 
• La Croix: https://www.retronews.fr/titre-de-presse/croix 
• La Libre Parole: https://www.retronews.fr/titre-de-presse/libre-parole 
• L’Aurore: https://www.retronews.fr/titre-de-presse/aurore-paris# 
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Political connections and stock returns, evidence from the 
Boulangist campaign 
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Appendix 1.A. The economic characteristics of firms in 1888. 
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Appendix 1.B. Political connections of the firms, 1888-1889 
 
 
Firm Politically Connected Party 
Name of the politicians, 
and type of connection 
Chemins Fer Lyon et la 
Méditerranée 
YES CONSERVATIVE 
 
Comte Paul d'Haussonville - 
Conservative. 
 
Baron Jean Hely d'Oissel - 
Conservtive (elected in September 
1889). 
 
Vicomte Huber de Rainneville - 
Conservative (former deputy). 
 
Canal Maritime Suez Compagnie 
Universelle 
YES REPUBLICAN 
Jules Herbette - Republican - 
Diplomatic corp appointed by the 
Republican government. 
Chemins Fer Nord YES REPUBLICAN 
Léon Say - Republican - Centre 
Gauche. 
Chemins Fer Orleans YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Agenor Bardoux - Republican - 
Centre Gauche (Anti 
Boulangiste). 
 
Paul Andral - Conservative - 
Conseiller d'État under the 
Second Empire. 
 
Banque de France  YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Joseph Magnin - Republican - 
Lifetime Senator since 1875. 
 
Numerous members of the 
Banque de France were appointed 
directly by the president of the 
Republic. 
 
Compagnie  
Parisienne du Gaz 
YES CONSERVATIVE 
 
Henry de Breteuil - Conservative. 
 
Georges de Heeckeren - 
Conservative (under the Second 
Empire). 
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Firm Politically Connected Party 
Name of the politicians, 
and type of connection 
Chemins Fer Est YES CONSERVATIVE 
 
Gustave Prosper Reille - 
Conservative (former). 
 
Léon Lefébure - Conservative 
(former). 
 
Crédit Foncier de France YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Albert Christophle - Republican - 
Opportuniste (formerly, Centre 
Gauche). 
 
Paul Devès - Republican - 
Opportuniste (formerly, Union 
Républicaine). 
 
Alfred Mezières - Republican - 
Opportuniste (formerly, Union 
Républicaine). 
 
Chemins Fer Midi YES CONSERVATIVE 
 
Adolphe d'Eichtal - Conservative 
- (under the Second Empire). 
 
Henri Bocher – Conservative 
 
Chemins Fer Ouest YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Joseph Gay - Republican - State 
Counselor (appointed by the 
Republic). 
 
René Brice - Republican - 
Opportunist (formerly Centre 
Gauche). 
Crédit Lyonnais YES REPUBLICAN 
Henri Germain - Republican 
(Anti-Boulangist) - Opportunist 
(formerly Centre Gauche). 
 
René Brice - Republican - 
Opportunist (formerly Centre 
Gauche). 
Canal du Panama YES CONSERVATIVE 
 
Ferdinand de Lesseps 
Conservative - Diplomatic corp 
under the Second Empire.  Given 
his biography, ideologically, he 
seems to have been aligned with 
conservative forces.   
Comte de Circourt - Conservative 
- State Counsellor (before 
republicans). 
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Firm Politically Connected Party 
Name of the politicians, 
and type of connection 
Comptoir d'Escompte NO NON-CONNECTED  
Société Générale pour le 
Développement Commerce et 
Industrie en France 
YES CONSERVATIVE 
 
Anatole Bartholoni - Conservative 
(former). 
 
Antonin Lefèvre-Pontalis - 
Conservative. 
 
Banque d'Escompte de Paris YES CONSERVATIVE 
Baron Georges de Soubeyran - 
Conservative. 
Compagnie Générale des Eaux YES CONSERVATIVE 
Gustave Reille - Conservative 
(under the Second Empire). 
Banque de Paris Pays Bas YES CONSERVATIVE 
Ernest Dutilleul - Conservative - 
Former Ministry of Finance under 
MacMahon. 
Société des Dépots et Comptes 
Courants 
YES CONSERVATIVE 
Maurice Aubry - Conservative 
(former). 
Compagnie des Métaux NO NON-CONNECTED  
Crédit Foncier Egyptien YES REPUBLICAN 
Members of the board obeyed 
French and Egyptian 
administrations. 
Messageries Maritimes YES CONSERVATIVE 
 
Armand Behic - Conservative 
(former) - Under Second Empire 
and the III Republic. 
 
Antonin Lefèvre-Pontalis - 
Conservative. 
 
Société Générale de Crédit 
Industriel et Commercial 
YES REPUBLICAN 
Joseph Gay - Republican - State 
Counsellor (by the Republic). 
Agénor Bardoux - Republican 
Opportunist. 
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Firm Politically Connected Party 
Name of the politicians, 
and type of connection 
Société Foncière Lyonnaise YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Henri Germain - Republican 
(Anti-Boulangist) - Opportunist 
(formerly Centre Gauche). 
 
Auguste Philippoteaux - 
Republican - Centre Gauche. 
 
Union des Gaz NO NON-CONNECTED  
Compagnie Générale des Voitures 
á Paris 
NO NON-CONNECTED  
Banque d'Algerie YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Its activities were supervised by 
French State, which appointed the 
directors. 
 
Nelson-Chierico - (appointed by 
the president of the Republic). 
 
Legendre - (appointed by the 
ministry of finance). 
 
Credit Foncier et Agricole 
d'Algerie 
YES REPUBLICAN 
René Brice - Republican - 
Opportunist. 
Compagnie Transatlantique YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Charles Guéry - Republican - 
State Counsellor. 
 
Delarbre - Republican - State 
Counsellor. 
 
Société Marsellaise de Crédit 
Industriel et Commercial 
NO NON-CONNECTED  
Omnibus de Paris YES REPUBLICAN 
Leon Lalanne - Republican - 
Opportunist (Anti-Boulangist). 
 
Camescasse - Republican Opportunist. 
 
Eugène Pereire - Bonapartist (former) - 
Following Grange (2016 pp. 102-106), 
the Pereire brothers had approached to 
republicans after 1877. 
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Firm Politically Connected Party 
Name of the politicians, 
and type of connection 
Bone Guelma YES REPUBLICAN 
Paul Devès - Republican 
Opportunist (formerly, Union 
Républicaine). 
Docks et Entrepots de Marseille YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Paul de Salvandy - Republican - 
Centre Gauche (former). 
 
Eugène Pereire - Bonapartist 
(former) - Following Grange 
(2016 pp. 102-106), the Pereire 
brothers aligned with republicans 
after 1877. 
Chemins Fer Départamentaux YES REPUBLICAN 
Bertrand Louis Eugène Mir - 
Republican - Gauche 
Republicaine (Opportunist). 
Eaux Vichy NO NON-CONNECTED  
Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
pour la France et l'Étranger 
YES CONSERVATIVE 
Gustave Prosper Reille - 
Conservative (under the Second 
Empire). 
Chemins Fer Est Algerien YES CONSERVATIVE 
Paul Gabriel d'Haussonville - 
Conservative (former). 
Mokta El Hadid YES CONSERVATIVE 
 
Jean Clary - Conservative 
(former). 
 
Jules Tarbé des Sablons - 
Conservative - State Counsellor 
(Second Empire). 
 
La Fonciere Transport Insurance YES CONSERVATIVE 
 
Le Baron Georges de Soubeyran - 
Conservative. 
 
Louis de Beauchamp - 
Conservative (former). 
 
Edmond Schérer - Republican 
(former) - Died in early 1889. 
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Firm Politically Connected Party 
Name of the politicians, 
and type of connection 
Compagnie Foncière France YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Auguste Philippoteaux - 
Republican - Centre Gauche. 
 
Paul Devès - Republican - Gauche 
Republicaine. 
Allumettes Chimiques pour la 
France et l'étranger 
NO NON-CONNECTED  
Compagnie Centrale d'éclairage 
par le gaz Lebon 
YES REPUBLICAN 
Jules Herbette - Republican - 
Diplomatic corps appointed by the 
Republican government. 
Société Crédit Mobilier NO NON-CONNECTED  
Banque Franco-Egyptienne NO NON-CONNECTED  
Banque Parisienne NO NON-CONNECTED  
Société Lyonnaise des Eaux et 
Eclairage 
NO NON-CONNECTED  
Société Centrale de Dynamite YES REPUBLICAN 
Paul Barbé - Republican -  
(Minister of Agriculture and Anti-
Boulangist). 
 
Gilbert Le Guay - Republican - 
Union Républicaine. 
 
Georges Vian - Republican - State 
Counsellor (republican deputy 
from 1890). 
Banque Transatlantique YES REPUBLICAN 
Henry Durangel - Republican 
State Counsellor. 
Eugène Pereire - Bonapartist 
(former) - Following Grange 
(2016 pp. 102-106), the Pereire 
brothers aligned with republicans 
after 1877. 
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Firm Politically Connected Party 
Name of the politicians, 
and type of connection 
Chemins Fer Andalous YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Edmond Joubert - Republican - 
Counsellor of Paris. 
 
Political connections with the 
Spanish government. 
 
Le Soleil Incendie NO NON-CONNECTED  
Canal Maritime Corinthe YES REPUBLICAN 
Rémy Bernard - Republican - 
Parisian politician. 
Fives Lille YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Krantz - Republican - Centre 
Gauche Senator. 
 
Marquis des Roys - Conservative 
(former). 
 
Société Immeubles France YES CONSERVATIVE 
 
Baron Georges de Soubeyran - 
Conservative. 
 
Comte Martin de Ayguesvives - 
Conservative. 
 
Banque Nationale Haiti NO NON-CONNECTED  
Compagnie Algérienne YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Georges Lesueur - Republican - 
Current Senator Centre Gauche 
(Anti Boulangist). 
 
Jules Tarbé des Sablons - 
Conservative - Former State 
Counsellor (Second Empire). 
 
Société Française des Reports et 
Depots 
NO NON-CONNECTED  
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Firm Politically Connected Party 
Name of the politicians, 
and type of connection 
Sous-Comptoir des Entrepreneurs NO NON-CONNECTED  
Chemins Fer Sud France NO NON-CONNECTED  
Rente Foncière NO NON-CONNECTED  
Gaz Bordeaux NO NON-CONNECTED  
Banque Commerciale et 
Industrielle 
NO NON-CONNECTED  
Crédit Algérien NO NON-CONNECTED  
Annuaire Imprimerie Didot Bottin NO NON-CONNECTED  
Bateaux Parisiens NO NON-CONNECTED  
Navigation du Havre a Paris NO NON-CONNECTED  
Naud YES REPUBLICAN 
 
Anatole Lemercier - Republican - 
Former monarchist, he changed to 
Centre Gauche and became Anti 
Boulangist. 
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Firm Politically Connected Party 
Name of the politicians, 
and type of connection 
Crédit Foncier Colonial YES CONSERVATIVE 
Gabriel Couturier - Conservative - 
Governor of Guadaloupe during 
the conservative period. 
Voitures  
L'Urbaine 
NO NON-CONNECTED  
Credit Foncier Franco Canadien YES REPUBLICAN 
René Brice - Republican - 
Opportunist. 
Comp Générale Tramways YES CONSERVATIVE 
Henri de la Fauconnerie - 
Conservative (Boulangist). 
Compagnie d’Aguilas YES CONSERVATIVE 
Theodore Benazet - Conservative. 
 
Paul Dufour - Conservative. 
Eaux de la Banlieue NO NON-CONNECTED  
Chemins de Fer Médoc YES REPUBLICAN 
Etienne Watel - Republican - 
Paris Counselor. 
Imprimerie Chaix YES REPUBLICAN 
Homberg - Republican - 
Diplomate corps at Ministry of 
agriculture. 
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Fake news and corruption in late 19th Century France: The 
case of the Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Panamá 
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Appendix 2: Primary documents used as references. 
 
 
Digitized legal report: Jules Fabre analyses the financial fraud of the Compagnie 
Universelle du Canal Interocéanique de Panama. 
Source: Archives du Crédit Agricole. DEEF 2371-1, and DEEF 2371-2. 
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Digitized legal report: Anonymous brochure from 1880, showing the potential profits 
of the enterprise of the Panama Company. 
Source: Archives du Crédit Ágricole, DEEF 2371-1, and DEEF 2371-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
206 
 
206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
207 
 
207 
 
 
 
 
 
  
208 
 
208 
 
 
 
 
 
  
209 
 
209 
 
 
 
 
 
  
210 
 
210 
 
 
 
 
 
Digitized legal report: Advertisement/Brochure of the Panama Company, encouraging 
people to participate in its first issue of shares, in 1880. 
Source: Archives du Crédit Ágricole, DEEF 2371-1, and DEEF 2371-2. 
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J’Accuse! Antisemitism and financial markets in 19th 
century France. 
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Appendix 3. List of Paul Levy’s Jewish surnames. 
 
List of Jewish surnames and their origins extracted from Paul Levy’s list. 
Family name Original Jewish name 
Aaron Aron 
Abadia Obadia 
Abbas From the Arabian - Lyon 
Abel, Abelin, Abelson (Breath, Man)  
Abens(o)ur, Abensou(r), Bensur Name of Arabian tribe - Sour 
Aberle Abraham 
Abib Habib 
Abigdor, Avigdor Aouvigdor (Judge) 
Aboucaya, Boucaya From Arabian - Cauterization 
Aboulker (Proud man) 
Abraham, Abrams, Abram(i), Brahm, 
Brami, Brahami, Afrom, Aberle, Aberlin 
Abramovit(s)ch, Abramovicz, Abramovici 
"Father of the crowd" 
Abravanel  
Amiache, Amias Nahmias 
Amschel, Ancel, Anchel Anselme 
Angélique Ange 
Anglais Name of origin - English 
Anna Hanna, Hendel 
Anschel Anselme 
Anselme, Anchel, Amsel, Amschel,  
Amselle, Ancel (in), Ansel (in) 
Ascher 
Aoudai, Aouday 
Juif, Jude (african denomination of 
Jew) 
Apfel, Appel, Epel Name of Vegetables (apple) 
Aquin Isaac 
Arditti Hardi (Italian) 
Arié Lyon 
Armentarius Shepherd  
Arnstein (er) Name of Place - Arnstein 
Aron, Aronso(h)n, Aronstan, Aronsberg,  
Aronivich, Aroun, Benaaron, Aronius 
Enlightened 
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Asch, Ascher, Auscher, Auger, Augé Ascher (Happy, glad) 
Ascoli Name of Place 
Askinazi, Askenazy, Aschkenasy,  
Aszkenazy, Eskenazi, Esckenazi, Eskinazi 
From the German - (the son of 
Japhet) 
Assaya Saya 
Assoul(a)y Azoulay 
Astruc, Astrug, Strouc(h), Struk, Stroux,  
Stroock, Benastruc 
(Star) - Being Lucky 
Athias, Attias, Attiaz, Atijas From the Arabian - (Gift) 
Attar(d), Benatar, Azar From the Arabian - (Grocer) 
Auerbacher, Auerbach, Auer, Oer Auerbach 
Augé Arscher 
AussigAscher  
Aussig Disig 
Avenel, Avenelle Job- - Oats-trader 
Averbouch Haber 
Avigdor Abigdor 
Avila Dabila 
Ayache Aïache 
Aysen Eisen 
Azar Attar 
Azencot, Azancot, Azencourt From Animal - (Gazelle) 
Azoulay, Assoulay, Azoula(i) 
Assouline, Assouly 
From a place - (Tazoulaït, from 
Oran) 
Babet Bessel (Élisabeth) 
Bacharach, Bachrach, Baccara(t),  
Bacherich, Bacherig  
From a place - (Bacharach) 
Bacher, Bachet, Baché From a place - (Bacharach) 
Back, Baeck Baecker (Baker, Boulanger) 
Bacri, Bacry, Cohen-Bacri From Arabian - (Cowherd) 
Bader Name of Country/Region - (Bade) 
Baer, Baër, Baermann, Berr, Beer,  
Behr, Berl, Berman 
 
Bahar Behar 
Baiersdorf, Beyersdorf, Bayersdorf Name of place (Saxony) 
Balensi Valensi 
Ballin Name of place - (Balin, Poland) 
Bamberger From a place - (Bamberg, Bavaria) 
Baranek, Beranek From the Polish, (Sheep) 
Baranès, Baranez Name of a Berber tribe 
Barbe Sobriquet 
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Baron From Hebraic Mélek (King) 
Baruch, Barouch, Barouck, Baroukh,  
Barucq, Borach, Borich, Boris 
Name of a prophet - (Barukh) 
Basch (Head) 
Bass A job - (Basch, Singer) 
Battagey, Battegay  
Rostand  
Bauer, Baur A job - (Farmer) 
Baum Sobriquet 
Bauman Job - (Farmer) 
Baumgart, Baumgarten A place - (Orchard, Huerto) 
Beaucaire (Guardian) 
Bechmann 
A job - (Pitch-Trader, Vendedor de 
brea) 
Beck, Becker A job - (Baker, Boulanger) 
Bedarida, Bedaride, Bedarride A place - (Bédarrides) 
Beer (Beer) 
Behar, Bahar, Lebhar, lebar, El Bhar (Baron) 
Behr  
Brifus (Doyfus) 
Brile  
Belaiche, Belais Jais 
Bella, Belle, Belette, Beile, Beyle Female name - Sehoene 
Bellalou Lalou 
Benaich Jaïs 
Ben Son of Ben 
Benaim Haïem 
Benamour Amar 
Benda, Bendavid ben David 
Bendian Daïan 
Benedic, Benedict, Bénédit, Bendit, Bendich, Bendix, 
Benedetti, Bennet 
Béni (Benedictus) 
Benguigui Guigue 
Benichen Jssï 
Benjamin, Jamin From Hebraic - (Son of fortune) 
Bennet Benedic 
Benoit (Benedictus) 
Bensour Abenseur 
Benveniste (The desired) 
Berg, Bergmann Berig 
Bergson Son of Berg/Baer 
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Ber Baer 
Berlin, Berlinsk A Place - (Berlin) 
Bernard Baer 
Bernays, Berneis Bernay 
Berncastel A place - (Bernkastel-sur-Moselle) 
Berner Bern (Verona) 
Bernheim, Bernheimer 
A place - (Burgbernheim, 
Mainbernheim) 
Bernstein 
A place - (From Prussia) 
A job - (Amber Trader) 
Berr Baer 
Bessel, Bezzel, Bess, Pessl  
Beyersdorf Baiersdorf 
Beyfus, Beifus Phoebus 
Beyle Bella 
Bibas Vivas 
Bicart Bickert 
Bickert, Bicart, Bicard, Bickart, Bigar, 
Picard, Piquart, Piquert 
Bickhart 
Biderman, Biederman, Biedermann, Bidermann (Brave Man) 
Bienen, Bienenfeld, Bienenstock (Hive) 
Bing, Bingen, Binger A place (Bingen, Hesse) 
Birnbaum, Birenbaum, Birenzweigue, Birène a Place (Birnbaum) 
Blatt Vegetable (Leaf) 
Blaufuks Fuchs 
Blaustein A job - (Stone trader) 
Blimel, Blin Blum 
Bloch, Bloche, Bloc, Block, Ploque wloch 
Blum, Blin, Blumel sobriquet 
Blumen, Blumberg, Blumstein, Blumenfeldt, Blumenthal, 
Blimental, Blumencwajgt 
 
Blume, Blimel, Bluemel  
Bock Sobriquet 
Bodenheim, Bodenheimer A Place (Bodenheim, Hesse) 
Bogen, Bogenmann Sobriquet 
Bollack, Bolac, Pollack, Pollac, Pollonais, Polonois,  
Polonowsky, Polonsky, Poliakof, Poliakoff 
A place (Poland) 
Bomsel Bumsel 
Bon Epithet 
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Bonafos, Bonafous Bonnafous, Bonafé, Bonnefoi, Bonnefoy Epithet 
Bonami, Bonamy Characteristic - (Good Friend) 
Bonaquet Naquet 
Bonavita Bonnevie 
Bondia, Bonjour From Latin (Bonus dies) 
Boneff Bonenfant 
Bonenfant, Bonnenfant, Bonêfant, Boneff  
Bonet  
Bonfils, Bonnefils  
Bonisac, Boniac Bon Isaac 
Bonjour Bondia 
Bonjudas Bon Juif 
Bonjuif Bon Juif, Bon Judas 
Bonmacip Massip 
Bonn, Bonne A place (Bonn) 
Bonne from Latin (Bona) 
Bonnefille   
Bonnefoi Bonafe 
Bonnefous Benafe 
Bonnen Bon homme  (a good man) 
Bonnevie, Bonavita  
Bonsenhor Bon seigneur (A good man) 
Borenstein, Borenstain, Borenstajn, Bornsetin, Bourstin, 
Bourstyn 
A place (Bursztyn) 
Borich Baruch 
Borin Borenstein 
Boris Baruch 
Bouchara, Boukara From Arabian (Haired, chevelu) 
Boucher, Boucherot A job (Metzger, Fleischer) 
Bourrin A place (Bourran) 
Bourstin Borenstein 
Boutboul, Bouteboul, Teboul, Teboulle  
Brabo Brave 
Brahm, Brami Abraham 
Brandeis, Brandes 
A place (Brandis sur l'Elbe, 
Bohemia) 
Brandon, Brandin Brand (Sword maker) 
Brauer Breger 
Braun, Brun Sobriquet 
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Braunschweig, Braunschvig, Brunschwig, Brunschwick, 
Brunsvick 
Braunschweig 
Braunstein, Bronstein, Bronztajn A job - Manganese Trader 
Bravo, Brabo A place (Bravo). A sobriquet 
Brêal  
Breger, Brégére, Breyer, Breuer, Brauer a job (Brewer) 
Breinel Brown 
Breslau, Breslave A place (Breslau) 
Breuer Breger 
Brezin, Brzeziner, Brezinski Bresin (Poland) 
Bril Brühl 
Brisach, Brisac, Brissac, Brisaque Breisach 
Brod, Brody, Brodsky A place (Galicie Slavic) 
Bronstein Braunstein 
Bruck, Brucker, Brück, Brucker Baruch 
Brühl, Brüll, Brill A place (Brül, Renania) 
Brun Braun 
Brune, Breinel Brown 
Brunswick Brunschweig 
Bumsel, Bomse, Bunzel A place (Bunzlau, Silesia) 
Burger  
Butenswieser A place (Budweis, Budejovice) 
Butterfass Sobriquet 
Cadenet A place (Vauclude) 
Caen  Cahen 
Cahen, Caen, Cain, Cahin Cahn, Kahn, Kahan, Cahnmann (Savior, Priest) 
Cain, Cahin Cahen 
Caleb, Kaleb, Calef, Caleff, Kaleff An animal (Dog) 
Calman, Calmann, Kalman, Kallman, Kallmann, Kalmann, 
Kalmanson, 
Kalmanovitz, Kleemann, Calmer  
From the Greek (Kalonymos) 
Calmer Calman 
Calo, Calot  
Calonymos Kalonymos 
Camel Kamel 
Campo, Delcampo A place (From the countryside) 
Cantor, Kantor, Kantorowicz, Kantorowitch, Kantorowicz A job (Singer) 
Carcassonne A place (Aude) 
Carcausse, Carcos Corcos 
Cardoze, Cardozo, Cardoso A place (El Cardoso, Spain) 
Carlebac, Carleback, Carlebach, Karlebach A place (Karlebach, Hesse) 
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Carmi Crémieux 
Caron, Charon 
From old Spanish (Caro-Querido-
Beloved) 
Carrus, Harrous From Latin (Carus, beloved) 
Carsenti Karsenti 
Carvalho, Carvallo, Carvaillo From a plant (Oak) 
Gaspar, Gasparj Gaspard 
Gaspi Kaspi 
Gassel Kassel 
Gassin A place (Cassino) 
Castres A place (Castres, Tarn) 
Castro A place (Castro, Cordoba - Spain) 
Catalan A place (Catalonia) 
Catz Katz 
Cavaillon A place (Vaucluse) 
Cayl, Cayla, Caylus  a place (Caylus, Tarn-et-Gar) 
Cerf, Lecerf, Serf Hirsch 
Gerfbeer Corf 
Cesana A place (Cesena, Italy) 
Chailly Scheie 
Chaim, Chajim Haiem 
Chajmanovicz Haimann 
Chalon, Jalon  
Champagne A place (Champagne) 
Chapiro Sapir, Spire 
Chaplain Koppel 
Charbit, Cherbet, Cherbete From Hebraic (Scepter) 
Charleville A place (Charleville) 
Chastain Schwarzstein 
Chavès, Chavez  
Chayé, Chayot Scheié 
Chebat, Chebath, Scebat, Sebat Sebbat 
Chekroun Chouecroun 
Chel Golb 
Chemouni, Chimouni Simon 
Cherbet Charbit 
Chich, Chiche, Chicha Nature (Marble, Mármol) 
Chouchan, Chouchane, Chouchen, Sousan,  
Sousane, Souzan, Bensoussan 
From Hebraic (Rose) 
Choucrou, Choucroun, Chekroun, Choucrou Characteristic (Blond) 
Chremnitz Cremnitz 
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Citroen, Zitrone, Tsitron A plant (Lemon) 
Clain Klein 
Clara, Claire, Clairsse A woman name 
Clever, Clever, Cliver Kleber 
Cobbi, Cobe, Koby, Elkoubi From the Arabian (Dome, cúpula) 
Coblence, Coblentz, Koblence, Coblance, Caublance A place (Coblence) 
Cochel Coussel 
Coen Cohen 
Coff, Coffmann Kaufmann 
Cohen, Coen, Coïn, Cohn, Kohn, Kon, Kohn, Kogan, Kagan, 
Kaganoff, Kuhn 
From Hebraic - Kohen (Priest) 
Coifman Kaufmann 
Cologna, Colonne A place (Cologne, Köln) 
Colombo  
Comper, Comperte Gumbrecht 
Copel Koppel 
Copin Koppel 
Corcos, Carcos, Karkos, Karkous, karkouse, Karkose A place Caracause (Carcasonne) 
Cordoba, Cordova A place (Cordoba, Spain) 
Correa A place (Correa, Correas - Spain) 
Costa, Da Costa, Acosta, Lacoste A place (Spain) 
Costatini  
Cousel, Kusel, Cochel, Koschel, Kosel, Kozel From Hebraic - (Yekouthiel) 
Créange, Créange A place (Créhange, Moselle) 
Cremieux, Carmi A place (Crémieux) 
Cremnitz, Chremnitz, Kremnitz A place (Kremnitz, Hungary) 
Crescas From Latin (Crescere, To grow) 
Crespel, Crispel, Crespi, Crespin, Crispin Sobriquet 
Cressant, Cressan, Cressent, Cressin 
From Hebraic (Guedalia, God makes 
you to believe) 
Crin Grlin 
Crispin Crespel 
Crombac Grumbach 
Crukir Zueker 
culmann Kullmann 
Cupfer Kupfer 
Cynober Zinnober 
Dabila, Davila, Avila A place (Avila, Spain) 
Da Costa Costa 
Dacquin Haquet 
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Daian, Dajan, Dayan, Dayantt, Dailland, Dayen, Bendayan, 
Bendian, Dian, djian 
A job , from Hebraic (Judge) 
Dalberg  
Dalmbert Deiberg 
Dalmeyda, D'almeida, Almeida A place (Almeida) 
Dalpuget, Depuget, Delpuget, Puget A place (Le Puget) 
Dalsace (Elsasser, Germany) 
Dalsheim, Dalsheimer, Dalsème, Dahl A place (Dalsheim, Hesse) 
Danan, Bendanan, Danon 
A job, from Arabian (Dahan- 
Painter) 
Daniel, Danyl, Danilevsky From Hebraic (God is my judge) 
Daninos Daniel 
Dannhäuser A place (Tannhausen) 
Danon Danan 
Dantzer Dentzer 
Danyl Daniel 
Daoui David 
Daquin Haquel 
Darmstet, Darmsteter, Darmstetter, Darmstädter A place (Darmstadt, Hesse) 
Dasilva Silva 
Dassaut Bloch 
Daugny Dagny 
David, Davin, Davi, Davy, Davis, Davys, Dovet, Dovetle, 
Daoui,  
Bendaoui, Davidson, Davidoff, Davidoski, 
Davidosky,  
Davidovitch, Davidovici 
From Hebraic (Beloved) 
Davila Dabila 
Davin David 
Davy, Davys David 
Deborah, Zipporah, Chipora, Zipper, Ziber, Ziberlé From Deborah (bee) 
Debré, Debray, Depré A place (Bray) 
Delcampo Campo 
Delgado Sobriquet 
Demuth Sobriquet (Humility) 
Dennery, Denneri, Ennery A place (Ennery) 
Dentzer, Denzer, Dantzer Sobriquet (Dancer) 
Denys Daniel 
Deodatus (God and Nathan) 
Derenbourg, Déren, Déron A place (Derenburg, by Halberstadt) 
Dessau, Dessauer, Dessayer A place (Dessau) 
Deutsch, Deutscher, Deutschmann, Teutsch, Dutch A place (Deutz, Rhineland) 
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Deutz A place (Rhineland) 
Devries, Devriès, Devrièse A place (de Vries) 
Diamant, Diamand, Diament Diamant -Berger A job (Diamant Trader) 
Dian, Djian Daïan 
Diaz, Diez  
Didisheim, Ditisheim, Dietisheim, Ditesheim A place (Deidesheim) 
Diel, Diehl A place (Dielheim) 
Dieu  
Dieudonné From Hebraic (Elchanan) 
Dieu-Lo-Gart, Dieutegard (God bless you) 
Dieu-Lo-Sal, Dieu-Lo-Sault (God saves, you) 
Dieux-Le-Croisse  
Diex-La-Beneie  
Digne A place (Digne) 
Dispecker A place (Diespeck) 
Dos, Dosh  
Dorrine, Dobriner, Dobrinski A place (Dobrin) 
Doderes, Dotteres, Totteres, Dotterles Theodorus 
Dolfus Adolfus 
Donatus Donare (Provided) 
Dorf, Dorfman, Dorfmann, Dorfschneider, 
D-Snajderforf 
Dorfmann 
Dorville, Dorvyl Orville 
Dotteres, Dotterles Doderes 
Douce, Doucette, Dolça, Douzonne, Doulcetta, Delsele Female, from Latin (Sweet) 
Dovet David 
Dreher Trier 
Dreyfus, Dreyfuss, Dreyfous, Dreifuss, Trefousse A place (controversial) 
Drighes Rodrigue 
Ducas, Dukas, Duges, Dockés Sobriquet 
Dupont A place (Closeness) 
Duran, Durand, Durant, Duranton  
Durkheim Terquem 
Durlacher, Durlach, Durlac A place (Durlach) 
Ebstein Epstein 
Edelstein A job (Precious Stones trader) 
Edinger Ettinger 
Ehrlich, Erlich, Erliche, Erlichstein,  
Erlickmann, Erligmann, Erlichmann 
Ehrman, Erman, Ermann 
Eichel, Eichelberger  
Eichenbaum, Ajchenbaum, Eichenstein, Eichen, Eychenne Sobriquet 
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Eichtal A place (Eichtal) 
Eifermann Sobriquet 
Einstein, Hinstin A place (Eisenstein) 
Lilienthal  
Eisen, Eizen, Eizen, Aisen, Aizen, Ajzen, Jsen Eisen 
Mosenthal  
Eisenberg A place 
Eisenbeth  
Eisenmann  
Eisenstadt A place (Burgenland, Hongrie) 
Eisenstarck, Eisenkraft Sobriquet 
Eisenstein, Aisenstein, Aisène A place (Austria) 
Eisik, Aussig Itzig 
Elbaze, Elbase, Albaz, Elbez, Elbeze Sobriquet 
Elchakim Hakim 
Elchanan Alcan 
Eléazar Lazard 
Elfassi Fassi 
Elgozi Algasi 
Eliachim From Hebraic (God over everything) 
Elias, Eliasz, Ellia, Élie, Ellies, Ellio, Elliot, Ellisen, Helias, 
Hélie 
Hély, Helye, Helly, Heliot, Helyot, Eljasiewick 
From Hebraic (Elijah) 
Éliezer From Hébreaic (God is my lord) 
Élizabeth Bessel 
Elk, Elkan Alcan 
Elkoubi Gobbi 
Elle, Ella Eliabeth 
Elliot Elias 
Ellisen Elias 
Elsäss, Elsasser Dalssae 
Emden, Embden A place (Emden) 
Emmendinger Hemmendinger 
Emmanuel Manuel 
Emerich, Emmerich, Emerique, Emmerique A place (Rinheland, Emmerich) 
Engel Angel 
Ennery Dennery 
Epel Apfel 
Ephraim, Efraim From Hebraic  
Ephrussi From Hebraic (Ephrail) 
Epstein, Ebstein, Epsstejn, Epestajin, Spstin Eppstein (Hesse) 
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Erlanger A place (Erlangen, Bavaria) 
Erlich Ehrlich 
Errera Herrera 
Eskenazi Ashkinazi 
Esperanza Sprintz 
Espinosa Spinoza 
Esrikman, Esrikmann, Essrig A job (Lemon peels trader) 
Estelle Female (Star) 
Esther Female, from jschtar 
Estraich, Estraicher A place (Osterreich) 
Etlin Ettlinger 
Étoile, Estell A place (Étoile, Drôme) 
Ettinger, Etinger, Edinger, Oettinger, Ottiner A place (Oettingen) 
Ettlinger, Stlinger, Stling, Ettlin A place (Ettlingen, Dade) 
Eudlitz A place (Eidlitz, Bohème) 
Êve, Hefa, Heffe, Heffelê From Hebraic (Vivant) 
Sychenne Eichenbaum 
Fain Fein 
Fajer Feuer 
Fajg, Fajgen Feig 
Falcon, Falconnet, Falco, Falcoz Josué 
Falk, Falke, Falck, Falq, Falque, Fallek, Falkowicz, Falkins Josué 
Fano, Faneau  
Farhi, Farry Sobriquet (Happy) 
Farro, Fareau, Pharo, Pharos A place (Faro Portugal) 
Fassi, Fassy, Alfassi, Elfassi A place (Fez) 
Fays Feist 
Feder, Federmann, Federbusch A job (Feather trader) 
Feibe, Feibes, Feibel, Feibelmann Phoebus 
Feigel Fajel (purple) 
Feige, Feigen, Fajg, Feigebaum, Feigenbaum, 
 Feigeberg, Feigenberg, Fajgbaum, Fajgberg 
Fig trader 
Fein, Fain Sobriquet 
Feiss, Feissel, Fays, Feist Phoebus 
Feld, Feldblum, Feldman, Feldmann, Feldstein, Feldhaendler A job (Skins trader) 
Felsen Sobriquet 
Fernandez, Fernandès Spanish (sons of Ferdinand) 
Ferrier, Ferria, Ferrer, Ferreira, Ferreyra A job (Black-Smith - Herrero) 
Feuer, Fajer, Feuerstein, Fajersztain, Fajerman A job (Pyrotechnist) 
Feyelê  
Fichesin Fisch 
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Fiehrer Führer 
Fiks Fuchs 
Fingerhut, Fingher, Finger Sobriquet 
Fink, Finkel, Finque, finquel, Finkelhaus, Finkelstein, 
Finkelstèine 
From the house (Finkel) 
Fisch, Fisz, Fischl, Fischel, Fischman, Fischmann, Fischbein, 
Fichebin, Fisselohn, Fizelson 
From the house (Fisch) 
Flaumbaum, Flamenbaum, Flammenbaum A fruit (Plum - Ciruela) 
Flegenheimer, Fleg A place (Flehingen) 
Fleischer, Fleischel, Fleischman, Fleischmann, Flaischaker A job (Butcher) 
Flersheim, Floersheim, Flursheim Flörsheim-sur-le-Main 
Fleurette Flower 
Flexner, Flexer A job (Hemp Trader - Cáñamo) 
Floersheim Florsheim 
Flora, Floria, Flore, Fleurette  
Fogel Vogel 
Fohlen  
Folz Fohlen's contraction 
Fonseca, Fonsèque A place (Fonseca, Spain) 
Forest Forest 
Fortado Fourtado 
Fould, Foult, Fuld Fulda 
Fourtado, Furtado, Fortado (Stolen) 
Fradel Freude 
Frajlich Freilich 
Français, Franzos A origin (France) 
Francfor, Frankforter, Frankfurt, Frankfurter Frankfurt 
Francia, France A origin (France) 
Franck, Frank, Franc, Franklin A origin (Franken) 
Fränckel, Frenkel, Frankel Sobriquet 
Franco Sobriquet  
Frankfurt, Frankfurter Francfort 
Franzos Français 
Fray, Frays, Fraiman Frey 
Freilich, Frajlich Sobriquet 
Freind Freund 
Frênkel Fränckel 
Freud Happiness  
Freude, Freudel, Frade, Fradel, Freida Freude 
Freudenberg, Freudenthal A place (Bade) 
Freund, Freind Sobriquet 
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Frey, Fray, Fraye, Fraiman, Fraiberger Sobriquet 
Fribourg A place (Friburg) 
Fried, Frid, Fryd, Friedmann, Friedemann (Friend, peace) 
Friedländer Friedland (Boheme) 
Friedmann Fried 
Fromental Fromel 
Fromm, Frommel, Froimvitch, Froimovitch Afrom 
Frommet, Frommette, Frometle, Frumet Frohmul (Female) 
Frucht, Fruchtman, Fruchtmann, Fruchet A job (Fruits trader) 
Frumet Frommet 
Fuchs, Fuks,Fouks, Foux, Fux A place (Frankfurt) 
Führer, Fiehrer A job (Fuhrmann, driver) 
Fuld, Fulda Fould 
Fürst, Ferszt, Fersztman Sobriquet 
Gabay, Gabai, gabbai, Jabai A job (tax collecter) 
Gartner, Gartner (Gardener) 
Gans, Ganseman, Ganssemann A house (House over Gans) 
Garcin, Garçon Guerschon 
Gard, Gardé, Gardet  
Garfunkel Karfunkel 
Gartner Gaertner 
Gaspard, Gaspar, Gaspari, Caspari Treasurer 
Gaudiocus Happy 
Gedalge Guedalya 
Geiger A job (Violin Player) 
Geisenberger A place (Geisberg) 
Geismar A place (Hofgeismar, Hesse) 
Geisman, Geissman, Geissmann, Geismann, Geisbock A job (Goat - Trader) 
Gel, Gelb Sobriquet 
Gela, Guela, Kela, Gälle Female Name 
Gelder, Geldern, Van A place (La Gueldre) 
Gens, Gentz, Gins, Gintz, Guns, Guntz, Guins, Guinsburg,  
Guinsburger, Guinsbourg, Guinsbourger, Guinsberg, 
Guinsberger 
A place (Günzburg) 
Gentille, Jente, Jentel Happy 
Cerkowiez, Gerkowicz, Gercowici, Gerschkovitch, Gerko Hirsch 
Gerothwohl Grethwohl 
Gerschberg A place (Herschberg) 
Gerschel Guerchon 
Gerson Guerchon 
Gerst, Guercht A place (Gérst) 
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Gersten-Haber, Gersten-Korn A job (A barley and oats trader) 
Getsch Guestsch 
Ghozlan, Gozland, Goslan, Gozlin A place (Ghozlan) 
Gimsel, Gimpel Gumbrecht 
Gins Gens 
Gittel Gutha 
Glass, Glasser, Glazer, Glashaendler, Glasman, Glaszmann, 
Glaszman, 
Glasberg 
A job (Glasberg) 
Glick Glück 
Glotz Klotz 
Glück, Clücklich, Glückman, Glückmann, Glücksman, 
Glücksmann,  
Glückselig, Gluckstein, Glick, Glicklich, Klick 
Sobriquet (Happy) 
Glückle Happy 
Godechaux Gottschalk 
Goetz, Goetsch Gottschalk 
Gold, Gould, Goldadler, goldberg, Goldenberg, Goldberger, 
Goldenberger, 
 Goldbert, Goldbaum, Goldblatt, Goldblum, 
Goldfarb, Goldfeder, Goldfeil,  
Goldfeld, Goldgrub, Goldhammer, Goldjkorn, 
Goldman, Goldmann,  
Goldmadel, Goldrajch, goldreich, Goldring, 
Goldschild, Goldstein,  
Goldsztein, Goldstern, Goldsticker, Goldstrom 
A place and a house (The house 
Goldadler in Frankfurt) 
Golda, Goldine Female name 
Goldschmidt, Goldschmid, Goldzmid, Goldsmith A job (goldsmith and silversmith) 
Gomartz Gumbretch 
Gomez, Gomès, Gommès, Gomis 
A christian name adopted by 
"Marranes" 
Gompel, Gomberz, Gombertz Gumbrecht 
Gonzales  
Gordon A place (Grodno) 
Gotchaux, Gotscho, Goteschaux, Godechau, Godchau, 
Godchaux,  
Godchot, Godechot, Godechoux, Goutchot, 
Goudchoux, Goudchaux 
Gottschalk 
Gottlieb, Gotlien Gotlis, Gotlibowicz, Gottschalk, Godschalk,  
Gudechal, Gotschal 
Godescale 
Gougenheim Gugenheim 
Gourenvitch, Gurvitch, Gurowicz A place (Horovitz) 
Gozolas  
Grace Female 
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Gradis A place (Gradis, Portugal) 
Gradowhl Grotwohl 
Graetz, Graetzer A place (Graetz, Poznan) 
Granat, Granatszajn  
Grauer, Grauhar, Grauhaar, Grauvogel Sobriquet 
Grauss Gross 
Green Grün 
Greilsamer, Greilsammer A place (Crailsheim) 
Greitzer, Greussay Sobriquet 
Gribinski  
Grin Grün 
Grombach Grumbach 
Gros, Gross, Grauss, Grosser, Groman, Grossman, 
Grossmann, Grosmann 
Sobriquet 
Grotwohl, Grodwohl, Gerotwohl, Gradwohl Sobriquet 
Grumbach, Krumbach, Grombach, Grombac, Gromback, 
Grumbar 
A place (Grumbach) 
Grün, Gryn, Grin, Grünblatt, Grunfass,  
Grunfeder, Grunfeld, Grunglas, Grungras, Grunhut, 
Grunkorn, Grunstein 
Sobriquet 
Grünbaum, Grünebaum, Greenbaum, Grynbaum A house (Grünen) 
Grünberg, Grüneberg, Grinberg, Greenberg, Grynberg, 
Grimbert 
Closeness 
Grünspan, Grynspan, Grinchpoun, Grinspun Sobriquet 
Grünewald, Grünenwald, Grynwald, Grinwald Closeness 
Gryn Grün 
Guastalla A place (Guastalla, Italy 
Guedalya, Gedalge From Hebraic (God is great) 
Guercht Gerst 
Guerchon, Guerson, Gerson, Garçon, Garcin, Gerschen, 
Gerschel, 
Gerstel, Gerst 
Guerson (Foreigner) 
Guetsch, Guedj, Getz, Götz  
Guitel Gutha 
Gumbel, Gumbert Gumbrecht 
Guitelmann Guttel 
Guns Gens 
Gurfinkel Karfinkel 
Gurvitch Gourevitch 
Guth, Gutfeund, Gutharc, Gutherz, Gutsztejn, Gutvurzel, 
Gutzilber 
Sobriquet 
Gutkind " Good Child " 
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Gutleben  
Gutmacher, Goutenmacher, Hutmacher Hutmacher 
Gutman, Gutmann, Guthman, Guthmann, Guttman, Goutman, 
Goutmann, 
Gutmant, Guttermann, Goodman 
The good man 
Gutta, Gutha, Guthel, Güttel, Gittel, Jüttel, Jüttele Female name 
Güttel, Guitel, Guitelman, Guitelmann, Guitelsohn  
Haarbleicher A job (Hemp landerer) 
Haas, Haze, Hazemann, Hasman A house (Hasen) 
Haber, Haberer, Haberberg, Haberbusch, Habergrytz, 
Haberkorn, Haberman,  
Habermann, Habersaat, Habersetzer, Haberstock, 
Averbouch 
A place (Habern) 
Hadamar, Hadamard, Hadamart A place (Hademar) 
Haddad, Hadida Adad 
Hagin Haim 
Haguenau, Haguenauer, Hagenauer A place (Haguenau) 
Hann Haennel 
Haiem, Hayem, Hayim, Haim, Haym, Heim, Heym, Heyem, 
Heyim,  
Heyum, Chajjim, Chaimovitch, Chajnovicz, 
Chaimovicz, Haimovici, Hajmovicz, 
Aiem, Benaim, Benhaim, Hagin, Hemm 
From Hebraic (Halmann) 
Haiman, Hajman, Hayman, Haymann, Haimant, Heyman, 
Heymann, Heuman, 
Heumann, Hyman, Hymans, Hyams, Chajmanovicz 
From Hebraic (Haïm) 
Hakim, Elhakim From Arabic (Doctor) 
Hakin Haquet 
Halbron, Halbronn Heilbronn 
Halévy Article + Lévy 
Half, Halff, Halfen, Halfon, Alphen 
From Hebraic (Chalfon, Money 
Changer) 
Halfon Halff 
Halimbourg A place (Hallenburg) 
Hallé, Halle A place (Hall, in Würtemberg) 
Halpern, Halperin Heilbronn, Heilbronner 
Halphen Halff 
Hambourg, Hamburg, Hamburger A place (Hamburg) 
Hamon, Hammon, Hammond, Hamou, Hamoun From Berber 
Hanau, Hanaut, Hanauer A place (Hanau, Hesse) 
Handelsman, Handelsmann, Handelman A job (Trader) 
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Hanna, Hanne, Hannelé, Henne, Häendel, Hanel, Channelé, 
Hendel, Hendelè,  
Hindel, Hindelè, Hynnée 
From Hebraic (God has mercy) 
Hänel, Hännel, Haendel, Hönnel, Honnel Sobriquet 
Haquet, Hacquin, Haquin, Hakin, Acquin, Acquinet, Dacquin, 
Daquin, D'acquin 
Jsaac 
Harburger, Harbourger A place (Harburg) 
Harrar, Elharar, Harari A job (Needleman) 
Harrous Carrus 
Hart, Harth, Hartman, Hartmann A place (Haardt) 
Hartock, Hartog, Hartogh Herz, Hirsch 
Hartsilber A job (Silver trader) 
Hassid Hebraic (Skins) 
Hatzfeld 
A place (Hatzfeld, in Hungary and 
Rhineland) 
Hauser, Hausser A place (Hausen) 
Hausmann, Huisman A job (Landlor) 
Hayat From Hebraic (Tailor, Sastre) 
Hayem Haiem 
Haymann Haimann 
Hecht A house 
Heckel  Jeckel 
Hecker, Hacker A job (Hacker, Carnicero) 
Hefe, Hfele Ève 
Heilbronn, Heilbronner, Helbronner, Heilbrun, Halbron, 
Halbronn,  
Halperin, Halpern, Alpern, Alperin, Alperine 
A place (Heilbronn) 
Heilmann, Helman, Helmann A job (Healer) 
Hein Halem 
Heimendinger Hmmendinger 
Heine, Heinemann Heinrich 
Helbronn, Helbronner Heilbronn 
Hellias, Heliot Elias 
Heller A place (Schwäsbisch-Hall) 
Helman Heilmann 
Hemendinger, Hemmendinger, Hemerdinger, Hemmendinger, 
Heimendinger,  
Emendinger 
A place (Emmendingen, Bade) 
Hendel, Hendelé Hanna 
Henriquez Enriquez 
From Portuguese - Spanish 
(Henricus) 
Herbst, Herbster Sobriquet 
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Herrera, Herrero, Erera, Errera A place (A town close to Santander) 
Hersch, Hertz, Herzel Hirsch 
Hertzog, Herzog, Hercog Sobriquet 
Hess, Hesse, Hessel A origin (Hesse) 
Heumann Haimann 
Heym, Heyem, Heyim Heyim Haiem 
Heymann Haimann 
Hildenfinger, Hillenfinger, Hillen A place (Hillenfingen, Bavaria) 
Hildesheim, Hildesheimer  A place (Hildesheim, Hannover) 
Hiller Hildesheimer 
Himmler  
Hindel Hanna 
Hinsin Einstein 
Hirsch, Hersch (Insect, and "Staghorn", respectively) 
Hitchcock Itzig 
Hitzig Itzig 
Hoenel Hännel 
Hoffman, Hoffmann, Hofman  
Holländer, Hollender  
Homberg, Homberger, Hombert  A place (Hesse) 
Hongre, Honger, Unger, Oungre, Ungar, Hunger A place (Hungary) 
Horenstein Orenstein 
Horovitz, Horowicz, Horowitz, Horevitz, Horwitz, Hourwitz Gourvitch 
Horvilleur A place (Horveiler) 
Hourwitz Horovitz 
Hunger Hungre 
Hutmacher Gutmacher 
Hyams, Hymans Heiman, Heimann 
Immanuel Manuel 
Isaac, Ishak, Isaksohn, Isacquet From Hebraic (The man who prays) 
Isaï, Isaïa, Isaja, Jische Jessaya 
Israel, Izrael, Izraelski, Israelovitz, Isrul, Srul, Disraeli From Hebraic (The God Fighter) 
Issachar Isser 
Isser, Isserl, Isserlê, Isserlin Issachar 
Itzig, Itiz, Itzicsohn, Izikovitz, Izicovitch, Yitzchok, 
Hitchcock-Hitzg 
Isaac 
Jabai Gabay 
Jachet, Jachette, Jachetle Female 
Jacmin, Jacqmin, Jacques, Jacquet, Jacquart, Jacot, Yaco French ways to say "Jacob" 
Jaffa, Jaffé, Japhet From Hebraic (Beautiful) 
Jahiel Yehiel 
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Jaime, James Jacob 
Jaïs, Jaïch, Yaïche, Jay, Aïche, Benaich, Benaiche,  
Belaich, Belaiche, Belaïs, Belaisch, Belaych 
From Arabic ("Vivant") 
Jalon Chalon 
Jamin Benjamin 
Janhel Jeckel 
Japhet Jaffa 
Jauchel Yohanan 
Javal Javal 
Jeckel, Jekel, Jekelè, Jeckelen, Heckel, Heckelin, Jekef, Jegof, 
Jegoff, 
 Jakev, Jankev, Jaukel, Jankelevitch, Yankel, 
Jankelevitch 
Jacob 
Jehiel Michel 
Jeissel Jessel 
Jenys  
Jessaias, Jeissel, Jessel From Hebraic (God helps you) 
Jische Isaï 
Job From Hebraic (The attack) 
Joce, Jocelin Joseph 
Joie Female 
Jonas, Jauné An animal (The Pigeon) 
Jonathan From Hebraic (God gives you all) 
Jos, Josel, Joselle, Josselin Josepth 
Joseph, Josephson, Josef, Josefson, Josephovitch, Jos, Josse, 
Josel, Joselmann, 
Joselle, Josselin, Joselowitz, Josson, Jocé, Jocet, 
Jocelin 
Josse 
Josué (God helps you) 
Juda, Judas, Tehouda, Judel From Hebraic (A tribute to God) 
Jude, Jud, Judmann, Judenbbeter Sobriquet 
Judel Juda 
Judith Female 
Juif Sobriquet (Jewish) 
Jung, Junger, Yunger Sobriquet 
Justa Female 
Juster Schuster 
Justus Zadok  
Kahn Cahn 
Kaim, Kaym, Keim Haiem 
Kales Caleb 
Kalisch, Kalisz, Kalis Kalisz 
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Kalman, Kallman, Kalmann, Kallmann Calman 
Kamel, Camel, Kamelhor, Kamelhorn, Kamelgarn  
Kann, Kanner  
Kantor Cantor 
Kaplan Kappel 
Karfunkel, Garfunkel, Garfinkel, Gorfinkel, Gourfinkel, 
Gurfinkel,  
Gurfinchel, Gurfinkiel 
A job (Carbuncle's trader) 
Karsenty, Karsenti, Carsenti A place (Calsana) 
Kaspi, Kasby, Casbi, Kespi  
Kasel, Kassel, Cassel, Kassler A place (Kassel) 
Katz, Catz, Katzman, Katzmann, Kaçmann Kohen 
Kaufman, Kauffman, Kaufmann, Kauffmann, Kofman,  
Koffman, Kofmann, Koffmann, Caufment, Coifman, 
Coff 
 
Kayser, Keiser, Keisser Sobriquet 
Keim Haiem 
Kern, Kernbeiser Sobriquet 
Kerschen Kirschen 
Kespi Kespi 
Kessel, Kesselman, Kessler A job (Coppersmith) 
Kestenbaum Closeness 
Kiki Guigue, Guigues 
Kimhi A job (Wheat trader) 
Kirschenbaum, Kerschenbaum, Kerszenbaum, Kerszenblatt (Cherry tree) 
Klaiber Kleber 
Klain, Klainer Klein 
Klajder, Kleidmann A job (Clothes trader) 
Kleber, Kleiber, Klaiber, Clever, Clivert A place (Cleve, Rhineland) 
Kleinbrod Sobriquet 
Klick Glück 
Kling A place 
Klopfer, Klopper, Klopman, Klopfstein  
Klotz, Glotz Sobriquet 
Knoblauch, Knobloch Sobriquet 
Khorr Sobriquet 
Koblentz Coblence 
Koby Cobbi 
Koch A job 
Koffmann  Kauffmann 
Kogan Cohen 
Kohn Cohen 
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Konigswarter, Koenigswarter, Konigswerther, Koenigswerther A place (Königswart) 
Kolonymos From Greek (Beautiful) 
Kopel, Koppel, Köppel, Kaupel, Copel, Coppel, Koppelman,  
Koppelmann, Kopelovitch, Kobinski, Kopeloff, 
Scobeleff, Kappel,  
Kaplan, Chaplan, Koppelin, Koppin, Copin, Coppin, 
Copinet, Coppinet 
Jacob 
Korb A job (Basket maker) 
Korn, Kornman, Kornmann, Kornfeld, Korenfeld, Korenberg, 
Kornblum,  
Kornblit, Kornblitt, Korenblit, Korengold, Kornfein 
A job (Grain trader 
Koschel, Kosel Cousel 
Kosmann, Kossmann Kaufmann 
Krakauer, Kracauer, Kracof, Krakowski, Krakovitch A place (Cracovia) 
Kramer, Cramer, Kraemer, Kremer A job (grocer) 
Kremnitz Cremnitz 
Kreutznach, Creutznach, Creizenach A place (Kreuznach, Rhineland) 
Xugel, Xugelmann, Kugler Sobriquet 
Xullmann, Culmann, Cullmann Kalonymos 
Kupper, Kupperman, Kuper, Kupperberg, Kupperblum, 
Kupperfarb, Cupper,  
Cuper, Cuperman 
A job (Coppersmith) 
Kusel Coussel 
Kutner, Kutter, Kuttler, Kotler A place (Kutno, Poland) 
Lacoste Coste 
Laemmel Lemmel 
Lajeunesse Jonas (French way) 
Lajzer Leisser 
Lallemand Allemand 
Lalou, Laloum, Bellalou, Bellaloum Elisou 
Lambert  
lameira, Lamaire, Lameyre, Mayras (Sea, "La mer") 
Landau, Landeau, Landaud, Landaut, Landault, Landauer Landau (Palatinat) 
Lang, Lange, Langer Sobriquet 
Lantz, Lanzberg, Lanzenberg, Lantzenberg A place (Lantzberg) 
Lapidus Stein 
Lara, Larat A place 
Laredo A place (Laredo) 
Laroque, La Roque, Larok, Roque, Roques, Roche A place (La Roche) 
Lascar, Laskar Sobriquet 
Laser Lazare 
Lasker A place (Lask, Pologne) 
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Lassalle Lassel (French way) 
Lasson Lazarus 
La Tour, Latour A place (La-Tour-du-Pin) 
Lattès, Latte, Lattes A place (Lattès) 
Lauria, Lauriat, Lauriau, Lauriaux Leria 
Lazar, Lazare, Lazarus, Lazarusohn, Lasson, Laser, Lasère, 
Lazareff,  
Lazarevich, Lazarovici, Lazarowitz 
Êléasar (God helps you) 
Léa, Leys, Leyele, Leyen, Lehê Female 
Ledel Lelb 
Lebovitz, Lebovich Lelb 
Leder, Lederman, Ledermann, Lederer A job (Leathersmith) 
Lehmann, Leiman, Leimann, Leymann, Leyma, Leime, 
Leimet, Laime, Laimet,  
Lêment, Lemoine 
Lehnsmann 
Lehr, Lehren 
A place (Lehrensteinsfeld, 
Würtemberg) 
Leib, Leif, Leb, Leibel, Lebel, Loebel, Lowel, Level, Liblin, 
Lebelson, Leibelson, 
Leibovici, Leibovitch, Lajbowicz, Lebovitz, 
Lebovitz, Lebovici, Lewkowitz 
Loeb 
Leibel, Leibelson, Leibovici Leib 
Leif Leib 
Leime, Leimet Lehmann 
Lemmel, Laemmel, Lemel, Lemelle, Laemlè, Laemblè Leime 
Lêment Lehmann 
Lemoine Lehmann 
Leiser Leser 
Lêo, Lêon, Lion, Lyon, Lionel Yehuda 
Léopold People 
Lerner A job (Lehrer) 
Léry Levy 
Leser, Lesser, Lezer, Leiser, Leizer, Leyser, Leiserovitch, 
Leizervici, Leserowitch, Lajzerowicz, Lüser, Loser 
Lieber 
Leval Lévy 
Level Leih, Leihel 
Leven Lévy 
Levi, Levilier Lévy 
Levin, Levine, Lewin, Lewine, Levinson, Levinsohn, 
Levinsky, Liévin 
A place (Lewin) 
Levit, Levitte, Levitan, Levitanus Lévy 
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Lévy, Lévi, Lehwi, Lewi, Lewy, Lejwi, Loewi, Loewy, Lövy, 
Lovy, Lewindoff,  
Levit, Levitte, Levitan, Levitanus 
Halévy, Leven, Levin 
Levylier Levy 
Lew, Lewy Lévy 
Lewin, Lewine Levin 
Leye, Leyele Léa 
Leyma Lehmann 
Leyser Leser 
Lhéry Lévy 
Liblin Leib 
Licht Sobriquet 
Lichtenstein, Lichtenber A place (Lichtenstein) 
Lieber, Liber, Liewer, Liberman, Libermann, Lieberman, 
Liebermann,  
Liepmann, Lipman, Lipmann, Lippmann, Lip, 
Lipmanowicz, Lipkind 
Éliezer 
Lievin Levin 
Liévre Haas 
Lifschitz Liebschütz 
Lilienbaum, Lilienstein, Lilienthal, Lilienfeld Lilic 
Limburg, Limbourg, Limbour A place (Limbourg) 
lindo, Lindos Sobriquet 
Lion Léo, Léon 
Lip Lieber 
Lipkind Lieber 
Lipmann, Lippmann Lieber 
Lisbonne A place (Lisbon) 
Litwak, Litvak, Litvack A place (Lithuania) 
Lobel From Spanish, animal (Lobo, Wolf) 
Loeb, Loew, Loewe, Loewenshon Yehuda 
Loebel Leib 
Loewe Loeb 
Loewel Leib 
Loewenberg, Leuvenberg, Loewenstein, Loewenthal, Levantal A place (Silesia) 
Lombard A place (Lombardie) 
Lombroso, Lumbroso Ury 
Longini  
Lopès, Lopez, Lop, Louppe, Louppes, Loup, Lupus From Spanish (Wolf) 
Lorach, Lorrach, Loerach A place (Lörrach, Bade) 
Lorch, Lorsch, Lorich, Loric A place (Lorach) 
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Loria, Loriat, Lauria, Laurit, Laurau, Lauriaux, Lorot, Lorrot, 
Lourie,  
Lurie, Aloro 
Laurier  
Loser Lazar 
Louppes Lopès 
Lovy Lèvy 
Lowe Loeb 
Löwel Leib 
Lublin, Lubliner, Lublinski, Lublinsky, Lulinski A place (Lublin) 
Lunel A place (Lunel) 
Lupus Lopès 
Luzato, Luzzato, Luzzotto A place (Launitz) 
Lyon Léo, Léon 
Lyon-Caen Lyon Cohen 
Maaleteste Testemale 
Maas, Mas, Mass, Mass, Meis, Meiss, Meissel, Maiseles, 
Maisel 
Meise 
Machole, Macholen, Mayol  
Macip Mannip 
Madel, Madelée Female 
Mai May 
Maier Meyer 
Maimon, Meimoun, Meimouni, Mimoun, Mimoune, Mimouni From Arabic (Happy) 
Malka, Malké Queen 
Maler, Maller, Molh From Hebraic, Mohel 
Mammona Female 
Manaine Mannahaim 
Manassé, Manassévitch, Ménassè, Menessier, Manessier From hebraic (God does not forget) 
Mandel Menachem, Mendel 
Mandelbaum, Mandelbrojt, Mandellejb, Mandelman, 
Mandelstam 
Mandelbaum 
Manès, Manhès, Manesse Mannassé 
Manessier Manassé 
Mann, Manus, Mannus, Mannie, Manny, Mannis, Manin, 
Menelinus, Menlen, 
 Menelin, Mennel, Ménnel, Mennelet, Maennle, 
Mannekint, Menke 
Manuel 
Manheim, Mannheim, Manheimer, Mannheimer, Manem, 
Mannem, Manaine 
A place (Mannheim) 
Mantout, Mantoux, Mantous, Montout, Montoux A place (Mantua) 
Manuel, Emmanuel From Hebraic (God is with us) 
Marc Marcus 
Marchand Kaufmann 
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Marcus, Marc, Marx, Marks, Marix, Marcussen, Marcusohn,  
Markovici, Markovics, Marcovitch, Markowits 
From Latin (Marcus) 
Marie, Mariem, Miriam, Marianne, Mährel, Merelle, Merlè From Hebraic (Stubborn) 
Marix, Marks Marcus 
Marmor, Marmel, Marmelstein A job (Marble trader) 
Marona Matrona 
Marx Marcus 
Massip, Mascip, Macip Mancip 
Matathia, Matathias, Matatia, Mathias, Matiê (Mathieu) Sobriquet 
Mathias, Mathieu Malathia 
Matrona, Marona From Latin (Matrona) 
Mauleteste Testemale 
Maurel Morel 
Mausché Moïse 
Maus Mausche 
May, Maye, Mai, Mey A place (Mayen) 
Mayer Meyer 
Mayol Machole 
Mayrargue, Mayrargues Meyrargues 
Mayras Lamaira 
Medina, Medine  
Meir, Meier Meyer 
Meis, Meiss, Meisel, Meiseles Maas 
Melamed, Melamet, Melaméde From Hebraic (Professor) 
Mélanie, Melle Female name 
Menahem, Menachem, Menahé From Hebraic (Comforting) 
Mendel, Mendels, Mendelsohn, Mendelsohn, Medelson, 
Mendelevitch, Mendlcwicz,  
Mendelovici 
Menachem, Manuel 
Mendès, Mendez, Mendès-France, Mendès da Costa  
Menessier Mannadé 
Mennel, Mennelet Mann 
Menz, Minz, Mintz A place (Mains) 
Merelle, Merlé Mario 
Merzbach A place (Merzbach, Rhineland) 
Mestre Meyer 
Metz A place (Metz) 
Metzger, Mezger A job (Butcher) 
Meunier Müller 
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Meyer, Meier, Meir, Mayer, Maier, Meyère, Mayeur, Myers, 
Meyersohn, Meyerovitz,  
Meyerovitch, Meyrovitch, Meyerbeer 
From Hebraic (enlightened) 
Meyrargue, Meyrargues, Mayrargue, Mayrargues A place (Meyrargues) 
Michel, Michelin Yehiel (The one who is like God) 
Miel, Mielet Muol 
Mil Mühl 
Milhau, Milhaud, Millaud, Milliau, Milliaud A place (Milhaud) 
Mimoun, Mimoune Maimon 
Mindel, Mindelé Minna 
Minna, Minette, Mindel, Mindelé, Mundel, Mundelé, 
Muncklé, Munchen 
From German (minne, love) 
Minz, Mintz Munz 
Miriam Marie 
Misrachi, Misrahi, Misraki, Mizrachi From Hebraic (eastern) 
Mock Moog 
Model Mordechai 
Modiano, Modigliani A place (Modigliano) 
Moische Moïse 
Moise, Mossé, Moses, Mausche Mölsh (The rescued, The saved) 
Molh Maller 
Molina, Moline, Molines, Molline A place (Molina, Spain) 
Montaux, Manteauc A place (Montalte) 
Montefiore A place (Ascoli end Foril) 
Monteux, Monteil, Montel, Montels A place (Monteux) 
Montout (Mantour) 
Moog, Mock, Moock Sobriquet 
Mordché, Mordechay, Mordohay Mardochée 
Moreau, Moreaux Sobriquet 
Morel, Morelle, Maurel Sobriquet 
Moreno, Marena Hebraic (Moreno, Professor) 
Morgen, Morgenstein, Morgenstern, Morgensztern, 
Morgenthau 
Sobriquet 
Morhange, Morange, Moranges A place (Morhange) 
Mortgé Marchohée 
Mortié, Mortier Mardochée 
Mosbach, Mosbacher A place (Mosbach) 
Moscovici Moïse 
Moser Moïrse 
Moses Moïse 
Mosley, Moslez Moses, Mausche 
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Mossé, Mosson Moïse 
Mouchnino, Mechnidou, Almosnino From Arabian (Orator) 
Moussa, Moussé Moïse 
Moyse Moïse 
Muel, Muelle, Miel, Mielet, Melle, Meles, Melése Samuel 
Mühl, Mil, Mülhberg, Mühlrad, Mülstein, Milstein, Milstajn, 
Milsztehn, Milchten 
Sobriquet 
Naigelblat Sobriquet 
Naj, Nay Neu 
Nakache, Nacache, Naccache, Nacasse From Arabic (Sculptor) 
Namia, Namias Nahmias 
Naquet, Bonaquet Bonac, Bonnac Young 
Narboni, Narbonne A place (Narbonne) 
Nass, Nasse A place (Nassau) 
Nassi, Nazi King, Prince 
Nathan, Natan, Natanson, Nathé, Nausen  
Nedjar, Nedjare Nadjar 
Neher, Neder, Naeder A job (Tailor) 
Nei Neu 
Nennel, Nennele, Naennel, Nentel, Naendel Female name (Nanette) 
Nephtalie, Nephtali, Nephtalis Jacob 
Nerson, Nersum A place (Neresheim) 
Netter A place (Nidda) 
Neubourg, Neuburg, Neuburger, Najburg A place (Neuburg) 
Neuman, Neumann, Najman, Nayman, Neiman, Nejman, 
Neyman, Neymann, Newman,  
Neumanovitch 
Sobriquet 
Neumark, Neymark, Newmarck A place (Neuenmark) 
Ney Neu 
Nimes, Nismes A place (Nismes) 
Nisard, Nizard Nadjar 
Noé From Hebraic (The calm) 
Nogeira, Noguera, Noguères A place (Nogueira, and Nogueras) 
Nohum Nahmias 
Monez, Monnez, Nunès, Nunez  
Nordman, Nordmann, Nordeman, Norman, Nordmand, 
Northman, Northmann 
A place (The "North") 
Nordon A place (Norden) 
Normand Nordmann 
Noudel Nudel 
Nudelman, Nudelmann, Noudelman, Noudelmann, 
Nudelmont, Noudel, Noudell, Nudelfaden 
Sobriquet 
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Nussbaum, Nussbaumer, Nussembaum A house 
Obadia, Ovadia, Ovadija, Abadia 
From Hebraic (That one who 
respects God) 
Oberndoerfer, Oberndorff A place (Oberndorf) 
Ochs, Ochsé, Oks  
Oer Auerbacher 
Oesterreich, Oesterreicher, Estraich, Estrajch, Estraicher A country (Austria) 
Oettinger Ettinger 
Offenbach A place (Offenbach) 
Olivera, Oliveira, Oliveras, Oliveiras  
Ollendorf A place (Allendorf) 
Olry Ury 
Opler A place (Oppeln) 
Oppenheim, Oppenheimer, Openchaim A place (Oppenheim) 
Orbec, Orbeck A place (Orbec) 
Orenstein, Orenstain, Orenstenne, Orensztajn, Orensztejn, 
Ornstein, Orinstein 
 
Orval Coldstein 
Orstel Pessah 
Ottinger Edinger 
Oudalid, Benoualid, Benoilid From Arabic (Child) 
Oulf, Oulif, Ulf, Ulff A place (Ulfa) 
Oulman, Oulmann Ulmann, Ulmer 
Oungre Hongre 
Oury Ury 
Ovadia Obadia 
Paquin Pessah 
Paragorus, Perigors From Hebraic (Comforting) 
Passo, Passot, Patto Sobriquet 
Paul Saint-Paul 
Paz, Pas From Spanish (Peace) 
Péixoto Sobriquet 
Pejsachowicz Pessah 
Pereire, Peraire, Pereyre, Pereira, Perèra, Pereyra From Portuguese (Pereira) 
Pérez, Péres, Peretz, Peret Perels 
Perigors Paragorus 
Perl, Perlberg, Perlman, Perlmann, Perlmut, Perlemut, 
Perlemutt, Perlemutter, Perelstein 
A job (Pearl Trader) 
Perpignan A place  
Pfeffer, Pfefferkorn  
Phoebus, Feibel, Feibelmann From Hebraic (Fire) 
Picard Bickert 
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Pimentel A job (Pepper Trader) 
Pinel Sobriquet 
Pinhas, Pinkas, Pinkus, Pinkelsohn From Hebraic (Blessed) 
Pinkel, Pinkus Pinhas 
Pinto A place (Pinto, Spain) 
Pioso  
Piquart, Piquert Bickert 
Ploque Bloch 
Polacsek Polish 
Poliakof, Poliakoff, Pollonais, Polonovsky Politz 
Pomerants, Pomeranz, Pomérance, Poméranc  
Pompet  
Poncin (Bridge) 
Pontrémoli A place (in Italy) 
Portal A place (Portal) 
Posner, Pozner, Poznan, Poznanski A place (Poznan) 
Poulain Fohlen 
Poznan, Poznanski Fosner 
Prague, Prager, Prazger, Preigher A place (Prague) 
Précieuse Female name 
Priscus From Latin (Old) 
Provençal, Provensal A place (Provence) 
Puget Dalpuget 
Rabe Rabbin 
Rabinovitch, Rabinowicz, Rabinovici A job 
Rachel, Rächel, Rechel, Reichel, Reichle, Recha From Hebraic (Sheep) 
Rachi (Rabbin Eagle) 
Rafael, Raffel, Rafalowicz Raphaël 
Raich, Rajch Reich 
Rais, Rajs Reis 
Raphaël, Rafaël, Raffel, Rafalowicz, Rafalovich From Hebraic (God heals you) 
Rapp  
Rapaport, Rappaport, Rappoport Rabbin 
Ratisbonne A place (Ratisbonne) 
Ravel A place (Ravello)  
Raynal, Rainal  
Reb, Rebhun, Rebhuhn, Reblaub, Rebstock Rebstock 
Rebecca, Riffga, Rifke, Rifkelé, Richza From Hebraic (Ribká) 
Rees Reiss 
Regine Reine 
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Reh Sobriquet 
Reich, Reicher, Raich, Raichbart, Rajchbart, Reichman, 
Raichman, Rajchman, Rajchnoudel 
Sobriquet 
Reichel Rachel 
Reichshoffer A place (Reichshoffen) 
Reims, Rheims, Rheins, Reyns, Reins A place (Rehns) 
Reinach A place (Reinach) 
Reinau A place (Rheinau) 
Reine, Regine Malka 
Reis, Reiss, Rais, Rajs, Rajz, Rees, Reuss A place (Rees, Rhineland) 
Rifke, riffke Rebecca 
Risler, Rissler Ries 
Robin Ruben 
Robles A place (Robles, Spain) 
Rodenbourg Rotenburg 
Rodrigue, Rodrigues, Rodriguez, Drighes From Spanish (Rodriguez) 
Roffe, Rofé, Roffi, Roffo, Rouff, Rueff, Ruff, Ruffé, Rouff, 
Rouffé 
From Hebraic (Doctor) 
Roget Rouget 
Roit Roth 
Romilly A place (Romilly) 
Roos Ros 
Roque Laroque 
Roquemartine A place  
Ros, Rose, Roos, Rozé, Rozén, Rosen, Rosin, roser From Hebraic (Prince) 
Rose, Reiss, Reuss, Rais, Reissel, Resele, Röslen, Rosed, 
Rosine 
Female name 
Rosen, Roszen, Rozen, Rosem, Rosenblat, Rosenblatt, 
Rosenfarb, Rosengart, Rosengeck… 
Rosen + SOMETHING 
 
Rosenbaum, Rosembaum, Rozembaum, Rosier, rozier  
Rosenberg, Rozemberg, Rosambert, Roisembert A place (Rosenberg) 
Rosenfeld A place  
Rosenstein, Rosenstain, Rozenstajn  
Rosenstiel, Rosenstiehl  
Rosenstock  
Rosenwald  
Rosenzweig, Rosencwajcg, Rozencwaig, Rozencweig  
Roser Ros 
Rosier Rosenbaum 
Rot, Roth, Rotbart, Rothbart, Rotberg, Rotblit, Roitman, 
Roitmann, Rotstein, Rothstein 
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Rotenberg, Rottemberg A place (Rodenberg) 
Rotenburg, Rothenbourg, Rottembourg, Rodenbourg A place (Rotenburg) 
Rothschild, Rotszyld  
Rouben Ruben 
Rouff, Rouffé Roffe 
Rouget, Roget Sobriquet 
Rousseau Sobriquet 
Rozen Rosen 
Rozier Rosenbaum 
Ruben, Rouben, robin  
Rubin, Rubinovic, Rubinowicz, Roubinovitch, Rubinski, 
Rubinsohn, Rubinrot,  
Rubinstein, Rubinstejn, Rubinstajn, Rubinsten 
 
Ruff, Rueff, Rueffé, Ruffé Roffe 
Russ Riess 
Sabbat, Sabbath, Sabba, Sabbah, Sabetai, Sabetay  
Sacerdote, Sacerdoti From Italian (Priest) 
Sachs, Sax, Saks, Sack, Sackh, Szac, Zak, Seckel, Sekl Isaac 
Sack Sachs 
Sacsic, Sacksick, Sacksic, Sacsick Sicsic 
Sacträger, Zaktreger  
Sadic, Sadique Zadoc 
Safir, Safirstein Sapir 
Saïman, Seiman  
Saint-Paul A Place (Pyrenees) 
Saladin A place (Soldin) 
Salazar, Salazard A place (Salazar) 
Salon A place (Bouches du Rhone) 
Salvador, Salvator (Savior) 
Salvet, Salves (Rescued) 
Salzedo, Salsedo A place (Salcedo) 
Samson, Sampson, Sanson, Samsonoff, Samsonovicz From Hebraic (The sun) 
Sander Alexandre 
Sandoz  
Sannel, Sanvel Samuel 
Sanson Samson 
Sapaudus From Savoy 
Sapir, Sapira, Schapira, Chapira, Chapiro, Schapiro, Safir, 
Safirstein 
Slavic form of (Spire) 
Saporta Sasporta 
Sara, Saarlé, Serlé, Zerlé, Sorlé, Soerette From Hebraic (princess) 
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Sarbib Zerbib 
Sarcil Schwartzschild 
Sarfati Serfati 
Sartor, Sartori Teilleur 
Sasporta, Sasportas, Sasportès, Saporta From Catala (The doors) 
Saum Saum 
Sauphar Soffer 
Savel Samuel 
Sax Sachs 
Saya, Sayac, Sayag, Sayagh, Assayas A job (Jeweller) 
Sazias Sobriquet 
Scebat Chebat 
Schachmann, Schachenmann, Schachnes  
Schapiro Sapir 
Schechter, Schachter, Schochet, Szojchert Butcher 
Scheid A place (Schaidt) 
Scheie, Scheien, Chayé, Scheyé, Scheyen, Chailly Jesaja 
Scheier Scheuer 
Schein Schoen 
Scheinel, Scheindel Schoene 
Schelli Schilli 
Scheps, Schepsel Schoeps 
Scherechewsky, Cherry From Hebraic (Scherek) 
Scheuer, Scheier, Scheyer, Scheir, Szejer  
Scheye, Scheyen Schelé 
Schick Sobriquet 
Schielè, Schillé, Schill, Schiller, Szyler, Ziller, Schilovitz, 
Szylowicz 
Saül 
Schiff, Schiffmann, Szyf, Chif Schiff 
Schill, Schiller Schiélé 
Schilli, Shili, Schelli From Arabian (Left-Handed) 
Schimme, Schimmel, Schimche, Schimkovitz, Schimenovitz Simon 
Schlachter, Schliachter, Schlechter Job (Butcher) 
Schlamka, Schlamme Salomon 
Schlesinger, Schlissinger, Schloessinger Schlesien 
Schliachter Schlachter 
Schlomme Salomon 
Schloss  
Schmidt, Smyd A job (blacksmith) 
Schmoli, Schmul Samuel 
Schmoukler, Szmuckler A job (jewellier) 
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Schneeberg, Schneeberger  
Schneer, Schneerson, Schneersohn The old 
Schneider, Schneyder, Schnaider, Schnejder, Snajeder, 
Sznajder, sznajderman 
A job (Tailor) 
Schnerb, Schnerf Gentleman 
Schochet Schechter 
Schoene, Schoenel, Scheinel, Scheindel Female name 
Schoeps, Scheps, Szeps Sobriquet 
Scholen Salomn 
Schpiegel Spiegel 
Schrameck A place 
Schreiber A job (Scribe) 
Schtitser Stutzer 
Schuhl, Schuhler, Schulman, Schulmann, Szulman, Schulhof, 
Schulkloper, Schulsinger 
 
Schuster, Souster, Juster, Schuchmacher, Schusterman, 
Schustermann, Schuman Schumann 
A job (Shoe maker) 
Schwab, Schwob A place (Schwaben) 
Schwarz, Schwartzs, Szwarc, Szwartz, Schwarz, Swarc -
BART -BORT -FUCHS - KOPF, -MAN 
-BERG -FELD -STEIN 
Sobriquet 
Schwarzschild  
Schweich, Schweig A place (Rhineland) 
Schweizer Switzerland 
Schwimmer Sobriquet 
Schwob Schwab 
Sciama  
Sebi Zivy 
Sécal A place 
Seckel, Sechs  
Sédecias A king 
See Zay 
Seelig Seligmann 
Ségal, Segalovitz Sigle 
Seligmann, Seéligmann, Seiligmann, Seelig, Seligsohn, 
Zelikson, Zeliqzon 
 
Sender Salexandre 
Seneor Sehner 
Senet, Sennet  
Senior Schner 
Serf Cerf 
Serfati, Sefatiy, Sarfati, Sarfatiy, Safati, Zarfati, Salphati From Hebraic (Français) 
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Seror, Aror  
Serano, Serrano Sobriquet (Montagnard) 
Sichel Sichel 
Sicsic, Sicksick, Sicksic, Sicsick, Sikçik, Saksik, Sicsu Ksiksu 
Siessel Süss 
Sigeric  
Silber, Silver, Zilber, Sylber,  A job (Jeweller) 
Silva, Dasilva A place (From the forest) 
Silver Silber 
Silveira, Silveyra, Silvera, Silvère A place (Portugal) 
Simha, Benzimra Happy 
simson From Hebraic (The sun) 
Singer, Singermann, Vorsinger, Schulsinger A job (Singer) 
Sintzheim, Sintz, Sins A place (Sinzheim) 
Siskind, Siman, Sisman, Sismann, Siman, Simann A place (Sinzheim) 
Siss, Sissel Susse 
Slamka Salomon 
Smadja  
Smyd Schmidt 
Soares Suarez 
Soffer, Sofer, Sauphar, Sofaer, Sojfer, Soifer A job (Scriba) 
Sola A place (Spain) 
Solal, Choulal, Cohen-Solal, Lévy-Solal Sobriquet 
Solar, Sollar, Solars, Solarz A place 
Solinski  
Soltan Sultan 
Sommer, Somer, Sommaire, Zoumerfeld (Door-to-Door trader) 
Sonet, Sonnet  
Sonnen, Sonnenberg, Sonnenman, Sonnenschein  
Sorel Sara 
Soria, Soriano A place (Soria) 
Sorlé Sara 
Sotto, Soto  
Sousmann Süss 
Souster Schuster 
Souza A place (Souza) 
Spaier, Speier, Speyer, Spira Spira 
Spiegel, Spighel, Schpigel, Spigelman, Spigelmann, 
Szpigelman 
A job 
Spinosa, Spinosi, Espinosa, Espinose A place (Espinosa) 
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Spira, Spir, Spire, Spirc, Szpirc, Szpirg, Szpira, Speir, Spaier, 
Spajer 
Sapjr 
Spitz, Spitzer, Spizberg, Szpicberg, Szpijzazjen Sobriquet 
Springer Sobriquet 
Sprintz, Sprinza, Sprintzel, Spranza Female name 
Srul Israël 
Stain, Stayn Stein 
Stam, Stamm, Stammvater, Sztamfater Sobriquet 
Stark, Stack, Sztark, Sztarckier, Starkmann Sobriquet 
Steg, Steeg, Stegmann  
Stein, Stain, Stayn, Sztein, Sztejn, Ztejn, Sztajn, Sztayn, Tain, 
Sten, Stène, Stenne, Steinner,  
Szteyner, Stein 
A  job (tailor) 
Stern, Sztern, Sternberg, Sternfeld, Sternheim  
Stiebel, Stieffel, Stüffel  
Stora A place (Astora) 
Storck, Storch Sobriquet 
Brolemann  
Kleimann  
Strassburger Strasbourg 
Strauss, Straus Strauss (Austria) 
Strouch, Struk Astruc 
Stüffel Stiebel 
Stutzer, Stycer, Schtitser Sobriquet 
Suarez, Suarès, Soarès A place (Close to Oviedo) 
Sultan, Sultani, Soltan  
Sultzer, Sulzer, Soultzener A place (Soultz) 
Süsse, Süsel, Sizel, Siesel  
Süsskind, Süssmann Süse 
Sutor, Suttor  
Symilon, Symillon  
Szac Sachs 
Szajn, Szejn Schoen 
Szlam Schlam 
Szmul Samuel 
Sznajder Schneider 
Szpiegel Spiegel 
Szpiz Spitz 
Sztajn, Szteyn, Szteyner Stein 
Stam Stam 
Sztycer Stutzer 
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Szwarc Schwarz 
Szwarc Schwarz 
Szyf Schiff 
Szyk Schick 
Taib, Taieb, Tibi From Arabian 
Tain Stein 
Tannenbaum Tennenbaum 
Taub, Taube, Taubman  
Taube, Taubel, Däubele  
Teboul Bouteboul 
Tedesco, Tedechi German 
Tenenbaum, Tennenbaum, Tannenbaum  
Terquem, Turckheim, Durkheim A place (Türkheim) 
Testemale, Mauleteste Sobriquet 
Teutsch Deutsch 
Thalheimer, Thalmann A place 
Thaumann, Thau, Theumann Sobriquet 
Theumann Thaumann 
Thorez Torres 
Tibi, Taïb  
Tischler, Tisler, Tyszler  
Tobaillem, Tobelem From Hebraic (A good young man) 
Tobi, Tobie, Toby, Touby, Tobias From Hebraic (Taib) 
Todros, Todrosse Théodor, Théodor 
Toledano, De toledo, Tolède A place (Toledo) 
Tordjman, Tordjmann, Tordjeman, Turjman, Troujman From Arabian (Translator) 
Torrès, Thorez A place (Torres) 
Trautmann, Trauttmann A job 
Tréfous Dreyfus 
Treine, Treindel, Trendel, Trändel Female name 
Trenel, Trenelle A place (Tragny) 
Trèves, Treyve A place (Trèves) 
Trèvoux Trabot A place  
Trier, Dreher A place (Trèves) 
Troujman, Turjeman  
Turckheim Terquem 
Turique  
Uhry Ury 
Ulf, Ulff oulf 
Ulmann, Ullman, Ullmann, Oulman, Oulmann, Ulmer, Ulver, 
Ulmo, Ullmo 
A place (Ulm) 
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Ungar, Unger A place (Hungary) 
Uri, Ury, Uhry, Oury, Olry  
Vaichleider Sobriquet 
Vain Wein 
Valabrègue A place (Valabrègue) 
Valensi, Valensy, Valynci, Balensi, Balensy A place (Valencia) 
Valentin A saint 
Valéry Valerius 
Velesthein Wallerstein 
Varchavsky Warschawer 
Veil, Veille Weil 
Vein Wein 
Vel, Veller, Weil, Weiler  
Velche Welsch 
Ventura, Venture, Venturi Bonaventura 
Vial Vidal 
Vidal, Vital, Widal, Vidalet, Vidalin, Vial, Viel From latin (Vivas) 
Viera A place (Vieira) 
Viel Vidal 
Vignetus  
Villar, Villard Willard 
Vital Vidal 
Viterbo A place (Viterbo) 
Vivant, Viant Vivant 
Vivas, Bibas, Bibes From Latin (Vivaz) 
Vive, Vives, Vivelin Vivant 
Vivier, Viviès A place (Viviers-sur-Rhone) 
Vogel, Vogelin, Vögelê, Feyelê A female name 
Volterra A place (Volterra) 
Vormus, Vormèse Worms 
Vorsinger Singer 
Waag, Wague, Woog, Wogue Waage 
Wachenheim, Wagenheim A place (Wachenheim) 
Wachs, Wachsman, Wachsmann, Waks, Waks, Waksman, 
Waksmann, Wachsberg 
A job (Candle maker) 
Wagenheim Wachenheim 
Wahl, Wohl, Walch, Welsch, Velche  
Wail Weil 
Wain, Wajn, Waitz Weiss 
Waks Wachs 
Walch, Wahl  
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Wald, Walhorn, Waldteufel  
Wallach, Walach, Wallich  
Wallerstein, Valesthein A place (Wallerstein , Bavaria) 
Wallich Wallach 
Walther, Walter, Walder Wallan 
Warschawer, Warschawski, Waszavski, Warszawski, 
Varchavsky 
A place (Varsovia) 
Wechsler, Weksler, Wexler, Vecsler, Wixler A job 
Weil, Weill, Weyl, Wail, Waill, Waille, Veil, Veill, Vel, Velle, Weil-Hallè, Veil-Picard, Vel-Durand 
Weiler, Weiller, Wyler, Veller, Viller, Wiler, Wihler, Wihl A place (Weil) 
Wein, Wain, Wajn, Wayn, Vain, Vayne, Vein, Wins…  -
APEL, -BACH, -BAUM, -BERG, -BERGER,  
-BLAT, -BRENNER, -FELD, -FLASZ, -GART, -
BRENNER, -FELD, -FLASZ, -GART, -GOTT, -
MAN, -MANN, 
-ROB, -RIB, -RYB, -SCHENKER, -STAIN, -
STOCK, -SZTOCK, -TRAUB, -TROB, -TROJB, -
TRUB 
A job (Distiller) 
Weis, Weiss, Wais, Waiss… -BECKER, -BEIN, -BERG, -
BERGER, -BLATT, -BLUM, -BORT, -BRODT, -
FELD,  
-FISZ, -FOGEL, -HOF, -KOPF, -MAN, -MANN 
 
Weissenburger A place (Wissembourg) 
Weissweiler, Weisweiller A place (Weisweil) 
Weisz, Weitz Weiss 
Welhoff, Wellhoff  
Welsch Wahl 
Wertenschlag  
Werth A place (Woerth) 
Wertheim, Wertheimer A place (Wertheim) 
Weyl, Weyler Weil, Weiler 
Wiener A place (Wien) 
Wihl, Wihler, Wiler Weiler 
Willard, Villard, Willar Weiler 
Wimpf, Wimpff, Wimpffen, Wimphen Wimpfen 
Wins Wein 
Winter, Wintergerst, Winternetz Sobriquet 
Wisner A place (Wiesen) 
Wittenberg, Wittemberg A place Wittenberh 
Wittersheim A place(Wittersheim) 
Wixler Wechsler 
Wogue Wang 
Wohl Wahl 
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Wolf, Wolff, Wolfl, Wolfmann, Wolfsohn, Wolfowicz  
Woog Waag 
Worms, Worms, Wormser, Vormser, Wurms, Wurmser A place (Worms) 
Yahiel Yahiel 
Yahya, Yahia  
Yaïch Jaïs 
Yaqar Jacob 
Yarhi  
Yehiel, Yahiel, Jahiel  
Yehuda Juda 
Yekouthiel Kaufmann 
Yohanan, Jochenen, Jauchel God is Great 
Yomtob, Yomtov From Hebraic (Good day) 
Zacharie, Zachary From Hebraic (Zekariah) 
Zadoc, Zadok, Sadok From Hebraic (The fair) 
Zahler, Zaleman A job 
Zakh Sachs 
Zalkind, Salkind  
Zaqui A place (Zaouia) 
Zarfati Serfati 
Zay, Say, Saye, Sée  
Zébaume, Zweigbaum  
Zeliqson Seelig 
Serbib, Serbib, Sarbib (Little) 
Serlé Sara 
Zevy Zivy 
Ziller Schielé 
Simmer A job 
Zinnober, Cynober Sobriquet 
Zipper, Zippora Deborah 
Zis Süss 
Zitrone Citroën 
Zivy, Zivi, Zevi, Sebi, Sebie  
Zousmann Süssmann 
Sucker, Suckermann, Zoukermann, Zuckerkandel, Cukierkorn A job (Sugar trader) 
Zunz A place 
Zweibaum, Zweigbaum Zébaume 
Zygmunt Sigismund 
Zys Süs 
Waldman  
 
